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John Lawrence Protevi
Loyola University of Chicago
THE ECONOMY OF TIME:
HEIDEGGER AND DERRIDA ON
ARISTOTLE, TIME AND METAPHYSICS

This dissertation explores the main texts of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida on the relation
of the so-called "straight-line" theory of time to the so-called "metaphysical tradition." In Being
and Time Heidegger states that a determination of Being as presence characterizes metaphysics
and that such a determination of Being can be found in Aristotle's theory of time.

Derrida

examines how such a characterization of metaphysics affects Heidegger's project.
Chapter I explores in detail how Derrida's essay "Ousia and Gramme" posits a "formal
rule" that implies the "haunting" of time by space in any discourse that attempts to ground
spatiality in temporality.

Chapter II shows how the disseminative economy of Sinn in the

Seinsfrage in Being and Time installs an irreducible spatiality in Heidegger's description of
temporality, precisely as Derrida's "formal rule" had predicted.

Chapter Ill concludes the

dissertation by showing how Heidegger's extended treatment of Aristotle in The Basic Problems
of Phenomenology also conforms to Derrida's "formal rule.•

INTRODUCTION
Space and time have always been among the primary topics for philosophical
discussion. The classical treatments include Plato's Timaeus, Aristotle's Physics, Plotinus'
Enneads, Augustine's Confessions, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Hegel's Encyclopedia,
Bergson's Essay on the Immediate Givens of Consciousness, and Husserl's Phenomenology of
Internal Time-Consciousness--in other words, works by virtually every major philosopher of the
Western tradition. Besides the philosophic treatments, early modern science debated the status
of space and time, the Leibniz-Clarke debate shaping consequent scientific discussions on the
1

issue of the absoluteness of space and time. Today, contemporary physics uses concepts of
space/time, which analytic philosophy of science attempts to explain.

2

In the continental tradition, the twentieth-century talk of the end of philosophy has
not lessened interest in space and time; if anything, it has increased it. Given such a huge
tradition any dissertation on this topic can only hope to carve out a tiny area of expertise. I
therefore restrict myself to examining some of the most important writings on time of the men
I take to be two of the three most important European philosophers of our century-Martin
3

Heidegger and Jacques Derrida. Since the confrontation with the tradition has always been
integral to their main task, I take up their readings of Aristotle's treatise on time in Physics 4.1014. The Heideggerian and Derridean texts examine the relation of the so-called "straight-line"
theory of time to the so-called "metaphysical tradition.· I call the articulation of these discursive
fields "the economy of time.·
I take "economy" in the widest sense to mean "range of interpretative possibilities"
for a word, concept, or text. These possibilities are governed by rules particular to each word,
concept, or text. Yet this particularity is not so abstract as to prevent a minimal structural identity

2
that allows for intertextual grafting whereby a family resemblance of texts governed by the
"same" set of rules can be recognized. These governing rules may be called an "economy" in
a narrower sense.
The feature of the economy of time upon which I focus in this dissertation is that
an irreducible spatiality haunts the discourse of time. I display this feature by showing how any
discourse on time contains terms that can also be Iterated in a discourse on space. Hence those
terms are undecidably spatial/temporal. Such undecidability is the basis for the analogy of time
and the line from which the "straight-line· theory of time gets Its name.

Confronted with such

undecidability, an author may attempt to settle the undecidability by determining a proper
(temporal) and improper (spatial) sense for them, but such strategy fails in the discussion of
time, for a determination of sense-or at least Heidegger's determinations--is caught in what I call
the "question of sense.· In German, the "question of sense· would be the Sinnsfrage-a play on
Heidegger's phrase "the question of Being· (the Seinsfrage). The economy of the Sinnsfrage
Itself contains an irreducible spatial moment so that temporal discourse cannot be purified of
spatial terms via a determination of proper sense, because "sense• is irreducibly spatial. To be
more precise, the possibility of Iterating Sinn in a spatial context (i.e., a context other than that
determined by Heidegger as properly temporal) cannot be reduced. Similarly, the infection of
temporal discourse by terms capable of Iteration in spatial discourse cannot be controlled by
appeal to the concept of "metaphor.· That is, language cannot be said to be dominated by
spatial terms which function as metaphors for a properly intended temporal sense because
"metaphor" is Itself a "metaphor" of "meta-pherein, • and thus contains an irreducible reference
to spatial motion.
For Its most basic argument, then, the dissertation relies on Derrida's related
notions of "Iteration• and "dissemination.• As Derrida explains in "Signature Event Context"
"Iteration" comes from the Sanskrit itara, meaning "other...4 Iteration refers to the play of identity
and difference in the repeated inscriptions of a mark. Each inscription--"iteration"-of a mark Is
different from the other inscriptions yet maintains a minimal recognizability as an inscription of
the same mark. Derrida shows in his Introduction to Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry how

3
5

such (material) inscription is necessary for ideality. Derrida shows that for Husser1 a mark must

be able to function in the possible absence of a controlling intention-hence the talk of the "death
of the author.• But the possibility of function beyond intention is also the condition Husser1
analyzes as "crisis.• Writing, Derrida's term for durable inscription in any medium, is thus the life
and death of thought.
Iteration then produces dissemination as its effect. Meaning produced by iterations
functioning beyond controlling intention is not the end of meaning but the beginning of too much
meaning. Meaning spills out from under the boundaries set by intention, and a fortiori, from
under the boundaries of that which one might wish to interpret as the author's intention. Such
spilling is what Derrida names "dissemination: As with many of Derrida's terms, this one
combines performative and indicative functions-that is, it does what it says. It produces meaning
from a fortuitous combination of marks-semen and ~-that have no real etymological
connection, yet produce a meaning-effect. 6
It is also Important to realize, however, that dissemination does not mean the end
of all authorial control-although it does entail giving up dreams of complete control. As Derrida
explains in "Signature Event Context,• his writings do not imply that intentions are useless.
Rather, intentions will still produce effects even if one accounts for dissemination, but these
effects will be produced within a system that is not fully controlled by intention. To what can one
appeal then in claiming that one reading is a "misreading"?

Derrida makes it clear In the

"Afterword" to Limited Inc that appeal can only be made to historically determined, and hence
only relatively stable, contexts--such as the profession of academic philosophy in the latter 20th
century. The relative stability of such a context makes possible appeals to standards of evidence
in reading texts, but does not imply that an author's intention can or even should be the~
guideline in producing a reading.
In the rest of this introduction I shall a) provide a brief historical background for the
issue of straight-line time and metaphysics; b) explain some key terms and assumptions involved
in this issue: c) give a brief outline of my dissertation; d) mention some of the special methodological issues involved; and finally, e) review the literature relevant to my project.

4
Since Immanuel Kant's work in the 1780s many European philosophers have been
concerned with the rules that govern that certain type of philosophical discourse traditionally
called "metaphysical. "7 A useful first approximation to the contemporary continental sense of
this most vexing concept can be found in Heidegger's "The End of Philosophy and the Task of
Thinking ...a In this essay Heidegger defines philosophy as metaphysics, that mode of thought
that thinks the whole of beings with regard to their Being in the manner of a grounding
representation [begrOndenden Vorstellens]. Metaphysical thought thinks Being as the ground
of beings. As such a ground, Being plays an active role; it brings [bringt] beings into their
presencing [Anwesen].

Metaphysics is further characterized by its thinking the ground as

presence [Anwesenheit]. Thought metaphysically, then, the present ground is responsible for
the presencing of beings, in that presence produces [hervorbringt] beings into their presencing
for a while. As the ground of this production, presence has itself a temporal present [Gegenwart]
in its bringing presencing things [Anwesende] into presence.

The characteristic mark of

metaphysics then for Heidegger in this essay is that it conceives of the process of presencing
as the production by one present ground of the presencing of all other presencing things.

9

Thus Heidegger's discourse seeks to articulate the rules governing metaphysics.
How does Heidegger characterize metaphysics in Being and Time? There he claims that a
certain "straight-line" notion of time characterizes "metaphysical• texts.

10

According to Heidegger,

metaphysics conceives time as a sequence of present moments best represented by a straight
line: hence the term "straight-line theory of time"). This claim has provided one of the most
profound stimuli to philosophical thinking in this century.
But my dissertation is not just on Heidegger, but also on the series of interpretations
of his work offered by Jacques Derrida, many of whose most influential essays are devoted to
the issues raised in Heidegger's work. Derrida is also the one responsible for my often having
put the word "metaphysics" in quotation marks throughout this introduction. Let me explain this
typographical device. Derrida is concerned in his writings on Heidegger to explicate the economy
of Heidegger's discourse on the linking of the straight-line theory of time and metaphysics. For
example, Derrida will show that Aristotle's text on time, which Heidegger in his 1927 work Sein

5
_ynd Zeit seems to "blame" for starting metaphysics because of its being the first formulation of
a straight-line theory of time, also contains other conceptual possibilities than those of
metaphysical thought, even the ones that enable Heidegger to thematize the link of the straightline theory and metaphysics. Th1,;0 after Derrida it is difficult to call any one text "metaphysical,"
for he shows that what seemed to be the very epitome of a metaphysical text, namely Aristotle's,
also contains elements of other-than-metaphysical thought.
What then is metaphysics for Derrida?

In the period of Maraes Derrida sees

metaphysics as the attempt to order a field of marks (a "text") by a mark that claims to be
outside the field. Contrary to some overwrought critics, in thus characterizing metaphysics while
also claiming that the isolation of the governing mark is impossible ("there is no out-text"),
Derrida does not leave us adrift in these fields. He recognizes we must pattern our texts, and
this recognition on his part forces us to recognize the radical political import of Derrida's thought.
Texts must be structured, but not necessarily as hierarchies of exploitation or domination. If we
then see structuring as a necessary structure, we must by the same token recognize that any
particular structure-as particular, historical, contingent--is also destabilizable. 111 other words,
what has been constructed can be de-constructed. Professional philosophers specialize in
detecting metaphysical pretensions in philosophical texts, but the structures also script life, as
institutional patternings, discursive formations, etc. We must see here the role of force, as
twisting the conceptual possibilities of what Derrida calls the "general text" into the hierarchies
that pattern specific institutional texts.
With the preceding as its context, the dissertation will show that while metaphysics
has always seen itself as beyond (meta) physics, Heidegger's work, when it seeks to characterize
metaphysics, does not provide another level, that is, is not a "meta-metaphysics,• or "3rd level"
discourse that would be radically purified of metaphysics, but instead provides a breakthrough
to a thought somehow "other" than that of metaphysics. Similarly, Derrida's discourse, which
seeks to explain Heidegger's explanation of how metaphysics orders the general text (seemingly
from outside), is not a "4th level" discourse, but rather one that explicitly thematizes the economy
(that is, the interplay of metaphysics and an exceeding of metaphysics), of the "other" thought

6
by which Heidegger's text can characterize metaphysics as the thought of Being as presence.
Derrida precludes characterizing his writings on Heidegger as "critique" by showing that his
discourse is only possible due to the way its subject matter Is hinted at in Heidegger's discourse.
Thus Derrida does not operate from a level above Heidegger's text, but in~tP.ad radicalizes and
thematizes certain tendencies in Heidegger's own text, playing one off against the other. The
main task of the dissertation, then, is to explore the relations between the two discourses of
Heidegger and Derrida on time and metaphysics, the one a breakthrough into a thought "other"
than metaphysical, the other the explicit thematization of the mechanisms and consequences of
that breakthrough.
The dissertation will also provide a framework for discussing Derrida's reading of
Heidegger's career path, that most vexed of issues, so often confused with the so-called "turn.•
The dissertation prepares the way for such a reading, which would focus on the move from time
to time/space. In the Marburg period Heidegger's thesis that a straight-line, or "vulgar" concept
of time characterizes metaphysics gave him a clue in his destruction of the handed-down content
of ancient ontology.

11

In the course of the project of fundamental ontology Heidegger thus

sought a primordial temporality of Dasein, one that would ground the primordial spatiality of
Dasein, as a preliminary to posing time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being,
die Frage nach dem Sinn van Sein i.iberhaupt. In the middle of his career, while researching
the "history /sending of Being,• the Seinsgeschichte. Heidegger admitted the failure of the project
of fundamental ontology in placing the blame on the constraints of the metaphysical concept of
language within which his work moved at the time.

12

Finally, at the end of his career, Heidegger

admitted that the attempt to ground Dasein's spatiality in its temporality was ill-conceived, and
that one must think time-space as the "open!

13

However, one can still discern a subordination

of space in Heidegger's insistence on naming the granting of this "open• as "authentic time."14
The Derridean-inspired questions that guide this dissertation, then are: What is the link in
Heidegger's text of language and space/time, or more precisely, metaphysical language and the
attempt to isolate a temporality of Oasein that grounds its spatiality? How do spatial terms haunt
the attempt to purify the language of temporality? How does this haunting of the allegedly

7
purified language relate to the metaphysical straight-line time concept? I try to draw together all
these questions in what I call "the economy of time.·
In spelling out the economy of time I am mostly concerned with Derrida's early
writing--up to and including Maraes de la Philosophie (1972). Derrida's readings of Heidegger
have informed his career from the beginning. One could trace something of the following path:
In Of Grammatology (1967) Derrida focuses upon the question of Being in discussing the
"priority'' of differance to the ontological difference.

15

In "Ousia and Gramme" (1969) the focus

on the question of Being shifts to an examination of the form of the question as a question of
sense (sens or Sinn) as this form of the question relates to Heidegger's change to examining the
epochality of Being.

16

In The Post Card (1980) and "Sending: On Representation" (1978) Derrida

takes up the Heideggerian reading of the history sending of Being in discussing the Seinsqeschichte.17 Finally, in Of Spirit (1986) Derrida takes up the question of the question itself as it
relates to epochality.

18

These points bring me to the outline of my dissertation. Briefly stated, Chapter I
will lay out the economy of time, by showing how Derrida's formal rule, arrived at in a reading
of Heidegger's note on Aristotle, predicts a haunting of time by space, or in other words, an
irreducible spatial moment in the economy of time. Chapter II shows how the Sinnsfrage is
implicated in the economy of time, by showing how Sein und Zeit cannot purify the discourse
of temporality of all spatial reference because Sinn as directionality is iterated in both spatial and
temporal discourses. Chapter Ill shows how Heidegger's reading of Aristotle proceeds via an
attempted purification of Aristotle's time discourse through skewing several economies Aristotle
leaves undecidable. Heidegger attempts these skewings via a determination of the proper (nonspatial) sense of key terms. I show how this strategy is limited by the Sinnsfrage. Chapter Ill also
shows how another Heideggerian strategy of regulating undecidable economies in attempting
to purify time discourses fails. This is the strategy of naming terms undecidable across the
ontico-ontological difference "ontic images.· This strategy falls under the economy of time, and
specifically the Aristotelian economy, since "met~phor" is itself a "metaphor" of meta-pherein, and

8
hence includes an irreducible reference to .Qb.Qrg, the Aristotelian term for spatial motion.

Let me now give a bit more detail for each chapter. Chapter I details Derrida reading
Heideg~er

reading Aristotle. Thus the dissertation does not proceed chronologically, but will first

examine Derrida's 1969 essay "Ousla and Gramme," in which Derrida articulates the economy
of Heidegger's discourse in his 1927 Sein ynd Zeit concerning Aristotle's significance as the first
formulator of a straight-line theory of time for the metaphysical tradition. Chapter I explores in
detail how Derrida's essay examines the constraints under which Heidegger's reading of
Aristotle's significance for the tradition (e.g., the way Hegel paraphrased Aristotle and thus was
the apotheosis of the "vulgar concept of time") operated in the famous note in Sein und Zeit #82.
These constraints make up what Derrida calls the "epoch(e)" of Sein und Zeit. "Ousia and
Gramme" shows that Aristotle's text on time also contains other conceptual possibilities than
those of metaphysical thought, even the ones that enable Heidegger to thematize the link of the
straight-line theory and metaphysics. Derrida also shows that his discourse, which may seem a
criticism of Heidegger directed from a higher level, is rmly possible due to the way it is hinted
at in Heidegger's discourse. Thus there is no infinite regress of levels of discourse, for Derrida's
discourse operates from within Heidegger's breakthrough, explaining both how Heidegger's text
operates and how the total fulfillment of its project of developing a discourse on temporality
purified of all spatial reference is impossible. In this way Derrida does not operate from above
Heidegger's project, but instead radicalizes and thematizes certain tendencies in Heidegger's
own text.
I set up the analyses of Chapter II by showing how "Ousia and Gramme" reads the
textual effects of Heidegger's posing of the queston of Being in terms of the Sinn of Being. In
attempting to show how asking the question of Being in terms of Sinn keeps to the system of
presence, that is, the system in which Aristotle asks about the Being of time on the basis of a
predetermination of the sense of Being in terms of a specific sense of time, viz. the present,
Derrida tries to show how the resultant "formal rule" limits any attempt to escape metaphysics
to a shaking from within. In my terms, the formal rule articulates the marginality of any text to
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the system of (desire for) presence. Now the formal rule of marginality is linked to the structure
of the re-mark. As with several of the other essays of Margins, Derrida shows in "Ousia and
Gramme" how any attempt to isolate a single concept from a field in an attempt to dominate that
field will always result in a supplementary fold or re· mark that comes to double the isolated term,
as in the famous "metaphor of metaphor" around which turns the analysis of 'White Mythology:
The doubling of the re-mark Is formally similar to what I call "haunting• in cases of conceptual
pairs, such as time-space. In Heidegger's case the concept to be isolated from its partner is that
of time, the original time that grounds the vulgar (i.e. spatially-conceived) time that characterizes
metaphysics. In attempting to isolate a purified notion of time, Heidegger's discourse finds itself
haunted by the repressed member of the pair time/space. If a spatialized concept of time Is
(Heidegger's) hallmark of metaphysics, and if Heidegger can be said to be attempting to escape
metaphysics by a notion of time purified of spatial reference, we must admit that he nonetheless
uses terms iterable in spatial contexts, so we must say his discourse is pulled back into
metaphysics-as he defines it in terms of spatialized time. But let us add that it is not totally
pulled back-Heidegger's discourse is marginal to metaphysics as defined by allegiance to the
system of (desire for) presence, for his use of terms that can be iterated in spatial contexts is in
the discussion of schemata that direct the ecstases of ecstatic temporality, an analysis that
cannot be assimilated to metaphysics defined In terms of presence.
In my second chapter I return to Sein und Zelt to ask whether Derrida In "Ousia and
Gramme" takes "seriously" enough this work's attempted transgressions of the metaphysical
tradition. Here I examine what I call the Sinnstrage as it comes to limit the Seinsfrage when
posed as die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein Oberhaypt. Derrida writes of Heidegger's attempt
at dismantling metaphysics with "the thought of Being as presence," a dismantling that operates
by posing the question of the Sinn des Seins: for Derrida, such a questlon--in so far as it is a
question about Sinn-remains tied to metaphysics. What are we to make of this seemingly flat
claim about the metaphysicalness of Sinn. when Derrida himself reminds us that there are no
metaphysical concepts~. for all depends upon the use to which they are put? 19
To what use Is Sinn put in Sein und Zeit? The textual performance of Sein und Zeit

10

twists several acceptations historically sedimented in the mark "Sinn,• viz. the sensuous,
linguistic, and directional, into each iteration of "Sinn.· Such sedimentations open possibilities of
iteration that cannot be totally controlled, even though Heidegger attempts to rewrite the
historical sedimentation of Sinn as "linguistic meaning• from noematic correlate to pivot of 2n
existential projection of Dasein In its Being-in-the-wor1d. These uncontrollable possibilities of
iteration result in a twisting of the question of Being. So while the Seinsfrage cannot be
considered a simple subjectivizing, an inquiry into a concept of Being in the sense of a
representation, neither can it totally escape from such a "misunderstanding,· about which
Heidegger complained in the "Letter on Humanism. "20 On the other hand, it is no longer so
clearcut, as Derrida seems to imply, that the textual work of Sein und Zeit does not disrupt the
system of presence, even as the historical sedimentations of Sinn open it to iteration in contexts
Heidegger would wish to name subjectivistic misunderstanding. Derrida does seem correct
however in his analysis of the haunting of the allegedly purified temporal terms by terms
Heidegger also uses in discussion of space. Even though Heidegger is aware of the "haunting"
he still casts it in terms of misunderstanding by attempting to identify the proper Sinn for such
terms; however, this move results in the Sinnsfrage. The important thing for us is not to give up
the concern for following an author's attempts at terminological control, but to see the economy
of possible Interpretations here, and the inability of an author to control fully the dlsseminative
drift. The drift brings us to see the possible iteration of Sinn as direction as an irreducible spatial
moment in the economy of time, since Heidegger iterates Sinn as direction (Richtung) in
discussslons of both space and time.
In my third chapter I take up Heidegger's extended treatment of Aristotle in his 1927
lecture course now known as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. This text was not
published until after Derrida pubished "Ousia and Gramme" so I will be able to test whether what
Derrida says about the way Heidegger wrote during the "epoch" of Sein und Zeit holds as well
for this contemporaneous work. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger tries to
show how the usual interpretation of Aristotle as the father of the straight--line concept is a
"misunderstandlng"--though perhaps a necessary one due to Dasein's falling, which causes it to
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couch its interpretation in terms oriented toward things encountered in the world. In pursuing this
reading Heidegger must subvert several Aristotelian economies: that of metabole, proteron kai
husteron and kinesis. Heidegger must equate metabole and kinesis, ignore Aristotle's privileging
of topos in the economy of proteron kai husteron and similarly ignore the privilege of phora in
the economy of kinesis. Heidegger skews Aristotle's three economies, but his reading rests on
distinguishing proper~. a strategy disrupted by the Sinnstraae. Heidegger must attempt
such overturnings in order to reduce space in Aristotle's time notion so he can read it as a clue
to Dasein's temporality. But key terms in Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle, such as
Oberaang, are iterated in contexts of both time and space. Confronted with such undecidability
Heidegger tries to manage their economies by determining their proper (non-spatial) Sinn, but
this strategy is embroiled in the Sinnsfrage.
Now Heidegger does seem to broach a trace-structure in the transition character
of the now, but the word he uses, Obergang, is iterated in both temporal contexts-in the
economy of the now-and in spatial contexts-in the economy of kinesis. The spatial economy
is itself undecidable, as Heidegger uses Oberaang both generically (as the character of all
metabole) and specifically (as the character of J2!:1Q.ra). All these economies which hinge on
undecidable terms could only be managed by positing a proper Sinn for certain key terms, but
this attempt runs into the Sinnsfrage.

At this point, let me mention that a few special procedural concerns present
themselves in my project. I will be interpreting in my dissertation the changing interpretations
developed by Heidegger and Derrida of the relation of the metaphysical tradition to various
notions of time. I must therefore be especially careful to note this doubled interpreting of
interpretative possibilities, and thereby take into account the ways in which Heidegger and
Derrida account for the possibility of various interpretative stances, even as I take them up in
interpreting their texts.

Only two books have broached this issue, neither in the detail it requires. David
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Wood's The Deconstruction of Time does not discuss either "Ousia and Gramme" or The Basic
Problems of Phenomenology with an eye to their relation. Herman Rappaport's Heidegger and
Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language ignores Derrida's notion of the ''formal rule" in favor
of focusing upon the var!~us rhetorical schemes to be found in the respective texts.
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Heidegger's work has provoked an enormous amount of commentary, with much
of Derrida's own work, which has provoked considerable Interest on its own accord, able to be
counted therein. Among the major interpreters of Heidegger on the issue of time and
metaphysics, several, namely Richardson,
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Peggeler,

23

4

and W. Marx2 published their major

works before Derrida's publishing career began. Others, such as Bernasconi,
Schurmann,

27

and Sheehan,

28

25

Kockelmans,

26

either do not treat of Derrida or dismiss him polemically. A few

approach Heidegger with greater or lesser appreciations of Derrida, such as Caputo, 29 F6ti, 30
Gasche,

31

Greisch,

32

Kockelmans,

33

and Sallis.

34

Several of these at least mention the texts I

will examine, so I will note their works whenever appropriate, pointing out as much as possible
their contributions to my study. My work will differ from theirs mostly in scope, in that they have
written articles about a few specific textual interconnections, while I will attempt to articulate a
much broader network.
Most commentators on Derrida cannot avoid mentioning his relation to Heidegger,
inasmuch as Derrida himself constantly writes of the importance of Heidegger for his own work.
Harvey,

35

Uewelyn,

36

and Wood are only marginally relevant to my project, but Gasche's37 work

will be very important in informing my reading of Derrida in general as wel! providing insights into
specific textual interconnections. My work will differ from his in both direction and scope. His
articles do not treat directly of the time and metaphysics issue, while The Tain of the Mirror is
an explication of Derrida that treats of Heidegger only in passing.
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CHAPTER I

DERRIDA ON HEIDEGGER ON ARISTOTLE:
A READING OF "OUSIA AND GRAMME"

Introduction

As Derrida himself has written, "the task proposed here is enormous and difficult." In
this chapter I will begin the articulation of the economy of time by examining "Ousia and
Gramme,"1 the essay in which Derrida reads Heidegger's reading in Sein und Zeit of the
paradigmatic force of Aristotle's thesis on time for the metaphysical tradition. In "Ousia and
Gramme" Derrida writes of the "epoch of Sein und Zeit" (72/62), which includes for essential
reasons Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. The epoch in question is one in which
Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology seeks to develop time as the transcendental horizon
for the question of Being. This project necessitates a destruction of what remains of the history
of ontology, 2 a destruction guided by the thesis that the tradition has, without thematizing it,
determined the meaning (or sense) of Being-the Sinn von Sein, the sens de retre-by means of
nnly one determination of time, that of presence. The intricate problems of translating Sinn with
"sens." "meaning• or •sense• will be addressed in Chapter II of this dissertation. In this chapter
I will provisionally translate "Sinn van Sein" and "sens de l'etre" as "sense of Being" rather than
the usual "meaning of Being.· In Chapter Ill of this dissertation I will address the further question
of whether or not one can include The Basic Problems of Phenomenology in this epoch, even
though it falls chronologically between Sein und Zeit and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.
For Derrida, the delimiting of metaphysics accomplished in Sein und Zeit, and
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specifically in Heidegger's note on the texts of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and Bergson, is itself
situated by its failure to open the "hidden passageway that makes the problem of presence
communicate with the problem of the written trace" (37/34). We cannot, of course, simply render
the Heideggerian text in terms of his thought of "presence,• as Derrida notes in proprising that
one might read "Ousia and Gramme" as "a timid prolegomena to a problem of translation" (35n.2/33n.6). The nexus of the terms Vorhandenheit, Anwesen, Anwesenheit, Gegenwart,
Prasenz traverses the entire history of Heidegger's text, and they undergo crucial shifts in
determination as Heidegger moves toward thinking the history of Being. Thus "Ousia and
Gramme" does not deal solely with the epoch of Sein und Zeit, but poses the question of the
development of Heidegger's thought (which is not to be contused with the "turn,• already
operative in Sein und Zeit). 3 "Ousia and Gramme" thus questions an epoch of Heidegger's
thought prior to the question of the epochality of Being. Posing the question in such terms
indicates that I will use "epoch" not only in its chronological sense, but also in the sense
Heidegger uses in his discussions of the history of Being. That sense, the one intended here by
Derrida, is derived from the Greek epoche, to hold back. My question then becomes, what does
Derrida think is held back in order to allow the text of Sein und Zeit to function? In answering
this question over the course of this dissertation I will show the relation of the trace to the
question of presence as well to the withdrawal of Being.
Posing the question of the epoch(e) of Sein und Zeit is tar from what anyone could
4

call a "criticism" of Heidegger, but rather records Derrida's attempt to show the rules governing
any attempt to delimit metaphysics. Derrida thus writes of a "formal rule tor anyone wishing !Q.
read the texts of the history of metaphysics,• a rule that formalizes the "play of submission and
subtraction" with regard to the determination of Being as presence (72/62). Such a play, as
formalized by Derrida, articulates the furrowed margin of the metaphysical text, for which the
image of an inside governed by presence that is simply enclosed by an opposing outside
governed by absence is inadequate. All the texts one would wish to label "metaphysical,· Derrida
claims, and all concepts within these texts, both are and are not governed by presence, that is,
they are submitted to the system of concepts governed by the desire for simple self-presence
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but also at the same time subtracted from that very system. Thus, for example, any attempt to
isolate a concept of time as characteristic of metaphysics in order to delimit the field of
metaphysics and thereby assure oneself of the purity of one's position beyond metaphysics will
5

find itself anticipated by even the most classic of "metaphysical" texts. As Derrida writes in
·ousia and Gramme":
... every text of metaphysics carries within itself, for example, both the so-called 'vulgar'
concept of
time ~ the resources that will be borrowed from the system of
metaphysics in order to criticize that concept. (70 /60)
If there is no simple escape from metaphysics, what is the relation of "metaphysics"
to "other-than-metaphysical" thought? As Derrida shows again and again, presence and absence
are articulated at the margins of philosophy according to various "graphics" (e.g., the
supplement, the pharmakon, differance. the trace) rather than by a Hegelian logic of opposition.
The formal rule of submission and subtraction articulated in "Ousia and Gramme" is imaged in
the "graphic• of the trace, as Derrida shows In his analysis of "The Anaximander Fragment" at the
conclusion of his essay. Reading "Ousia and Gramme• thus allows one to see how the formal
rule of the margin governs any attempt to escape from metaphysics by means of thematizing
the previously unthought determination of Being as presence (72/62), thus limiting any attempt
to escape metaphysics to a shaking of metaphysical security from "within." Heidegger's
"destruction• of the sedimented remains of the history of ontology6 must then be able to be read
as governed by this formal rule. Derrida is thus attempting to show in "Ousia and Gramme• the
extent to which Sein und Zeit had to operate by means of
certain propositions or conclusions within which the Heideggerian breakthrough has had
to constrain itself ... For example, the reading of Aristotle and Hegel during the epoch
of Sein und Zeit. (72/62)
These readings are those in which the relation of metaphysics to that which exceeds the
determination of Being as presence (from which metaphysics lives), is addressed by Heidegger
in terms not suited to the graphic of the trace, but in terms of Sinn. As we will see in Chapter
II, Sinn--as it functions in the textual performance of Sein und Zeit-can itself articulate a
economy marginal to metaphysics, that is, an economy at once disruptive and conforming to the
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telos of self-identical presence. However, the marginal economy of Sinn disrupts the
metaphysical answers to the question of Being without being able to inscribe the graphic of the
trace. We can thus call the holding back that allows Sein ynd Zeit to function an epoche of the
trace. Since Derrida shows that the trace is inscribed in "The Anaximander Fragment"--in the
thought of the epochality of Being-we can also say that Sein ynd Zeit is governed by an epoche
of epochality.

Now one should also realize that the elucidation of the formal rule of the

margin is one of the abiding themes of Margins of Philosophy, from "Tympan" through "Ousia
and Gramme,• "Form and Meaning," "The Linguistic Circle of Geneva," "The Supplement of
7

Copula,· and 'White Mythology." The question of the margin appears in all these essays via
Derrida's analyses of attempts to isolate a single concept or group of concepts--drawn from the
general fund of metaphysical predicates, the "general text• --by a specific science-such as
linguistics, "metaphorology, • or indeed, fundamental ontology--in order to "dominate• or
characterize that general text univocally. Such attempts always result in the structure of the remark, in which there Is always one mark too many or too few missing from the to-be-dominated
field, such as the "category of category" ("The Supplement of Copula") or the "metaphor of
metaphor" ('White Mythology"). We can say that such a doubling "haunts" the attempted
domination of the field.

8

In this chapter I will work out the analogy between the formal law of the re-mark and
the formal rule of submission and subtraction necessary for reading the metaphysical text. Doing
so articulates the economy of time. Thus I will show a move to a prior undecidable (time-space,
or "differance") analogous to the move to the re-mark as a response to the attempt to isolate a
concept from its "original" pairing,

9

as Derrida focuses on the textual effects of isolating iime•

from its quasi-transcendental "origin" in time-space, or "differance. •10 "Ousia and Gramme" can
thus be read as Derrida's analysis of Heidegger's attempt to dominate the metaphysical text by
isolating time as the transcendental horizon of Being, and the consequent destruction of the
history of ontology on the basis of its unthematized determination of Being as presence.
Derrida's formal rule of "submission and subtraction" with regard to the determination of Being
as presence reveals how Heidegger's attempt to think a primordial temporality of Dasein
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preparatory to the isolation of time as the transcendental horizon of Being remains caught in the
graphic of the margin, that is, is both inside and outside metaphysics. This marginality is
indicated by the way the supposedly purified description of primordial temporality, which would
enable Heidegger to delimit the metaphysical time conce;'.lt as one oriented to the falling
temporality that allows for the encountering of the spatial present-at-hand, is itself "haunted" by
"spatialized" language.
Let me pause for a minute to explain what I mean by the term "spatialized
language.· I do not mean that some terms are essentially or inherently spatial-that is, have a
spatial sense-but that the discourse that seeks to purify the description of time or temporality
of space functions by means of terms iterable in discourses on space. Now the possibility of
such iteration cannot be reduced; thus such terms are haunted.

11

Such haunting betrays the

repression of one member of the pair "time-space· from which Heidegger must draw the
conceptual resources for such an attempt. In Chapter 111 show how Heidegger's attempt in Sein
und Zeit to determine a proper (non-spatial) sense for the terms of the discourse on temporality
founders on what I call the Slnnsfrage, the economy of which contains an irreducible spatial
. moment. Chapter Ill will then show how the Sinnsfrage disrupts Heidegger's reading of Aristotle
in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. One cannot call such haunting a spatial "metaphor,•
that is, one cannot attempt to understand it as a spatial "image• subsequently coming to invade
a previously pure temporal flow without becoming enmeshed in the absyssal structure Derrida
analyzes as "metaphoricity" in "White Mythology." Thus the dissertation shows how Heidegger
is caught by the formal rule that operates whenever the sign "time" is used, a formal rule that
makes time the name of the evasion by metaphysics of the thought of the trace, an evasion
marked by Aristotle's determination of "gramme" in the system of dynamis and energeia-as
gramme in act.
The Contexts of ·ousia and Gramme•
The rest of this chapter will take the form of a commentary on "Ousia and Gramme.•
Let us first consider the French title: "Ousia et Gramme.• We can begin our reading by

21

considering the title as a rejoinder to Heidegger's Sein und Zeit. We thus have two pairs of
words, Sein and ousia, plus Zeit and gramme, as well as a pair of conjunctions, und and et. The
first pair is not a perfect match. Ousia, which Heidegger tells us •ontologically-temporally signifies [bedeutet] Anwesenhelt," was a determination of the Sinn van Sein.

12

Heidegger further tells

us that this determination is the •outer document• for the fact that the Greek understanding of
Being was gained from "Zeit."
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As I will show in Chapter II, Heidegger places Zeit in quotation

marks to mark its derivation from ·original time,• the Zeitllchkeit of Dasein. The pairing of the
words Zeit and gramme suggests that the relation of what goes by the name of ''time" to a
certain determination of gramme will be the focus of "Ousia et Gramme.· Derrida will name
•gramme" that which Is elided in the determination of gramme that constitutes the metaphysical
concept of 9time. • Alan Bass, the English translator of "Ousia et Gramme,• explains the relation
of the Greek "gramme" to Derrida's French neologism "gramme":
It should be noted, however, that there is a difference between the Greek gramme and the
French gramme. Thus, for example, the title of this essay is "Ousia and Gramme,· roughly,
"presence and line,· while the last two subtitles are "Gramme and Number" and "The
Closure of the Gramme and the Trace of Differance." Derrida uses "gramme." which of
course "derives" from gramme Qine, trace), and reminds us of gramma Qetter), as a
neologism related to the concept of differance, as is evident in the last subtitle, which
makes this relationship specific. Like differance it is best left untranslated. (Margins,
English translation, p. 34)
Thus gramme and differance, and hence 9the possibility of th~ trace in general" (69/60), are
occluded by the determination of gramme that allows for 9time" to determine the Sinn von Sein
in the system of metaphysics. Thus "Ousia and Gramme,• so close to the title, says "Being and
that which allows time to determine Being; or in other words, "Being and Trace."
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The complexity of the essay is further revealed when we note that "Ousia and
Gramme,• which poses the question of an epoch at the beginning of Heidegger's career, has for
5

an epigraph an excerpt from "Zeit und Sein,"1 a work that appeared close to the end of Heidegger's publishing career, bringing it around full circle, as It were, from the epoch of Sein und Zeit.
The excerpt, quoted in German by Derrida, reads:
Am bedrangendsten zeigt sich uns das Weitreichende des Anwesens dann, wenn wir
bedenken. dass auch and gerade das Abwesen durch ein bisweilen ins Unheimliche
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gesteigertes Anwesen bestimmt bleibt.
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This sentence, bearing on the determination of absencing by presencing, occurs
in the context of Heidegger's discussion of the destiny of Being as logocentrism, that ls, our
being bound to a determination (Pragung. stamping) of Being as Anwesen. from "the beginning
17

of the unconcealment of Being as something that can be said, that is, can be thought. "

Such

a determination of Being as Anwesen, initiated by the Greeks, holds as well for modern
technology, in the way in which entities come to presence for us in the sense of calculable
property (das Sein als Anwesen im Sinne des berechenbaren Bestandes). We needn't think back
to the Greeks to apprehend (vemehmen) Anwesen, however, because we can see it in any
simple, sufficiently unprejudiced reflection on presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand. However,
to pick up the point of the epigraph, Anwesen shows itself most oppressively when it determines
even Abwesen. In this context Heidegger goes on to develop the motif of Seinsgeschichte as he
gives a list of the ways in which Anwesen has shown itself in the abundance of its metaphysical
transformations (WandlungsfOlle). However, the Geschichte of Being is not history in the way
cities and people have history, but Is determined by the way Being is given Cwle Es Sein gibt),
which Is a fateful sending, a destiny, Geschick.
Thus the context of the epigraph outlines virtually the whole of Heidegger's
itinerary,
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from the attempt to apprehend Anwesen on the basis of a reflection on Vorhand-

enheit and Zuhandenheit-a transformation of the Marburg period project to thematize time as
the transcendental horizon, or sense. of Being--through the examination of the Greek beginning
of metaphyics from the perspective of the Seinsgeschichte--to the last attempt at a topology of
Being in terms of Ereignls/Enteignis that would situate the Geschichte of Being in a sending that
withdraws, an entziehende Schickung. The epigraph itself, which opens Derrida's essay
examining the first period, names the pivot between these last two periods, the questioning of
the determining of absenclng by presencing that enables us to think the non-present/non-absent
"source" that regulates such determination, or in Heidegger's terms, that which grants Anwesen
such binding power.

19

Thus "Ousia and Gramme• opens by questioning the last period of Heidegger's

23
thought, and, as we will see, concludes by questioning his first period by way of his second. We
can clearly see that ·ousia and Gramme• deals with the first period of Heidegger's thought by
way of the entirety of his thought by following the path of Derrida's notes, the first of which
(34/31) deals with the early Kant an;i the Problem of Metaphysics, the second of which (35/33)
opens the question of the history of the Heideggerian text by considering the "privileged"
example of the middle-period "Anaximander Fragment: and the fourth of which (37/34) refers
us, by way of a mention of the "problem of the written trace• to Derrida's essay "The Ends of
Man." In this essay we find, instead of an explicit discussion of the written trace, the issue of
Oasein's self-proximity being examined in terms of supplement {148/124) and metaphoricity
(156-58/130-32). At this point In "The Ends of Man: in the course of a discussion of the
Heideggerian thought of the presence of the present in terms of metaphoricity, Derrida refers us
by way of a note (158 n.19/131 n.35) to the play of the proper (eigentliche) four-dimensional
time/space in "Zeit und Sein,• which Heidegger names as a reaching that holds the dimensions

of time apart in their "nearness• CNahheit). 20

Derrida then asks us in the text of "The Ends of

Man• to regard Heidegger's thinking of "le proche et le propre"
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according to the opening of

espacement. which "belongs neither to time nor to space, and which dislocates, while producing
it, any presence of the present• (159-60 / 132-33).
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Where are we at the end of this labyrinth of notes on notes? What indeed is the
"hidden passageway" (passage dissimylft) opening the problem of presence, that is, metaphysics,
to the problem of the written trace? What connects the trace to metaphor, and metaphor to the
opening of space and time, and thus metaphor to the problem of presence? That is, finally, what
connects metaphor to metaphysics? Is it Indeed a "passageway" in the sense of a tunnel we are
dealing with here, or rather the passage around the perimeter of a circle connecting all these?
I continue my reading of "Ousia and Gram me,· then, at the point where Derrida asks
us to take up the chain of interdependent concepts (ousia. oarousia. Anwesenheit. Gegenwart.
gegenwartigen. Vorhandenheit) as they are "deposited" at the beginning of Sein und Zeit and
then taken up again at the point of interruption of the text in Heidegger's note on the "vulgar
concept of time.• This note offers itself to several readings, Derrida continues, but he wishes to
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restrict himself to extending it a bit according to two motifs. The first is the "highly determined
form" of the question in Sein ynd Zeit about the determination of the sense of Being by
ontotheology as presence. The key here for understanding Derrida is to emphasize the two types
of "determination• in his sentence: "To read in it, such as it is announced in r.ighly determined
form, the Heideggerian question about presence as the ontotheological determination of the
sense of Being• (35-36/34-35). We should note that the question of Being in Sein ynd Zeit is
itself determined-by its epocM of the epochality of Being. Such an epocM enables the question
of Being to focus on the determining of Being as presence In the history of Being. For Heidegger
in Sein ynd Zeit the question of Being Is asked In terms of Sinn. However, if the question of
Being is to become the question of the Selnsgeschichte. that is, if it is to ask what grants Being
in sending and withdrawal, then this question can only be posed in terms of the trace, not In
terms of Sinn. Thus ·ousia and Gramme• says that the delimitation of metaphysics produced by
thematizlng the previously unthought determination of the sense of Being as AnwesenheitfYorhandenheit remains subject to the formal rule, that is, remains within metaphysics, even
though it subjects metaphysics to a powerful shaking. That Vorhandenheit is itself put into
question by Heidegger's analyses of Zyhandenheit In Sein und Zeit, as John Sallis correctly
points out,
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is not Derrida's point. Derrida need not deny the transgressive opening of the

analyses of wortdhood and significance in order to focus on the form of the question about the
sense of Being, and point out the economy of such a delimitation in what he calls the "formal
rule." All this will be spelled out in more detail in Chapter II.
Heidegger does indeed transgress metaphysics in his question about the
determination of Being as presence, Derrida claims, but asking about such determination in
terms of the sense of Being articulates an economy that contains an irreducibly metaphysical
moment. As we have noted before in anticipating Chapter II, the text of Sein und Zeit establishes
a economy marginal to metaphysics for the mark Sinn, an economy both disruptive and
conforming, and hence not to be condemned prima facie. To modify slightly Derrida's position,
we can say that metaphysics is transgressed in a more forceful way when Heidegger's texts
Inscribe the trace as the form of a meditation on the bending back upon the limit of metaphys-
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ics to examine the epocM of Being, than when the transgression takes the form of a question
of the Sinn von Sein. The inscription of the trace as the margin of metaphysics allows us to
think that which hides itself in the movement of its presentation, that is, that which allows itself
to be determined as presence while exceeding such determination (36/34). Such a thought of
presence as sent, as determined by a movement beyond presence, would transgress metaphysics, for metaphysics could never thematlze what serves it as the very element of evidence
in determining even the (absent) past and future as past and future presents, as the passage
used as the epigraph mentioned above suggests. This first motif according to which Derrida
reads Heidegger thus sets as its task the situating-by the notion of epochality-the delimiting of
metaphysics. That is, it seeks to determine how Heidegger's first attempt to delimit metaphysics
by means of the working out of the sense of Being as Temporalitat-which reveals the previously
unthematized determination of Being as presence--implies the movement of epochality. That such
movement was hidden from Heidegger in Sein und Zeit is the meaning of Derrida's phrase
•epoch of Sein und Zeit."
Derrida's second motif considers the question of the written trace, the gramme, as

It leads us to a center and a margin of Aristotle's text.. Derrida is not certain that the concepts
involved in a thought of the gramme are dominated by the concepts Heidegger fixes as decisive
in Sein und Zeit's note on Aristotle (37-38/34-35). My task in this chapter is to show how these
two motifs-the epoche of epochality and the trace--are related.
Derrida next calls attention to the context of the note in the last chapter of Sein und
Zeit, entitled: "Temporality and within-time-ness as the Source of the Ordinary Concept of
Time.• The note asks whether Hegel's affirmation of a fall of history into time indicates, by way
of the displacement of Hegel by fundamental ontology, that Hegel's formulation remains (merely)
the most radical formulation of the vulgar concept of time. Derrida notes that for Heidegger this
is not a criticism, but a sharpening of differences between fundamental and classical ontology
(38-39/35-36).
Derrida reproduces the note in toto, then remarks that the note's calling attention
to the "extraordinary right" of the present: to the impossibility of thinking outside the present as
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self-evidence, amounts to a shaking of the metaphysical closure by thinking the link between
truth and presence.
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This shaking must not be considered a positing of absence as another

center from which to think, for such a positing would be a movement subject to incorporation
by dialectic::-1 negativity in a movement which would negate the first center in yielding another,
higher, truth. The situating of truth-the tying of it to a determined philosophical, and in fact,
vulgar, concept of time--is a thought that •henceforth may no longer need to be either~ or
gresent, and for which the meaning and value of truth are put into question in a way impossible for any intraphilosophical moment, especially for skepticism and everything that is
systematic with it• (42/38).
After this first sketch of the relation between metaphysics and a thought that would
shake metaphysics as proposed in Sein und Zeit, Derrida moves on in the section entitled '1"he
Exoteric" to ask about the contact between the concept of vulgarity and Aristotle's aporetic treatment of time. Specifically, the question concerns the connection of vulgarity with the
"exotericness• of Aristotle's.l.Q.gQ§ (43/39).
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Aristotle's aporetic is the question about the being

and non-being of time according to an exoteric .!QgQ3. That is, Aristotle will deal with what
appears to common sense, what appears as self-evident. We have just seen above that the
privilege of the present is self-evidence itself. Thus our question becomes: What connects
Aristotle's aporia to presence?
Aristotle's Aporetic and Its History
In its most formal terms, Aristotle's aporetic states that time Is what is not: time must
appear as the now, yet the now appears as •no longer" and ·not yet.· As such, as containing ".YD
certain ne-ant,• time cannot participate in presence, substance, "etantite" itself (Qyfilg)
(43/39-40). To reach this conclusion, the aporetic has two phases: in the first, time is divisible
into parts, yet no now ( = part) is in the present; while in the second, the now is not a part, so
time is not composed of nows. The now is thus seen as the atemporal kernel of time, its form. In
order to be, the now must remain present: ousia, presence, Is what is. So far Derrida's reading

of Aristotle conforms to what one would suspect Heidegger would think. 26
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In the next section, however, entitled "The Paraphrase,· Derrida begins to develop
his thought of the formal rule we mentioned above, the rule whose formulation depends on a
recognition of the margin furrowing all ("metaphysical•) texts. Derrida shows the way in which
Hegel's repetition of Aristotle in the Encyclopedia

27

net only cannot be seen under the rhetorical

schema of the "paraphrase,• as Heidegger would have it, but also includes Hegel's own critique
of intratemporality, a critique that is in a way •analogous· to Heidegger's critique in Sein und
Zeit. 28 This Hegelian critique must be seen in terms of metaphoricity,
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so Hegel's texts on time-

-as including both a repetition of Aristotle and a critique of intratemporality--seem furrowed by
the margin of metaphysics, seem to be at once inside and outside metaphysics.
Derrida's characterization of Hegel's text proceeds as follows: Hegel's repetition of
Aristotle occurs in the section on "Mechanics" where space and time are categories of the Idea
as immediately, that Is, abstractly and indeterminately, outside itself. In Hegel's text space is pure
exterlority which must be determined by a self-negation in the point. The point negates and
retains itself In lifting itself into the line, and the line in turn becomes the plane. This process is
circular; we could start with concretely determined space and proceed inversely to indifferent
abstraction. What of time in this account?

Derrida reminds us that time has already appeared,

in that space Is a process of self-negation: time is required in the Aufhebung as the work of
space spacing itself; in Derrida's words, "le temps est espacement" (47 /43).
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We will see the

significance of this dialectic of time and space when Derrida examines the •dialectic of the
gramme" that enables Aristotle's text to function while never resolving its central aporia.
We next move to the section of "Ousia and Gramme" entitled -What the Question
Evades.• Here Derrida will show that what Heidegger considers the Kantian breakthrough--a
breaking with the Aristotelian tradition via a thinking of time as the condition of possibility of
experience--ls possible only by means of a development of Aristotle, who both •establishes" and
"critiques" metaphysical security in anticipating the concept of the nonsensuous sensuous
(55-56/48-49). Derrida here refers to Physics 219a 3-4: hama gar kineseOs aisthanometha kai
chronou. Such an Aristotelian anticipation of Kant is enough for Derrida to establish the
"marginality" of Aristotle's text.
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Derrida will also claim here that Heidegger's shaking of metaphysics by an appeal
to the sense of Being is also implicated in metaphysical conceptuality due to the irreducible
binding of sens, sense, to presence (58/51).
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As I have already made clear, Derrida does not

here take into account the marginal economy instigated by Sinn in Sein und Zeit, an economy
that exceeds metaphysics in one of its moments without, however, inscribing the graphic of the
trace. Most importantly for his purposes, Derrida is on his way to showing that the texts of
Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel are all furrowed by the margin of metaphysics-a marginality that the
note under examination in Sein und Zeit does not thematize. The marginality of Aristotle and
Hegel escapes the note, Derrida claims, because it does not see the "problem of the written
trace" and its relation to the circle and the line.
In explicating this claim for the importance of the written trace in thematizing the
marginality of metaphysics, Derrida's question here is this: In demonstrating that the now is not
a part of time, that is, in overturning the first hypothesis of the aporia, does Aristotle extract time
from the "spatial" concepts of part and whole (52/46-47)? We must recall that Aristotle never
settles the aporia: unlike the treatise on place, which precedes the discussion of time in Physics
IV, he does not offer here a critical, non-exoteric level of discussion, but moves on past the
aporia of the being of time to consider
undecided.

the~

of time, whose belonging to being remains
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Now, explicating Sein und Zelt, Derrida emphasizes that metaphysics is posited precisely
by this evasion of the question of the Being of time, or rather, by asking the question in terms
of the belonging of time to Being already determined as~. presence, Vorhandenhelt. 33 Thus
Aristotle's treatise contains an unexamined determination of the now as a (present) entity. In
other words, It evades the question: How is Being already determined in investigating (the Being
of) time? Sein und Zelt brings to light, Derrida points out, this omission by posing the question
of the transcendental horizon for Being, that is, time as the transcendental horizon for any
possible understanding of Being. In this way, Derrida notes, Sein und Zeit is thus a decisive step
"au-dela ou en deca" metaphysics.

34

The relation of "on that side" to "on this side" is precisely

what is articulated in the "formal rule:
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Metaphysics as the effect of this evasion is seen not only in the determination of time as
nothingness or accident prior to Kant, Derrida continues, but also in what is "least metaphysical"
in Kant, the notion of time as the pure form of inner sensiblity (53/48). For Kant, it is because
time is not a being that it must be made into a pure form of sensibility: this move belongs to
metaphysics in that it was made possible by the evaded question that predetermined Being as
presence and thus enabled Kant to conclude that time was not a being. Thus Aristotle can be
seen as having prepared the Kantian break with metaphysics that Heidegger lauds in Kant and
the Problem of Metaphysics, but that he denies to Aristotle and Hegel in the epoch of Sein und
Zelt (54/48).
What is the link of Aristotle to Kant? For Derrida, time as the form of inner sense
still seems "rigorously prescribed" in the famous Aristotelian phrase of 2198: hama gar kineseos
aisthanometha !<al chronou. Derrida reads Aristotle as saying here that time and movement are
united in aisthesis, a sensibility that functions even in the dark, when the only movement is in the
soul. 35 Thus time is the form of movement, even that movement that can occur only in the soul,
thereby preceeding any objectivity; that is, time is the form of all phenomena in general, a
formulation identical to Kant's (54-56/48-49).
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Derrida concludes:

What Aristotle has set down, then, is both traditional metaphysical security, and, in its
inaugural ambiguity, the critique of this security. In anticipating the concept of the
nonsensuous sensuous, Aristotle furnishes the premises of a thought of time no longer
dominated simply by the present ... (56/49)
The question of ·ousia and Gramme,• then, is whether Sein und Zeit has arrested these
possibilities of an inaugural break by means of its reading of Aristotle, that is, in its epocM of the
trace, which forces it, because of Its use of the concept of "time: to repress the other member

of the undecidable pair time/space, a pair whose articulation can only be thought in the graphic
of differance.
Thus we seem to have arrived at a paradox: that Kant's breakthrough transgresses
vulgar time only by making explicit the possibility of a break hinted at in Aristotle's very
establishing of the possiblity of the vulgar concept of time. Thus the formal rule is first sketched
by Derrida in claiming that •at a certain point, then, the destruction of metaphysics remains within
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metaphysics, only making explicit its principles• (54/48).
Derrida next shows that the breakthrough of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, as it is
retrieved in the question of the sense of Being, is also subject to the "formal rule.· As Derrida
puts it: "Making explicit the ~vaded guestion always and necessarily keeps to the system of
what is evaded" (57 /50). This necessity follows from the fact that time is thought on the basis
of the present as nontlme, as not yet or no longer, that is, on the basis of the silent predetermination of the question of the Being of time in terms of ousia and Vorhandenheit.
Now as we will see in Chapter II, "sense"-in terms of which Heidegger poses the
Being question in Sein und Zeit--is bound to an economy marginal to presence. Derrida spells
out the consequence of this bond in a note part of which runs as follows:
And if time has a meaning (sens) in general, it is difficult to see how it could be extracted
from onto-theo-logy .... It Is not any given determination of the meaning (sens) of time that
belongs to onto-theo-teleology, but it is the anticipation of its meaning (sens). Time already
has been suppressed at the moment one asks the question of its meaning, when one
37
relates it to appearing, truth, presence, or essence in general. (60n/ 52n)
Thus if the question of sense in general must be posed within the closure of metaphysics, then
the economy of the question of the sense of Being would retain a moment that remained within
such a closure, no matter the "force, necessity and value (irruptive as well as fundamental) of
such a question" (58-59/51-52).
The formal rule, which in its narrow sense concerns the thought of Being as
presence, articulates the marginality of all metaphysical texts, which Derrida demonstrates here
in the case of Hegel. On the one hand, Hegel does not interrupt Aristotle in that "the concept as
absolute subjectivity itself thinks itself, is for itself and near itself, has no exterior, and it
assembles, erasing them, its time and its difference in self-presence· (59-60/52). On the other
hand, we are drawn to the definition of time at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit: time is
what erases (!!!gt) time. However, this erasure Is a writing that maintains time, enables It to be
read while erasing it: thus Hegel ends with time as the Inscription of a circle, infinitely
self-reflective, and as Derrida reminds us, the circle is also the Aristotelian model tor thinking time
and the gramme (Physics IV 223b) (60n./52n.). From this we can conclude that Hegel is both .
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"inside" and "outside" metaphysics: he thinks absolute spirit as self-presence, but thinks time in
terms of self-erasing writing.
We now move to the section of ·ousia and Gramme" entitled "The Pivot of
Essence.• Here Derrida calls attention to the fact that the aporetic form of the question of the
~

of time is never questioned by Aristotle. What Is this form? How do number and gramme

intervene dialectically here? We recall that the formal structure of Aristotle's time aporla depends
on defining time as composed of parts (the now), then realizing that the now is not a part of time
because the unity and identity of the now in relation to time do not accord with the relation
part/whole.
What is the dialectic of the gramme that resolves the aporia? Time is affirmed by
Aristotle as the line, the solution of the contradiction of the point, which is a nonspatial
spatiality. Yet time is not the line, for the nows are not points, since they destroy each other in
a way that points do not. These contradictions are taken up and affirmed together as the~
of time. However, the dialectic of the gramme is governed by the potentiality/act distinction,
which itself is governed by a teleology of presence, that Is, the determination of energeia as
ousia (62/54).
Let us follow the way Derrida develops the dialectic of the gramme. At first it seems,
he claims, that Aristotle rejects representing time by the gramme, but this is only the gramme
in the sense of a linear inscription in space; he will later accept time as gramme in the sense of
the circle in act. At first, then, time is different than space, for time is successive, not coexistent: the nows destroy each other as points do not, so that noncoexlstence is the essence
of the now as presence. However, the now must be the same in its essence as the other now
it destroys, so that time is an "Impossible possiblity" (63/55), the synthesis of identity and
difference in the same.
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On this first level space is also different from time, in that space is the

space of possible coexistence. However, this simultaneity can only appear in a synthetic relating
of two points, that is, the temporal synthesis shown above in Derrida's discussion of Hegel
(63-64/55). Thus space implies time, which in turn implies the possibility of space: in order to
relate points to themselves in dialectical self-negation, the nows--as now-must be simultaneous,
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that is, must coexist, which is the definition of space.
So we must conclude that space and time must be thought together, which Derrida
remarks is what Hegel and Heidegger remind us (64/55). I point out here, anticipating Chapter
11, that Heidegger does not speak of the necessity of a concept of space/time in Sein und Zeit,
where there is precisely an attempt to ground spatiality in the temporality of Dasein, but only later
in "Zeit und Sein.· Derrida here makes the regression to the quasi-transcendental "time/space•
by showing how Aristotle gives the difference between space and time as already constituted;
the articulation of this difference, the l:!9.!:!:lii, would then reveal an undecidable that Derrida calls
"differance" or timespace. As the articulation of same and other in the "difference" of time and
space, "Being-together" as "the very production of Being,· the hama would reveal "the common
origin of time and space" (64-5/56).
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In other words, the determination of Being (in Aristotle's

case, ousia) as presence depends upon a mode of time, the present, but time itself is
undecidably articulated with space: thus~ is "produced" by time/space. Here the demand
is made for us to think differance as that which, In exceeding it, allows for the determination of
Being as presence.
Differance

How are we to clarify this most difficult point? A brief detour to the "Differance"
essay, following the lead of Rodolphe Gasche's analysis in The Tain of the Mirror. can help here.
In trying to explain the neologism "differance, • which Is "neither a word or a concept" Derrida
shows its construction from the Latin differre by way of the French differer (8/7). In so doing he
shows how one meaning is that of delaying or deferring, which he names "temporization"
(temporisation). Differance as temporization names the constitution of the present on the basis
of a relation to an "absolute" past and future:
It is because of differance that the movement of signification is possible only if each socalled "present" element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to
something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and
already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element, this trace
being related no less to what Is called the future than to what Is called the past, and
constituting what is called the present by means of this very relation to what it is not: what
it absolutely is not, not even a past or a future as a modified present. (13/13).
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In discussing the constitution of any present element, such as the "now,· Derrida brings to bear
the graphic of the trace, which bears a certain resemblence to the Hegelian logic of self and
othor. 40 The relation to a "radical" or "absolute" alterity is necessary for the constitution of a selfidentity, even of that self-identity, the present, in which all other identities would be registered in
a classically determined subjectivity. This alterity constitutive of identity, when considered in the
context of the constitution of "time• as thought on the basis of the present, is the becomingtime of space. How so? According to the graphic of the trace, "space,· the exterior, the other of
time, "becomes,• that is, constitutes, "time.· This becoming-time of space is also a becomingspace of time, writes Derrida, an equation to which we now turn.
Derrida links the moment of delay, temporization, of differance to the moment of
active differing with an astonishing sentence:
In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be called
spacing, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space (temporization). And
it is this constitution of the present, as an "originary" and irreducibly nonsimple (and
therefore, stricto sensy nonoriglnary) synthesis of marks, or traces of retentions and
protentions (to reproduce analogically and provisionally a phenomenological and
transcendental language that soon will reveal itself to be inadequate), that I propose to
call archl-writing, archi-trace, or differance. Which (is} (simultaneously} spacing (and}
temporization. (13-14/13)
Spacing is, in the language of Of Grammatology "the opening of the first exteriority in general. .41
Spacing, espacement, is the becomlng..:space of time in which the present, the pure interior ls
opened out by the alterity that constitutes it in its self-identity. Spacing is then the interval within
the present that allows it to bend back upon itself in auto-affection as well as the opening to the
"outside.•
Differance, then, includes within its scope two becomings, the becoming-space of
time and the becoming-time of space. Temporization and spacing make possible "time· thought
on the basis of the present--but they also make this "time" impossible by producing presence as
the effect of an absolutely other pas~ and future. Now if time is always already becoming space,
and space always already becoming time, this Implies that any attempt to isolate one member
of the undecidable pair "time/space" will find itself becoming its "opposite: That Is, to take the
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instance most relevant for us, any attempt to isolate, or describe in purely temporal terms, "time·
will find itself becoming "space,• that is, will find its description haunted by "spatial" terms.
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We can see Derrida working out an example of this haunting most clearly in Speech
and Phenomena. He writes concerning Hussert's descriptions in The Phenomenology of Internal
Time-Consciousness that "there is a duration to the blink [the AygenblickJ, and it closes the
eye. -4 3 Here Derrida demonstrates that Husserl's descriptions of temporal constitution betray that
the moment of self-presence is invaded by alterity. Here the conceptual series time:presence:identity-space:absence:difference is worked out by Derrida as it functions in Husserl's
text. Now we must not think of the invasion of time by space as temporally subsequent, as an
unhappy accident befalling an previously pure essence, especially when at issue is the very
constitution of time. The •outside,• "space,· has always already invaded the "inside," "time:
constituting it from within. Derrida writes:

Since the trace is the intimate relation of the living present with its outside, the openness
upon exteriority in general, upon the sphere of what is not •one's own,• etc., .!tl§
temporalization of sense Is. from the outset. a "soaclng. • As soon as we admit spacing
both as "interval" or difference and as openness upon the outside, there can no longer be
any absolute inside, for the "outside" has insinuated itself into the movement by which the
inside of the nonspatial, which is called "time," appears, is constituted, is "presented.•
Space is "in" time; it is time's pure leaving-itself; it is the "outside-itself' as the self-relation
44
of time.

Here we see that spacing makes possible the temporalization of sense. That Is, if the supposedly
pure stratum of interior monologue is invaded by time, this temporalizing cannot be accomplished by a "time" that would be a pure time without any spatial reference.
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If the

temporalizing of sense is only possible because space is always already within time, then "time•
as thought on the basis of the present as pure self-identity must be rethought:

But what we are calling time must be given a different name-for "time" has always
designated a movement conceived in terms of the present, and can mean nothing else.
Is not the concept of pure solitude-of the monad in the phenomenological senseundermined by its own origin, by the very condition of its self-presence, that is, by "time,"
to be conceived anew on the basis now of difference within auto-affection. on the basis
of identifying identity and nonidentity within the "sameness" of the Im selben Augenblick? 46

How are we then to think the relation of differance and the "time" thought on the basis of the
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present? Derrida, in keeping with the graphic of supplementarity that structures texts that attempt
to determine origins, names the final chapter of Speech and Phenomena "The Supplement of
Origin.• Of perhaps more interest to this dissertation, however, is his naming of time a
•metaphor.· In discussing Husserl's descriptions of the pure movement of temporal const!+ution,
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about which Husserl claims that "for all this names fail us, •

Derrida points out that Husserl

nonetheless names It "flux,• thus taking up a name from the level of experience that the temporal
synthesis makes possible. This transfer of a name is a ·metaphor,· writes Derrida, but this must
be understood in terms of his notion of metaphoricity as analyzed in 'White Mythology.• Derrida
writes:

We speak metaphorically as soon as we introduce a determinate being into the description
of this "movement"; we talk about "movement• in the very terms that movement makes
possible. But we have been always already adrift In antic metaphor; temporallzation here
48
is the root of a metaphor that can only be primordial.

The transfer of this name, "flux,· from conditioned to condition, cannot be the same as the
transfer of names from one thing to another, the traditional definition of metaphor, but must be
seen as a "primordial metaphor.• We cannot understand the oxymoronic phrase, "primordial
metaphor; except in terms of Oerridean metaphorlcity. Recognizing something like metaphoricity is no doubt why Heidegger will write about Zeitlichkeit that it is not a being, that it "is" not,
but that Zeitlichkeit sich zeitigt.
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Derrida continues on the issue of the metaphoricity of iime":

The word "time" itself, as it has always been understood in the history of metaphysics, is
a metaphor which at the same time both Indicates and dissimulates the "movemenr of this
auto-affection. All the concepts of metaphysics-in particular those of activity and passivity,
will and nonwill, and therefore those of affection or auto-affection, purity and impurity, etc.50
·cover up the strange "movement" of this difference.

"Time" thus names, via metaphoricity, differance, which in turn names "under erasure" the
undecidable pair time/space. For a gloss on this sentence, risking an explanation of the obscure
by the more obscure, I refer to the section in Of Grammatology entitled "The Hinge": "Origin of
the experience of space and time, this writing of difference, this fabric of the trace, .permits the
1

difference between space and time to be artlculated ... ..s The "fabric of the trace,· that is,
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.Qjfferance, can permit the articulation of the difference between space and time because it says
the undecidable pair time/space.
Let us recall that besides time/space, differance also names the play of differences
within which the general text is structured:
The same, precisely, Is differance (with an -9) as the displaced and equivocal passage of
one different thing to another, from one term of an opposition to the other. Thus one could
reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed and on which our
discourse lives, not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that
each of the terms must appear as the differance of the other, as the other different and
deterred. (18/17)
Thus differance, which names the "possibility of conceptuality" (11/11) as the systematicity of the
general text52-the relation of any pair to each other and all other pairs-also names the relation
of one particular pair of concepts. For Instance, the relation of time to space and space to time,
which as we have seen, Derrida calls alternatively "spacing" or "temporization: As irreducibly
linked in this primordially undecidable pair, any attempt to isolate one side from the other will
result In a haunting, In which the language used in the allegedly purified description will betray
the repression of the other member of the pair, just as any attempt to isolate a concept from the
general text will be haunted by a re-mark. Thus the haunting of time by space is formally similar
to the way a re-mark, such as "metaphor of metaphor,· comes to haunt any attempt to isolate
a single concept from the general text. 53 In this way we see the place "Ousia and Gramme" holds
in the investigations into the margins of philosophy in the book of the same name. "Ousia and
Gramme,• like the other essays in Margins, investigates the textual effects of the attempt to
isolate concepts, either from their (repressed) partner, or from the general text as a wlio!e. As
Derrida says in "Signature Eyent Context, ..s4 all conceptual oppositions are hierarchies, so any
attempt at isolation involves repression of the other member of the pair, a repression that results
in a haunting.

"Time" and the Gramme

Let us now move on to the penultimate section of "Ousia and Gramme,· "Gramme
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and Number.· Derrida claims here that the aporia prevents Aristotle from identifying time with
the gramme as mathematical movement along a line, the "cinematographic concept of time"
denounced by Bergson (66/57). Although Aristotle rejects the gramme as series of points, as
a composition of part!" each of which would be a limit, the distinction between potency and act
comes in here: the point as limit is only potential; it takes its existence only from the line in act,
so one can preserve the analogy of time/line on the basis of the line in act, that is, thought on
the basis of its extremities (ta eskhata) present to themselves. Thus fully completed, the line, in
act, is the circle, the finite movement of the circle repeating itself indefinitely. Derrida concludes
that the gramme Is "comprehended" by metaphysics between the point and the circle, between
potency and act, so that any critique of the spatialization of time must operate in terms of the
gramme thought in terms of presence. That is, one comes to criticize a "spatialized" time in terms
of ''time" thought on the basis of presence-on the basis of the epoche of the trace. "Time" must
be rethought as differance-as time/space--Derrida tells us, so that one cannot give a "critique·
of a description of time that uses spatial terms, as if this were a contigent failure of a specific
author that might be subsequently improved upon in giving a purified description of a pure time.
Instead, one must instead see this spatializing as a "haunting" necessitated by the very attempt
at a pure description of time.
Thus Derrida charges that metaphysics can only think the gramme, which he now
links with the "possibility of trace in general," in terms of presence, that is, in a way that cannot
inscribe its peculiar graphic (69/60). This inability of metaphysics to think the trace in general
other than in terms of presence is one of Derrida's recurrent topics. Here in "Ousia and Gramme"
this necessarily limited comprehension of the gramme will mark the limits of the epoch of Sein
und Zeit.
We begin to see this use of the thought of the gramme as trace, when we read that
for Derrida "time" becomes the name of these limits, potency and act, within which the gramme
is comprehended. That is, time can only be thought on the basis of Being as presence since the
question of the Being of time is posed by the evaded question, which presupposes ousia as
presence, Vorhandenheit. Thus differance, "that which is related to time, but is not time" is indeed

38
to be thought beyond the determination of Being as presence, but cannot still be called time
(69/60). 55 Derrida is thus claiming that Heidegger's attempt to describe a primordial temporality
in Sein und Zeit is caught by the formal rule that operates whenever the sign "time" is used, a
formal rule that makes time the name of the evasion by metaphrics of the thought of the trace,
an evasion marked by the determination of •gramme• in the system of dynamis and enerqeia.
Such an evasion returns as the haunting of any attempt to purify a temporal description of all
spatial elements, as Derrida shows Is the case with Aristotle's hama. In Chapter II of this
dissertation I will show how Heidegger's description of Dasein's primordial temporality, which
Heidegger calls "original time,• is similar1y haunted by spatiality.
Because of the necessity of thinking time according to presence, Derrida contends,
to criticize any one of the concepts of metaphysics is to go around in circles, reconstituting the
same system. This circle will then, a priori, envelop any delimitation one thinks applicable to a
"past" text. As Derrida puts It: "More simply, every text of metaphysics carries within itself, for
example,

..bQ!b the so-called 'vulgar' concept of time .snQ the resources that will be borrowed

from the system of metaphysics In order to criticize that concept" (70 /61 ). Thus Derrida claims
that Aristotle can be read as confirming Heidegger's delimitation, for he does think Being as
presence depending on the now as point, yet one could also read Aristotle in a way that would
repeat both this limitation and its opposite (what opposes the now as point-the gramme), and
make it appear that the de-limitation (Heidegger) is still governed by the same concepts as the .
limitation (Aristotle) (70/61 ).
Derrida makes these claims by reading two Aristotelian texts of the time discussion,
220a and 222a. In his reading of 220a, Derrida shows that the now is a constitutive part of time
and a number foreign to time as well as the fact that the now is a constitutive part of time and
an accidental part of time (as limit) (71 /61 ). The difference that here allows such contradictory
determinations is the difference between act and potency.

In his reading of Physics IV, 222a,

which is organized by the definition of kinesis as M tau dynatou. hei dynaton. entelecheia at
Physics Ill, 201 b 4, Derrida shows that time, as number of movement, is potential; Being in act,
entelecheia, is not time but eternal presence. On the other hand, though, time is not non-Be-
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ing, and non-Beings are not in time, for potentialities are in movement toward act. Thus
movement and time are neither (present) beings nor (absent) non-beings (72/62).
With this conclusion Derrida is ready to formulate his "formal rule." The non-presence /non-absence of movement and time implies that the desire for presence (dynamis as
movement toward energeia) and time (which is thought according to this movement) in
Aristotle's text are ·submitted and subtractecr (72/62). Submitted and subtracted with regard
to what? Derrida must mean with regard to the determination of Being as presence. He says
movement and time, which are neither present nor absent, belong "as much to• the de-limitation
of metaphysics (Heidegger's gesture in Sein ynd Zeit. which operates by the thought of the
present, of the presence of the present) as to the simple overturning of metaphysics (that is,
thinking absence as another center, which will just end up in dialectics).
Thus Derrida can claim that the play of submission and subtraction (to the
determination of Being as presence) is the formal rule for "anyone wishing to read the texts of
the history of metaphysics· (72/62).

Derrida's emphasis alerts us that the formal rule governs

the reading of texts: as such, it should not be equated with, although it conforms to, the
metaphoricity that articulates the formation of the thereby "marginalized" texts themselves In the
relation of philsophy to non-philosophy. Thus the formal rule situates the delimitation of
metaphysics wrought by the thought of presence, showing that it must operate, as Derrida notes
at M 70 /61, with the same concepts as the Aristotelian foundation of a metaphysics of presence.
This means we can read the history of metaphysics within the opening of the (1st) Heideggerian
breakthrough, that is, the thought of the sense of Being as presence, but must also read them
beyond the constraints of this 1st breakthrough, that is, the constraints that form the epoch of
Sein und Zeit, the occlusion of the problematic of the written trace. Derrida then concludes that
the formal rule must be able to guide our reading of the entire Heideggerian text.
As Derrida notes, this implies that we can see the inscription within the formal rule

of the epoch of Sein und Zeit Does this mean that we must also be able to read the inscription
of the middle period, for instance, 9The Anaximander Fragment" within the formal rule? Or is it
that 9The Anaximander Fragment" is Heidegger's inscription of the formal rule, so that by reading
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''The Anaximander Fragment" in terms of the trace--whose possibities of legibility are denied by
the metaphysical comprehension of the gramme--Derrida is able to situate the early Heidegger,
by means of the formal rule, in terms of an occlusion of the gramme? Entertaining this latter
possibility implies that we can be moved to destroy what remains of the history of metaphysics
by an imperative made possible by the thought of Being as presence, but that we can be called
to read the Seinsgeschichte as the result of an sichentziehende Schickung only on the basis of
this play of submission and subtraction, that is, on basis of the trace which Heidegger sees in
Anaximander.
The Conclusions of "Ousia and Gramme"
Let us try to see these dynamics at work in the last section of "Ousia and Gramme,·
entitled "The Closure of the Gramme and the Trace of Difference." Derrida numbers his
conclusions here. In the first he spells out how the formal rule regulates the question of the sense
of Being in the text of Sein und Zeit; in the second he shows how a second gesture of
Heidegger's--that of questioning the determination of the sense of Being as presence in terms
of epochality--situates the epoch of Sein und Zeit; finally in the third he describes the movement
of the trace in ''The Anaximander Fragment" in terms of differance.
When we consider Derrida's first conclusion we must keep in mind that this is only
his first conclusion. That this is only the first move in a long and complex conclusion to a long
and complex essay situated by a series of interlocking notes to other long and complex essays
in Margins and other texts renders immediately suspect any easy protest over this as the site of
one of Derrida's "misreadings,• or "critiques" of Heidegger. Here Derrida writes that Heidegger
cannot oppose another, originary concept of time to the vulgar, for the so-called originary
concept would also rely on metaphysical concepts for its formulation (73/63). Derrida wants
here to enforce his notion of marginality, and the impossibility of simply leaving metaphysics
behind. In other words, a simple reading of Sein und Zeit as beyond metaphysics ignores the
formal rule that regulates the attempts to shake metaphysics from within, or better, which forces
one to regard the attempted destruction of metaphysics as precisely a shaking from within. Der-
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rida writes that one could multiply questions about the irreducible ties to metaphysical
conceptuality of fallenness and origin-the concepts that dominate the two types of temporality
Heidegger opposes to one another--around the notions of finitude or the proximity to itself of
oasein. We have noted above that this "enigmatic" proximity to itself of Dasein is the focus of
Derrida's "The Ends of Man.· Why does Derrida make no reference to his essay at this point? It
must be that because nowhere-not here, nor in "The Ends of Man•--is Derrida interested in
simply showing the adherence of Heidegger. or anyone else, to metaphysics. This move would
indeed be a "critique; but we must remember that "The Ends of Man· asks its question in terms
of metaphoricity, which as a "marginal" notion obviates any questions of a simple inside or
outside of metaphysics.
Derrida next asserts that his question remains within Heidegger's thought. Derrida's
question is that of situating the relation of ordinary to primordial time, so he is calling attention
to the development from the first period of Heidegger's thought, dominated by the issue of
Dasein's temporality, to the second period, which situates this thought by means of the
epochality of Being. Derrida notes that Hedegger Interrupts Sein und Zeit to ask whether
orlginary temporality leads to the sense of Being; in finding himself unable to answer this
question Heidegger found himself forced to change horizons, and ask about the epochality of
Being (74/64).
Derrida situates the change in horizon by paying attention to the terms governing
the concept of presence in Heidegger. In Sein und Zeit and Kant and the Pro!:>lem of
Metaphysics, Derrida claims, "presence· is interchangeably expressed as Anwesenheit and
Gegenwartigkeit. Beyond Sein und Zeit, however, Derrida continues, Gegenwartigkeit appears
as a restriction of Anwesenheit, and Prasenz will be another narrowing of Anwesen under the
heading of subjectivity and representation (75/64).
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Derrida concludes from this movement that

the Heideggerian delimitation of metaphysics must be thought of as two gestures: one subject
to the formal rule and hence caught in an economy that remains metaphysical though capable
of shaking metaphysics, and one that, in inscribing the trace, would transgress metaphysics by
articulating the formal rule of its very margin in showing how Being is determined as presence.
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The first gesture consists of an appeal from a more narrow to a less narrow
determination of presence-from the present as Gegenwart to the thought of Being as presence,
Anwesenheit. Now this move, the imperative in Sein und Zeit to destroy the history of ontology,
•. . . se tiendraient

a l'interieur de la

metaphysique (de la presence) en genera.l."
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Since

delimiting metaphysics is possible only by the thought of presence, as Derrida's parentheses
claim, Sein und Zeit is subject to the formal rule of submission and subtraction with regard to
the thought of Being as presence; it can only shake metaphysics from within, by developing the
posslblities laid down in Aristotle.
The second gesture consists in questioning the determination of Being as presence
Itself as the closure of Western metaphysics. This is the gesture of the epigraph, the pivot
between the 2nd and 3rd Heideggerian periods, which situates the Anaxlmander fragment by
thinking a "Wesen that would not yet even be Anwesen" (75/65). Indeed, Heidegger writes that
56

to khreon is that which Anaximander "als das Wesende Im Anwesen denkt."

We might try here

to say that the attempt to think to khreon as what abides In Anwesen is the thinking of what
allows the determination of Being as presence, a thinking that leads us to think the Seinsgeschlchte as the result of a withdrawing sending. Now this second gesture Is Heidegger's "more
difficult" gesture, Derrida claims, and he continues by stating that it can only be sketched out
from its announcement In "certain calculated fissures of the metaphysical text" -as we will see,
in the thought of the trace. In other words, then, thinking what gives Being must be done in
terms of the trace. Here an enormous projP.ct announces itself: thinking sending and withdrawing, the active differing of the Unter-Schied. the revealing-concealing Austrag of Identity and
Difference. In terms of the trace, and the granting of such difference in the es gibt of Ereignis in
terms of differance.
Such a project would no doubt involve Derrida's essay "The Retrait of Metaphor,•
in which he analyzes the withdrawal of Being in terms of metaphoriclty. Derrida writes that the
inscription of the trait of the incision, "marks the Ereiqnis, • in such a manner "as I have at59

tempted to articulate It in the trace or In differance."

The self-withdrawing of the Ereignis-

which allows the sending and withdrawal of Being, and the reaching that withholds and denies

43
in the play of timespace--is here thought as the movement of differance. Derrida later confirms
such a reading when he writes that:
We thus have recognized the relation between the _m.. of retrait [the movement thought
above as trace or differance] ... and the Ereignen of the Es gibt ... in precisely this trait
50
whereby the Enteignen ... happens to empty out all Ereignis.
The third point of Derrida's condusion sketches a reading of "The Anaximander
Fragmenr in terms of the trace and differance. The two Heideggerian gestures Derrida outlined
above are said to be "together simultaneously and separately" (as are time and space, we
recall). What then is the relation of the two texts of Heidegger, the delimitation and the
transgression? Derrida will name this relation "trace,· for he says the relation between the text
of the question of presence in general-the first gesture, the question of the sense of Being as
Anwesenheit--and the text of the question of what exceeds Anwesenheit "at the daybreak or on
61

the other side of (a la veille ou au-deta)"

Greece-the second Heideggerian gesture-cannot be

a relation of presence or absence (which would either give us nothing to think, or would be
thought as merely an absent presence, not yet or no longer) (75-76/65). Yet this relation must
still signify; it must still be legible-that is, it must be an inscribed trace: here we see the reason
for the focus on the gramme, the •problem of the written trace.• The gramme is precisely that
which gives us the opportunity to think the relation of the two texts as an inscription other than
in the mode of presence. But to think this other mode of inscription is to think what exceeds
metaphysics-which means to think the second text as the one that poses the question of what
enables metaphysics-that granting which determines that Being will be thought as presence for
metaphysics. As we will see in Chapter II-but as Derrida apparently does not--Heidegger's
question of the Sinn von Sein poses the question of the determination of Being as presence, but
is subject to such violent twisting that its disruption of metaphysical answers to the Seinsfrage
necessitates the move to thinking the Seinsgeschichte (in terms of the trace). The trace names
the relation of the delimitation of metaphysics to the thought of what exceeds metaphysics, thus
situating the delimitation bound to the formal law. What is at stake here is the development in
Heidegger's thought from a scien~e of Being that would delimit metaphysics by isolating (by way
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of a destruction of what remains of the history of ontology) time as the transcendental horizon of
Being. to the thought of the Seinsgeschichte as a Geschick, as the gift of a self-withdrawing
giving.
T.,e mode of inscription of such a trace is the erasure of the trace in its own
production (76/65), which, as we noted above, "The~ of Metaphor" asks us to think as the
movement of Being in its self-withdrawal. The first stage In reading Heidegger this way is to note
that it is the forgetting of the ontological difference .M difference that enables metaphysics, that
is, the forgetting that Being withdraws so that it can be determined as Anwesenheit. and
Anwesenheit as Gegenwartigkeit, (and later as Prasenz). Now this withdrawal is so complete that
there is no trace of it. Since difference (is) (itself) trace, then the trace of the trace has
disappeared (76/65-66). 62 Here we see a structure of triple concealment in which even the
forgetting of withdrawal is forgotten, so Being Is no longer questionable. This structure of
concealment seems to correspond, writes Derrida, to that in "The Anax:imander Fragment,•
where the early trace of distinction Is obliterated when Anwesen appears as the highest Anwesende. However, the erasure of the trace must be traced in the text of metaphysics, so that
it must still be legible, must still be able to be read as •presence,• so that presence is now read
as the trace of the erasure of trace (76-n /65-66). In Heidegger's text on Anax:lmander, the
distinction between Sein and Selenden can be experienced only with its unveiling with the
Anwesen des Anwesendes. This implies that the difference as difference, which is the
self-concealing granting of Being, must have left a trace which is preserved in Anax:imander. In
other words, to khreon Is not the Heideggerian Sache. but the Sache has left a trace in to khreon
which we are to read in order to think the~.
Derrida does not quote this passage from "The Anax:imander Fragment,· but we are
led to it in this context. It should be compared with the passage from the "Logos• essay noted
above. Heidegger's German relies on the plays of~ and .!.l.!.lliH. Geschick and Geschichte:
The translation [Obersetzung] of to khreon as •usage• has not resulted from a
preoccupation with etymologies and dictio~ary meanings [Oberlegung]. The choice of
the word stems from a prior crossing .2Yfil l.!.l.bfiLrsetzen) of a thinking which tries to think
the distinction in the essence of Being in the fateful [geschlcklichen] beginning of Being's
oblivion. The word "usage• is dictated to thinking in the experience of Being's oblivion.
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What properly remains to be thought in the word "usage• has presumably left a trace
[Spur] in to khreon. This trace quickly vanishes in the destiny of Being [im Geschick des
~which unfolds in world history (weltgeschlchtlich) as Western metaphysics:63
Thus all the names of this trace, that is, all the ways in which the self-effacing
difference that grants Being has been determined as the Being of beings, starting with to khreon
and on through mm, ~. ~. energeia. are all metaphysical names. This is a very difficult
point. Does not Heidegger think to khreon as a word dictated to early thinking, before the turn
into metaphysics with Plato and Aristotle? Any number of texts could be marshalled to support
this claim. However, "The Summary of a Seminar on the Lecture Time and Being• tells us we
must move away from what is still metaphysical in the ontological difference: not that Being is
thought as ground, as in "classical" metaphysics, but that Being is "subjugated" to beings.
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The

point Is not to forget the relation of Being to beings, but to think it as a "letting,· an •Anwesen..:
!assen: thought In the manner of Ereignls". 65 Thus to khreon. thought through the kata which
refers Irreducibly to a higher that has a lower under it,
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would be "metaphysical" in the second

of the above senses. Of course the relation of the "Summary of a Seminar" to the rest of
Heidegger's thought remains problematic; here I follow SchOrmann's lead in his chapter "A
Theory of the Texts.• In any event, we must ask how we are to think the relation of Anaximaner's
thought of "das Wesende Im Anwesen• to the thought of Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato and
Aristotle of the "Grundzug des Anwesens· in the following passage from "The Anaximander
Fragment":
The energeia. which Aristotle thinks as the fundamental character of presencing [Grundzug
des Anwesens], of §Q!!, the~ which Plato thinks as the fundamental character of
presencing, the Looos which Heraclitus thinks as the fundamental character of presencing,
the Moira which Parmenides thinks as the fundamental character of presencing, the
Khreon which Anaximander thinks is essential in presencing [als das Wesende Im
Anwesen]--all these name the Same. In the concealed richness of the Same the unity of
the unifying One, the Hen, is thought by each thinker in his own way. 67
All these names belong to the text of metaphysics, Derrida would claim, not to the trace "itself,•
for there is no trace "itselr that can be named. Is this not what Heidegger himself says? Here we
touch upon the controversial ending to Derrida's essay "Differance• where he quotes Heidegger
from "The Anaximander Fragmeni- about the quest for the single word, the proper name of
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Being, which he names "Heideggerian hope• (29/27). Without wishing to advance any final
judgments here, we can note that Derrida omits the last sentence of the paragraph he quotes;
restoring this sentence might lead us to think that the quest for the single word is metaphysics'
quest. not that of eigentliche Denken. which, we might venture with the help of "The Retrait of
Metaphor,· is a thinking that recognizes metaphoricity. I quote the paragraph in its entirety, and
ask the reader to note that the relation of the phrases Wesen des Anwesens and das Wesende
des Seins to das Sein setbst, and the attempt to think das Sein selbst als Ereignis in Zeit und
Sein, which also finds itself faced with the problem of language-in terms of what the "Summary
of a Seminar" calls the issue of "antic models"-is worthy of much scrutiny for its relation to the
Derridean notion of metaphoricity.
The relation to what is present that rules in the essence of presencing itself is a unique
one, altogether incomparable to any other relation. It belongs to the uniqueness of Being
itself. Therefore, In order to name the essential nature of Being, language would have to
find a single word, the unique word. From this we can gather how daring every thoughtful
word addressed to Being is. Nevertheless such daring is not impossible, since Being
speaks always and everywhere throughout language. The difficulty lies not so much in
finding in thought the word for Being as in retaining purely In genuine thinking the word
68
found.
Now if all naming is a naming of presence \only presence is mastered" Derrida says
above at 76/65), then all the names of difference are metaphysical too, not just the difference
between Anwesen and Anwesende but also the difference between ~ and Seiende
(77 /67). Thus difference is older than Being itself, if Being has always let itself be determined as
a being (n'a jamais voulu dire gue l'etant). That Is, if as Heidegger says in "The Anaxlmander
Fragment: "Die Sache des Seins ist es, das Sein ~ Seienden zu sein ...s Now Heidegger
9

attaches two notes to this sentence in the 1950 edition of Holzwege, the first aking us to consider
"Sache" as "Geschick, • and the second telling us that the entire sentence is a hint to regard the
ontological difference. Thus the destiny of Being is to be the Being of beings and thus open to
determination as a being. Now "Geschick" gives us to think the withdrawing sending, whose
structure we noted above is thought by Derrida In terms of the trace. Now, that difference is
older than the Being of beings is what Heidegger tells us in another note from the 1950 edition: "Der Unter-Schied ist unendlich verschieden von allem Sein, das Sein ~ Seienden
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bleibt. Daher bleibt es ungemass, den Unter-schied noch mit 'Sein'--sei es mit, sei es ohne y--zu
benennen. • The extent to which difference is older than Being itself (which might be Ereignis)
is another issue, to be analyzed--as we noted above-by means of the relation of the
Heideggerian thought of "antic models" -which arises when we attempt to think Being itself as
Ereignis-to the Derridean notion of metaphoricity.
Derrida then moves, at the very end of "Ousia and Gramme· to name the difference
which is beyond Being and beings, which traces itself by itself, differance (78/67). Differance
would then let us think writing beyond the metaphysical comprehension of the gramme between
point and circle, that is, in a teleology of presence.

We asked earlier about the oassage

dissimule opening the problem of presence to the problem of the written trace. Now that we
have reached the end of "Ousia and Gramme• we can hazard some guesses. One can attempt
to go beyond metaphysics only by first marking off its limits by a thought of Being as
presence. This attempt, in its questioning after the sense of Being as presence, remains within
an economy that includes an irreducibly metaphysical moment. To overcome metaphysics in
the Heideggerian fashion, Derrida would conclude, one must not just ask about the sense of
Being as presence, but about the granting that determines that Being be so thought throughout
the history of metaphysics. For Derrida, such a granting that withdraws cannot be thought on
the basis of the Sinn van Sein, but only as trace, or differance, which, as the spacing and timing
of the text, can only be thought beyond presence. Such a textual movement, a trace that erases
itself in its own production, can only be called an inscription beyond presence. It is hence
unthinkable for metaphysics, which precisely is sustained by its comprehension of the gramme
within the limits of a teleology of presence, that is, by its blindness to the movement of
inscription, the trace in general, differance.
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NOTES

1.All references to "Ousla and Gramme" in this chapter will be in the text, with the French page
number given first.
2.Heidegger does not seek, as Is often written, to destroy the history of ontology, but instead to
destroy the sedimented remains (Ober1ieferten Bestandes) which cover over the history of the
Seinstrage (Sein und Zeit, p. 22). In the next paragraph Heidegger specifies that his target is not
the past but the contemporary dominant ways of interpreting the history of ontology.
3.David Krell's Intimations of Mortality (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
1986) provides a very strong account of the "turn" that should lay to rest any further attempts to
think it chronologically rather than structurally, that is, as having structured Heidegger's text from
the very beginning. Briefly, the "turn• Is best thought not as the move from Dasein to Being, or
from phenomenological ontology to a meditation on the history of Being, but as the step back
from the metaphysical determination of the being of beings, the Sein des Seienden, to what
enables such a determination. Such enabling was at first thought by Heidegger to be a
transcendental horizon, hence the formulation of the project of scientific philosophy, or
phenomenological ontology, as the working out of die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein Oberhaupt.
4.Slnce Derrida's relation to Heidegger Is precisely what is in question here, I think it best to
avoid any characterization of that relation as "critique.· Both Kantian critique and ideology critique
imply a standing outside a textual object and discovering its condition of possibility in a totally
different arena, thereby finding the truth of the error under critique. Deconstruction, on the other
hand, intervenes in a social text by situating it in the general text, thereby exposing the force
Investments of its construction. Deconstructive Intervention thus changes the balance of a field
of forces by robbing the examined text of its aura of naturalness and (pure) reasonableness.
5.Whether or not "Heidegger" (that is, the unity of those hermeneutical determinations of the
author's intention of those texts signed by the man Martin Heidegger) was under any illuslons
concerning the purity of his position vis-a-vis metaphysics, such a schema is useful in directing
our readings of Heidegger.
6. See note 3 above.
7.See "Tympan," In Maraes: "Therefore, if they appear marginal to some of the great texts in the
history of philosophy, these ten writings In fact ask the question of the margin" (xviii-xix/xxiii).
8.0n the structure of the re-mark see Derrida's "The Double Session" in Dissemination. tr.
Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). The best readings of this most
difficult point can be found in GascM's The Tain of the Mirror, as well as his "Non-Totalization
without Spuriousness: Derrida and Hegel on the Bad Infinite," Journal of the British Society for
Phenomenology, 17, 3 (October 1986), pp. 289-307.
9.0n the relation of the trace to differance as time/space see the section of Of Grammatology
entitled "The Hinge," as well as Irene Harvey's commentary on it in her Derrida and the Economy
of Differance.
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1o.Rodolphe Gasche has developed the term "quasi-transcendental" in The Tain of the Mirror to
describe the way in which any mark in a textual field can assume a position of domination of that
field (and thus as ordering the field seem exterior or transcendent to it) and yet still remain a
member of the field. Such a structure always results in the "haunting• of which ''the metaphor of
metaphor" described in 'White Mythology" is perhaps the best example.
11. Derrida discusses the impossibility of controlling iteration, of limiting iteration to contexts
deemed appropriate by an author, under the rubric of "dissemination." See "Signature Event
Context" in Margins; Limited Inc; and "The Double Session" in Dissemination.
12.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 25.
13.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 25. Heidegger's quotation marks.
14.I am indebted to Lawrence Waxman for helping me see the significance of the title, as indeed

I am for many more points that must go otherwise unacknowledged.
15.Martin Heidegger, "Zeit und Sein,• in Zur Sache des Denkens.
16.Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 7.
17.Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens. p. 6. It is of course much too precipitous to simply
equate the Heideggerian thought of the history of Being and the Derridean notions of
logocentrism (and phonocentrism). A complex move at the end of Heidegger's essay
"Logos (Heraclitus, B 50)* renders any simple readings of his notions of the connections of the
Greek logos, metaphysics, and the privilege of the voice extremely problematic, as he poses
them explicitly in terms of the trace, or more suggestively, in terms of a non-trace, what has not
left a trace, a trace that has erased itself:
The Greeks do experience saying In this way. But, Heraclitus included, they never
think the essence of language (das Wesen der Sprache) expressly as the Loaos, as the
Laying that gathers.
What would have come to pass (sich erelgnet) had Heraclitus-and all the Greeks
after him-thought the essence of language expressly as Logos, as the Laying that
gathers! Nothing less than this: the Greeks would have thought the essence of language
from the essence of Being--indeed, as this itself. For ho Logos is the name for the Being
of beings. Yet none of this came to pass Cereignete sich nicht). Nowhere do we find a
trace (§Qur) of the Greek's having thought the essence of language directly from the
essence of Being. Instead, language came to be represented--indeed first of all with the
Greeks-as vocalization, ~. as sound and voice, hence phonetically. . .. Once,
however, in the beginning of Western thinking, the essence of language flashed (blltzte)
in the light of Being-once, when Heraclitus thought the Logos as his guiding word, so as
to think in this word the Being of beings. But the lightning abruptly vanished (ver1osch
jah). No one held onto its streak of light and the nearness~ of what it illuminated.
Nortrage und Aufsatze [Pfullingen: Neske, 1961, pp. 24-25; Ear1y Greek Thinking, pp. 7778.)
I will later examine Derrida's reading of Heidegger's "The Anaximander Fragment• in terms of the
trace.
18.This account of the development of Heidegger's thought is indebted to Reiner SchOrmann's
Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy. which was in turn influenced by
Werner Marx's Heidegger and the Tradition.
19.Although I find SchOrmann's reading of Heidegger extremely enlightening, such that I will use
his three-fold schema throughout, the distinction between "Heidegger 2· and "Heidegger 3•
seems extremely hard to draw. And Indeed Derrida in this essay does not seem to recognize
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such a distinction. For instance, "The Anaxirnander Fragment,• the centerpiece of the
.§einsgeschichte period, speaks of the beginning of the sending of Being in terms of Ereignis:
The oblivion of the distinction [Unterschiedes], with which the destiny of Being [Geschick
des SeinsJ begins, and which will carry through to completion, is all the same not a lack,
but rather the richest and most prodigious event [Ereignis]: in it the history of the Western
world comes to be borne out [zum Austrag kommt]. It is the event [Ereignis] of
metaphysics. What now is stands in the shadow of the already forgone destiny of Being's
oblivion. (Holzwege. p. 336/51)
For that matter, Heidegger's letter to Richardson complicates any thought of a simple turn from
"Heidegger 1• to "Heidegger 2, • as the following sentences show:
As a result, even in the initial steps of the Beingquestion in Being and Time thought is
called upon to undergo a change whose movement car-responds with the reversal
... only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is
to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible only
if it is contained in Heidegger 11· (Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, xviii,
xxii).
But Heidegger himself would never ask us to unquestioningly accept any author's self-interpretation, so let us continue examining Derrida's reading of the changes in Heidegger's focus.
20.Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 16/15.
21. "Le proche et le propre• should be read as "the near and the proper,• not ''the near and the
far,• as Bass mistranslates it.
22.We will note several times Derrida's reading of espacement as that which grants presence. Here we must carefully note Heidegger's insistence on moving away from "production"
models in describing this process: "Thus the character of effecting [Bewirkens] is removed from
the letting in letting-presence [Anwesenlassen]" (Zur Sache des Denkens, 50/47). Derrida takes
no fewer precautions in insisting that differance be thought of as neither passive nor active, as
this passage from "Differance" shows:
Thus one comes to posit presence ... no longer as the absolutely central form of Being
but as a "determination" and as an "effect.• A determination or an effect within a system
which is no longer that of presence but of differance, a system that no longer tolerates the
opposition of activity and passivity, nor that of cause and effect ... (17 /16)
23.See for example, "The End of Metaphysics,· p. 26, and "Heidegger/Derrida - Presence,•
p. 144, in Delimitations.
24.I am indebted here, as indeed in much of this dissertation, to stimulating discussions with
Charles Scott on "Ousia and Gramme" at the Collegium Phaenomenologicum in Perugia, Italy,
during the summers of 1987 and 1989.
25.E. Martineau applauds Derrida for noticing Aristotle's awareness of the exoteric nature of the
.!.QgQ§ under examination in his "Conception vulgaire et conception aristotelicienne du temps:
Note sur Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie de Heidegger,· Archives de Philosophie, 43
(1980), pp. 99-120.
26.Recall here that the Basic Problems were unavailable at the time Derrida wrote "Ousia and
Gramme.· I will address this point in Chapter 3, since this is obviously one point at which a
reading of Basic Problems of Phenomenology would be critical. Derrida does refer us here to
the privilege of the 3rd person present active indicative of the infinitive "to be,· as Heidegger
mentions it in EinfOhrung in die Metaphysik (TObingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953); (English translation,
Introduction to Metaphysics, by Ralph Mannheim [New York: Doubleday, 1962]) and as Derrida
takes it up in his essay "The Supplement of Copula,• Marges.
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21.GWF Hegel, Enzyklopadie der Philosophische Wissenschaften im Grundriss (Hamburg: Felix
Meiner. 1969),
# 257. English translation by A.V. Miller, Hegel's Philosophy of Nature
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1970).
2a.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 49.
29.ln a note at this point in his text, Derrida refers us to 'White Mythology," Marges.
30.Derrida's analysis of the Hegelian relation of time and space figures in "The Pit and the
Pyramid," Maraes.
31.Derrida writes: ·sense (in whatever sense it is understood: as essence, as the meaning of
discourse, as the orientation of movement between~ and~ has never been conceivable,
within the history of metaphysics, otherwise than on the basis of presence and as presence,•
Marges (58/51). This quote will be one of the foci of Chapter 2.
32.0n the aporiai of Aristotle seen as a positive method, see Pierre Aubenque, Le probleme de
l'etre chez Aristote (Paris: PUF, 1962). As I will discuss in Chapter Ill, Heidegger does claim in
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology that Aristotle does in fact present a solution to the aporia
of time's belonging to beings in Physics IV.14. See here Martineau's discussion of the point.
33.See also the conclusion to Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik.
34.Bass' "within" for ·en deca" seems problematic in the context of a thought attempting to
exceed metaphysics.
35.ln Chapter Ill I discuss this point in relation to the Heideggerian and Derridean notions of selfaffection.
36.Derrida remarks here (Marges 49/55) that Kant also relates while distinguishing time to
movement and change. He refers in a note to the Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of
Time as it appears in the Transcendental Aesthetic. The Kantian move also takes off, Derrida
continues. from the "analogy constituted by what is traced determined as line (gramme. Linie), •
as does Aristotle.
37.As Rodolphe Gasche remarks on this point, the irreducible tie of the question of the meaning
of time to the system of presence suppresses the thought of differance as temporalization, the
spacing and timing of a text of traces. See his The Tai:i of the Mirror. p. 197.
38.Derrida spells this out In more detail in his analysis of Husserl in La voix et le pMnomene
(Paris: PUF, 1967); (English translation, Speech and Phenomena and other essays on Husserl's
Theory of Signs, David Allison [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973]). This analysis
relies heavily on Heidegger's ldentitat und Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957); (English
translation, Identity and Difference, Joan Stambaugh [New York: Doubleday, 1961]), to which
Derrida will allude shortly in "Ousia and Gramme.·
39.Here there seems an explicit reference to Identity and Difference. Derrida's full sentence at
Marges 64 /56 reads:
Now, if Aristotle gives himself the difference between time and space (for example, in the
distinction between nun and stigme) as a constituted difference, the enigmatic articulation
of this difference is lodged in his text, hidden, sheltered, but operating within complicity,
within the complicity of the same and the other, with the with or the together, with the
slmul In which Being-together Is not a determination of Being, but the very production of
Being.
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To think the belonging-together of identity and difference in the same as the granting of Being
is Heidegger's project in Identity and Difference.
40.I cannot even begin to explore the relation of Derrida's graphics [plural and lower-case] to
Hegel's J:Q.giQ [singular and capital(izing)] here. Derrida himself acknowledges his "almost
absolute proximity to Hegel" in Positions, p. 44, even as he distinguishes differance from
Hegelian Unterschied at the point where Hegel "d9termines difference as contradiction only in
order to resolve it .. ." See John Uewelyn, "A Point of Almost Absolute Proximity to Hegel" in
Deconstruction and Philosophy, ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
41.Derrida, Grammatologie. p. 90/70.
42.0f course, "spatial• must be put between quotation marks as well, for similar reasons. As I
make clear in the Introduction, I explain the undecidable spatialjtemporal status of specific terms
by virtue of the irreducible possibility of their iteration in both spatial and temporal contexts. More
precisely put, in contexts one might wish to denominate as "purely spatial or temporal, but
whose denomination as such Is haunted.
43.Derrida, La voix et le pMnomene. p. 73/65.
44.Derrida, La voix, 96/86. This ls of course exactly what Heidegger says about the ecstatic
nature of temporality. Derrida's complaint, as we will see in Chapter II, Is with Heidegger's
naming of temporality as "original time" and thinking the description of this time could be kept
pure of spatial reference.
45.My use of "reference" here perhaps calls for some explanation. Just as marks refer to the
other marks of the field via traces, so does one iteration of a mark refer to all the other iterations
of that "same" mark. To say that a pure time Is impossible without any spatial reference is to say
that any discourse on time must make use of marks which refer to their possible iteration in
spatial contexts.
46.Derrida, La voix.

n /68.

47.Hussert, Vorlesungen zur PMnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewussteins, #36. Ed. Martin
Heidegger, in Jahrbuch fOr Phanomenologie, 9 (1928). English translation by James Churchill,
The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,

1964).
48.Derrida, La voix, 95/85.
49.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 328.
SO.Derrida, La voix, 95/85.
51.Derrida, Grammatologie, p. 83/65-66.
52.0f course, Derrida is no simple structuralist, as the emphasis on "system" might seem to
imply. See here his ·structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences; and ·Force and
Signification" in Writing and Difference.
53.Gasche articulates the strange intertocking of these and all other quasi-transcendentals.
Differance can seem to order the field of quasi-transcendentals from which it is drawn, thus
appearing as a master name, Derrida's fundamental concept, and so on, only to be itself subject
to a re-marking. Likewise, the re-mark relates itself to other quasi-transcendentals according to
differance. that is, for example, as the supplement different and deferred.
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54.Derrida, Marges, 392/329.
55.As indeed Heidegger recognizes, when he speaks in "Zeit und Sein" of that which grants time,
but is not temporal, even though its "movement" is one of withdrawal (Zur Sache des Denkens,
18/17).
56. As Schurmann warns us on this point, we have to be careful equating Anwesenheit a.rid
Anwesen, as Derrida seems to do here, without taking into account the difference between the
phrase Anwesen des Anwesenden, which as similar to Sein des Seiendes seems indeed to be
the same as Anwesenheit, and the meaning of Anwesen that would be analogous to das Sein
selbst. To make matters even more complex, Heidegger uses the phrases das Wesende des
Seins, and das Wesende des Anwesen in the "Anaximander Fragment." Also, Prasenz appears
in Basic Problems of Phenomenology as the horizon of everydayness, the "handiness of the
handy." p. 438/308.
57.Bass' "would remain within the metaphysics of presence in general" eliminates the emphasis
of the parentheses.
58.Heidegger, Holzwege. p. 340; EGT. p. 54.
59.Derrida, "Le Retrait de la Metaphore," Poesie 7 (1978); English translation, "The Retrait of
Metaphor,• Enclitic 11, no. 2 (Fall 1978).
60. Derrida, "Le Retrait, • 123 /29-30.
61.Bass' "before or beyond" misses the "vigilance," the "keeping watch," connotations of "a la
vielle" that Derrida thematizes in "Plato's Pharmacy,• the sense that the constitution of
metaphysics requires a vigilance to insure the success of its repressive gestures, as well as the
plays on Greece as the dawn of the evening-land, die Fruhe des Abend-Landes in Heidegger,
e.g. Holzwege, pp. 300-302.
62.Derrida here writes "is" under erasure, for at issue here is precisely the relation of difference
to Being. If difference is "older" than Being, it could never be a being about which one could say
. •. •
it IS.

63.Heidegger, Holzweqe, p. 340/54.
64.Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 36/33.
65.Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 40/37.
66.Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 334/49.
67.Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 342/56.
68.Heidegger, Holzwege, pp. 337-38/52.
69.Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 335/50.

CHAPTER II

THE SINNSFRAGE AND THE SEINSFRAGE

Introduction
As we have seen in beginning the articulation of the economy of time in Chapter
I, Derrida's "Ousia and Gramme" reads the constraints within which operates Heidegger's reading
in Sein und Zeit of Aristotle's relation to the metaphysical tradition. For Derrida, Heidegger's
1

attempt to isolate Temporalitat as the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt remains tied, via the marker
"Sinn," to the system of metaphysical conceptuality oriented by the desire for self-presence. The
accompanying attempt to destroy what remains of the history of ontology thus produces textual
effects which can be analyzed according to what Derrida calls a formal rule of "submission and
subtraction" with regard to the system of the evaded question, that is, to the determination of
Being as presence as it serves to delimit metaphysics. "Time," which Heidegger wishes to isolate
as the horizon for any understanding of Being, for Derrida serves as a mark of the epoche of the
trace, that is, as an indication of metaphysics' necessary occlusion of "differance" as time/space.
"Ousia and Gramme," via its posing of the "formal rule" as the articulation of the textual effects
of using a notion of ''time,· will thus enable us to understand how Heidegger's attempt to isolate
"time" as the transcendental horizon of Being is haunted by "spatial" terms. Such a haunting also
explains the necessity to use quotation marks in this context. As I have explained in the
Introduction, such haunting is the result of the irreducible possibility of iterating the terms of
temporal discourse in spatial contexts.
At question here is Heidegger's move from a science of Being to the history of
Being, a move often confused with the Heideggerian "turn. "2 John Sallis asks in his recent essay
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"Twisting Free"--regarding the foundering of the project of Sein und Zeit-whether "an analysis
of temporality could ever suffice for developing the question of the meaning of Being. "

3

Continuing along this line of questioning, we can see the larger context of my task: What were
the constraints that led 1-'eidegger at the end of his career, in Zur Sache des Denkens, to end
up speaking about Ereignis/Enteignis in terms of time/space, explicitly backing away from Sein
und Zeit's attempt to ground Dasein's spatiality on its temporality on the way to isolating time
as the the Sinn von Sein Oberhaupt?

What was it about the working out of the project of

fundamental ontology announced In Sein und Zeit that led Heidegger, as Derrida puts it, "to
change horizons" and move from the question of the Sinn van Sein to take up the question of
the Seinsgeschichte?
In moving toward an answer to these questions, in this chapter I will focus upon the
effect that what I will call the "Sinnsfrage"-the question of the sense of sense, or the Sinn von
Sinn-has upon the Seinstrage, the question of the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt. I will show that
posing the Seinsfrage in terms of Temporalitat as the Sinn von Sein Oberhaupt does not remain
simply tied to the system of presence, as Derrida seems to claim, but articulates an economy
marginal to the system of presence. However, I will also show that the transgression of
metaphysics wrought by the economy of the Sinnsfrage / Seinsfrage is a dead-end street, so
to speak, one that necessitates the change to the graphic of the trace that Heidegger later
comes to inscribe in his text in the question of the Seinsgeschichte. The move from Temporalitat
as the Sinn von Sein Oberhaupt to the inscription of the graphic of the trace in the ~
geschlchte Is thus a move from time to time/space.
It is now time to give a first Indication of the focus of this chapter, the Sinnsfrage
as it is at work in Sein und Zeit. The Sinnsfrage arises through two mechanisms. In the first,
various historically sedimented acceptations of the mark "Sinn" are intertwined in each iteration
of "Sinn." In the second mechanism of the Sinnsfrage, Heidegger attempts a double rewriting
of the historical sedimentation of one acceptation-that of Sinn as "meaning.• Here Heidegger
takes as the most common acceptation-the one he assumes most readers would adopt-the
metaphysical notion of an intentum expressible in a statement. I call this a metaphysical notion
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because it seems bound to a notion of a stable, self-present subject who aims a flashlight-like
ray of intentionality at a mental object. Heidegger will first-and only provisionally--rewrite the
4

notion of meaning as intentum as the "pivot" of an existential projection of Dasein in its Beingin-the-world. Later, in the temporal recapitulation, he will rewrite the notion of "pivot" as the
direction of Dasein's movement (Beweatheit).
Thus, via these two mechanisms of historical sedimentation and attempted rewriting,
the textual performance of Sein und Zeit twists several acceptations of the mark "Sinn,• viz. the
sensuous (the bodily "senses"), linguistic (the "sense· or meaning of a phrase), and directional
5

(the "sense" of a river), into each iteration of "Sinn." Now, as Derrida has shown in his analyses
6

of dissemination, to be recognizable as a mark "Sinn,• like all marks, must be citable in contexts
other than the ones a hermeneusis could specify as corresponding to the author's intention. The
meaning of "Sinn• hence drifts back and forth among all its senses, haunted by the ones it tries
to delimit. As a result of its haunted drifting, the Sinnsfrage poses a marginal economy of the
Seinsfrage, the Frage nach dem Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt.
By accounting for the haunted drifting the Sinnsfrage sets loose in Sein und Zeit,
we arrive at the following economy of possible interpretations of the question of Being as it is
posed in terms of Sinn in Sein und Zeit.

While it cannot be considered solely a simple

subjectivizing-an inquiry into a concept qua representation of Being, a concept discoverable by
investigating the use of the word-family gathered under the infinitive "to be"-neither can it totally
escape from such an understanding, about which Heidegger complained in the "Letter on
7

Humanism. " On the other hand, it is no longer so clearcut--as Derrida seems to imply-that Sinn
in Sein und Zeit remains hopelessly caught within a metaphysical pattern. As I will show, the
textual work of Sein und Zeit installs a moment in the economy of possible interpretation of the
mark Sinn as it functions in the question of the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt that is refractory to the
system of presence. Such refraction, however, functions even as the historical sedimentations
of the marker "Sinn" open the question of Being to subjectivistic misunderstanding.

The

economy of Sinn in the Seinsfrage that is Sein und Zeit is thus marginal to metaphysical
patterning. It includes readings that do and do not cohere with metaphysical patterns.
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Recognizing the marginality that the Sinnsfrage installs in the Seinsfrage of Sein und
Zeit is what allows my reading to differ substantially from that of Derrida.

Derrida claims that

the Seinsfrage, when posed in terms of Sinn. is inherently metaphysical, as the following
quotation from "Ousia and Gramme" shows:
The determination of beingness (Qy.filW as energeia or entelekheia, as the act and end of
movement, is inseparable from the determination of time. The sens of time is thought on
the basis of the present as nontime. And this could not be otherwise: any sens (in
whatever sens it is understood: as essence, as the meaning [signification] of discourse,
as the orientation of the movement between arche and telos) has never been conceivable,
within the history of metaphysics, otherwise than on the basis of presence and as
presence. The concept of sens Is governed by the entire system of determinations that
we are pointing out here, and every time that a question of sens [Derrida's emphasis] is
posed, it must be posed within the closure of metaphysics. To put it quite summarily,
one seeks in vain to extract the question of sens (of time or of anything else) as such from
metaphysics, or from the system of the so-called "vulgar" concepts. Such also would be
the case, therefore, for a question of Being determined, as it is at the beginning of Sein
und Zeit, as a question of the sens de l'etre, whatever the force, necessity, and value
(irruptive as well as fundamental) of such a question. Heidegger doubtless would
acknowledge that as a question of sens, the question of Being is already linked, at its
point of departure, to the (lexical and grammatical) discourse of the metaphysics whose
destruction it has undertaken. In a certain manner, as Bataille gives us to think, the
question of~. the project of preserving sens, is "vulgar." This is his word too. 8
However, this seems rather a flat condemnation of Sinn / sens by Derrida, one not quite as
9

nuanced as other of his writings. For instance, at the end of Margins he writes: ''there is no
10

metaphysical concept in itself, only a work performed in conceptual systems. •

If Derrida does

not then seem justified in simply condemning prima facie any inscription of Sinn/sens, we then
need to ask: What work does Sinn perform in Sein und Zeit?
As we will see, Sinn sets up an economy marginal to the telos of self-presence, and
hence inscribes Sein und Zeit at the margin of metaphysics. It doP.s all this, however, without
inscribing the graphic of the trace. The useful thing about "Ousia and Gramme" for our purposes
is that Derrida does seem correct in his analysis of the haunting of the allegedly purified temporal
terms by "spatial" "metaphors." Thus, using Derrida's lead in "Ousia and Gramme," as I have
interpreted it in Chapter I, I will explain how the moment of the economy of the Sinnsfrage in
which Sinn functions as "direction" shows the spatial haunting of the allegedly purified language
about time. Now, this means that that which disrupts any metaphysical interpretations of several
analyses in Sein und Zeit--the rewriting of Sinn as the direction of ecstatic self-movement--is both
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haunted by Sinn as meaning and installs a spatiality at the heart of Heidegger's descriptions of
Zeitlichkeit. Such a spatiality limits Heidegger's attempt to isolate Zeitlichkeit as the ground of
oasein's spatiality on the way to exhibiting Temporalitat as the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt, and
'1ence time, redeemed from the vulgar concept, as the horizon for any possible Seinsverstandnis.
Thus two hauntings will need to be articulated with each other: the haunting of time
by space and that of .filnn as direction by Sinn as meaning. These hauntings, along with others
centered on the Sinn of sight as it is redetermined by Heidegger from bodily to understandingly
disclosive, could only be disentangled by asking about the proper Sinn for the mark "Sinn.• Even
though Heidegger is aware of these "hauntings" he casts them in terms of misunderstanding; the
important thing for us to see is the economy of possible interpretations here, and the inability
of an author to control fully the disseminative drift to which his or her terminology is subject,
even as he or she analyzes its conditions of possibility, as Heidegger does in Sein und Zeit.

11

The two hauntings are related in the following way: On the way to determining
Temporalitat as the Sinn van Sein Oberhauct Heidegger tries to rewrite Sinn as he rewrites
understanding in the temporal recapitulation whereby projection becomes Dasein's Bewegtheit.
The "upon-which" of a projection then becomes the unity of horizonal schemata that provide
direction to Dasein's ecstatic movement. Projection can thus no longer be seen as a subjective
intending, so that the image for "understanding" becomes one of thrownness into the clearing,
not that of a flashlight shining from a fixed point. Now, in order that Zeitlichkeit be kept pure of
the vulgar time concept, Heidegger tries to keei:i the Bedeutung of several temporal marks free
of any spatialized acceptation. But Heidegger never succeeds in fully breaking free of the
historically sedimented "spatial" terms. The "temporal" terms employed by Heidegger are "spatial"
as well: movingness, which Heidegger attempts to define as the Beweatheit of Dasein as
opposed to the Bewegung of present-at-hand entities, is still described in back and forth terms,
directional terms. Heidegger's struggle is with such a historically sedimented spatial language,
a sedimentation that opens possibilities of iteration he makes a last attempt to manage by
claiming it is brought about by Dasein's falling self-interpretation in terms of present entities encountered within the world. 12
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At this point one might be tempted to say that Heidegger intends a purified original
time-Zeitlichkeit as the Sinn of care--as the Sinn of his discourse, but is betrayed by the
language at his disposal, so that "spatial representations" occur only at the level of expression.
This attempt would however bring up the problem of metaphoricity analyzed in 'White
Mythology.• I will show in the rest of this chapter that Heidegger's being forced to use what he
acknowledges as a language dominated by "spatial representations· (369) to talk about
Zeitlichkeit is not contingent failure, but rather the inscription of a haunting that limits the alleged
purity of its description by recalling its birth in time/space. In other words, the inevitability, even
in a highly sophisticated and self-conscious text like Sein und Zeit, of "spatial representations"
in describing a primordial time constitutes what I call the "haunting• predicted by the formal rule
articulated by Derrida in ·ousia and Gramme.· My question will be, following Derrida, if spatial
representations are the result of falling temporality, and falling is a necessary structure of Dasein,
why call it "falling" and "inauthentic,• and why not account positively for the way spatial terms
inhabit the description of temporality? I call such a positive account "the economy of time."
Now, one cannot avoid the positive account by calling this necessary spatializing a metaphor
without risking an abyssal reduplication-or an endless proliferation of scare quotes-because
"metaphor" bespeaks an "original" carrying ("..Q!:!Qm"), a carrying beyond (".!!!filg"), the primary
signifying "field.•

The Formal Structure of the Sinnsfrage

Let us begin with the formal structure of the Sinnsfrage. The abyssal question about
the "sense of sense• or "meaning of meaning,· is posed whenever one attempts to establish a
privileged Sinn for the mark "Sinn." Asking about the primary or proper Sinn of Sinn already
presupposes that we know what Sinn as Bedeutung "means." In asking about the Sinnsfrage as
It operates within Sein und Zelt, we must not only be cognizant of the system of exchange
between the English "sense," the French "sens" used (and mentioned) by Derrida and the
German "Sinn" used (and mentioned) by Heidegger; we must also distinguish between the
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historical sedimentations of "Sinn" in German and Heidegger's attempted rewritings of its various
acceptations. Heidegger's attempts to rewrite Sinn by privileging some of its acceptations run
afoul of the Slnnsfraae because "acceptation" (which I here take as equivalent to Bedeutunq)

13

is also an acceptation of "Sinn.· Consulting dictionaries here is most illuminatin3. Wahriq
Oeytsches Worterbuch lists under Sinn the following: "Bedeutung, geistiger Gehalt (einer
Oichtung, Aufgabe, Frage, eines Wortes). • The OED has for #22 under "sense":
~.according

".ID.s. (specified)

to a particular acceptation or interpretation (of a word, phrase, etc.) .. ." And

Robert has for 111.2 under ·~·: "Ce qu'un signe (notamment un signe du langage) signifie.
Acceptlon, signification, signifie, valeur ... •
We might attempt to avoid the Sinnsfrage by unraveling this doubling through the
use of something like the use/mention distinction of speech act theory developed by Austin and
Searle and explored by Derrida in Limited Inc.
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However, the distinction breaks down in the

case of "sense"; the quotation marks can multiply ad infinitum. Is the second "acceptation· (which
I have just mentioned, hence the quotation marks) used or mentioned In the sentence: "This task
Is most complicated because 'acceptation' Is also an acceptation of 'Sinn' "? But then again
could I not have doubled the quotation marks, since the second "use" is also a "mention"? Then
the sentence would have to be written: "This task Is most complicated because 'acceptation' is
also an ' "acceptation•' of 'Sinn.'· Each step up the use/mention "ladder" would then necessitate another set of quotation marks, yet we would still be faced with the question of the sense
of sense.

In this chapter I will often use "acceptation,• but I ask readers not to think this solves
the Sinnsfraqe. Rather it is only a strategically adopted device for the sake of readability.

What were the acceptations of Sinn that Heidegger could assume in his audiences?
Obviously I can do no more than begin to answer this question with a brief survey of the use of
"Sinn" in philosophical German In the 50 years prior to Sein und Zeit. Brenatano's Von der
15

which, as is well known, played an
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does not thematically distinguish

mannigfachen Bedeutungen des Seiendes nach Ari§toteles,
important role in Heidegger's philosophical development,
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between Sinn and Bedeutung. Thus Sinn could here be taken as quite close to the English
•meaning [of a word or phrase]." As the title indicates, Heidegger changes Brentano's question
from the Bedeutungen des Seiendes to the question of the Sinn van Sein.
Sinn and Bedeutung were first thematically distinguished by Frege in his 1892 article
"Uber Sinn und Bedeutung."
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In this essay Frege discusses his distinction first for what he calls

"proper names,· that Is, those units of discourse that denominate a single object, and then for
"declarative sentences." In the case of proper names, the Bedeutung is the object intended in
the talk, while the Sinn lies between the Bedeutung and the idea in the mind of the speaker; Sinn
is "indeed no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself.· Frege also uses the
following analogy: Bedeutung: Moon:: Sinn : telescope image:: Idea: retinal image.
In the case of declarative sentences, Frege is a bit more clear. Bedeutung is the
truth-value of the sentence, while Sinn is the "thought" contained in the sentence. The thought
is not the "subjective performance· to be sure, but "its objective content, which is capable of
being the common property of several thinkers.• Frege goes on to criticize natural languages as
containing expressions without a definite Sinn and of allowing for expressions with a Sinn but
without a Bedeutung. These shortcomings, which can wreak political havoc, as the example of
the phrase "the will of the people" shows, should not be tolerated in a logically perfect language,
Frege's famous project of a Begriffsschrift.
Sinn also plays an important role in Husserl, as Derrida has shown in Speech and
Phenomena (which analyzes the Logical lnvesigations) and "Form and Meaning• (which analyzes
Ideas I). I cannot investigate these most complicated analyses here, but will instead show only
how Sinn is thematized in its relation to Bedeutung. In the Logical Investigations18 Husserl tells
us he will use Sinn and Bedeutung interchangeably, and even defends the usefulness of their
ambiguity against Frege. In the process he inscribes the Sinnsfrage as he uses Bedeutung in the
definition of Sinn and Sinn in the definition of Bedeutung:

Bedeutung gilt uns ferner als g I e i c h b e d e u t e n d mit Sinn. . . Einerseits ist es
gerade bei deisem Beg riff sehr angenehm, parallele Termini zu haben, mit denen man
abwechseln kann; und zumal in Untersuchungen van der Art der vorliegenden, wo eben
der Sinn des Terminus Bedeutung erforscht werden soll. 19
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Later in his career Husserl distinguishes Sinn and Bedeutung. In Ideas 1,

20

#124-31 Husserl

restricts Bedeutung to the "logical" or "expressive" stratum, while Sinn is conceived as the
determinable noematic matter stamped by the elevation to the stratum of Ausdrucken.
Heidegger's Inscription of Sinn
The Introduction to Sein und Zeit
In moving to discuss Heidegger we should realize that Sinn appears in Heidegger's
work prior to Sein und Zeit, especially in Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit and Prolegomena
zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes, two lecture courses immediately preceeding the 1927
publication of Sein und Zeit.
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Here Heidegger characterizes the question of the Sinn van Sein,
22

the Seinsfrage, as the question of "was besagt Sein, " 'Was ist Sein,· 'Was heisst Sein"
Sein bedeutet."
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Sometimes Heidegger will also write 'Was besagt 'Sein,'"

25

23

or "was

indicating with the

scare quotes that the Seinsfrage at this time, as it would become again in Introduction to
Metaphysics, was enmeshed with the question of the meaning of the word "Sein.· As is well
known, Introduction to Metaphysics addresses the etymology of the word "Sein" as a clue to
exploring the history of Being. At the time of Introduction to Metaphysics, however, Heidegger
had not yet completed the move toward an explicit posing of the Seinsgeschichte in purely
"structural" terms,

26

as he does in "The Anaximander Fragment. "27

Finally we arrive at the inscription of Sinn in the text of Sein und Zeit. I will attempt
something of th.e "perverse" reading of Heidegger alluded to in Derrida's Of Spirit. 28 That is, I will
take Heidegger seriously when he commands us to redetermine several key terms of his text,
especially Sinn and Sicht.

29

To do so I will have to take up another of Derrida's strategies in Of

Spirit, that of paying special attention to Heidegger's use of quotation marks.
In the rest of this chapter I will first read closely the opening page and Introduction
to Sein und Zeit, in order to lay out the various mechanisms of the Sinnsfrage. Then, in the first
part of the section on the existential analytic, I will explore a bit more closely Heidegger's
struggles with redetermining "sight,• as well as the important discussions of Vorhandenheit and
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extension in the analysis of Descartes and the analysis of Dasein's spatiality. In the second part
of the section devoted to the existential analytic I will begin a "structural" reading of the
Sinnsfrage. beginning with the privileging of Sinn as meaning over Sinn as the senses. Then in
the section on the "Temporal Recapitulation" I will trace thE' third acceptation of Sinn, that of
"direction,· as it is at work in the analyses of Zeitlichkeit, the transcendence of world, and
historicality. We will then finally be in a position to consider Chapter 6 of the Second Division,
on the genesis of the ordinary concept of time, within which occurs the note that is the object
of Derrida's ·ousia and Gramme.·
My major concern with Sein ynd Zeit is its posing of the Being question in terms
of Sinn. The usual translation of die Frage nach dem Sinn van Sein is ''the question of the
meaning of Being." However, the English "meaning" is a poor translation of Sinn as it operates
throughout Sein und Zeit. This is so first of all because Heidegger's text rewrites Sinn from the
metaphysical notion of intentum--leaving aside the question of the status of the Husserlian Sinn
as noematic correlate of a sense-conferring act-to "pivot" of an existential projection, and
secondly because this first rewriting is itself rewritten in the temporal recapitulation of Part I,
Division 2, Chapter 4. If we wish as well to take Derrida's writings on dissemination into account
we must concede that Sinn's plurivocity cannot be totally governed by a hermeneusis of
contexts, so that many acceptations are twisted into each mark, a twisting that broaches the
abyssal Sinnsfrage.

Heidegger's struggles with the intertwining of the Sinnsfrage and the Seinsfrage-posed in terms of Seinsverstandnis, the understanding which projects upon the Sinn van Sein-begin on the first page of Sein und Zeit. Under the Greek quotation from the Sophist Heidegger
asks us if we today have an answer to the question of what we intend [meinen] with the word
"Being" lseiend]? Heidegger places in scare quotes "seiend" to indicate he is using it to translate
Plato's to on. We should notice here the emphasis on the word "Sein,· which will result in a
doubling of Sinn throughout Sein und Zeit. The metaphysically marginal economy of Sinn in Sein
und Zeit, the Sinnsfrage, will partially be posed between Sinn as Bedeytyng of the word ·~·
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and the Sinn van Sein as Heidegger rewrites Sinn as the direction of Dasein's Beweatheit.
Heidegger will attempt to restrict the range of Sinn as Bedeutung of the word "Sein" to its
function as a clue to the Seinsfrage. That is, Heidegger wants the level of our awareness of the
Bedeutung of the word "Sein" --how aware we are about that which we intend by "seiend" --to
function as a clue to the need to renew the Seinsfrage. As we will see, the answer to the
question of Being will not come in the form of an acquaintance with the use of a word, but rather
in the form of a practice, "concrete phenomenological investigation,· that will investigate the
Bewegtheit of Dasein. Having to conduct this concrete phenomenological investigation under the
rubric of the single mark "Sinn"-Heidegger's having to hunt, via the analysis of Dasein's
Zeitlichkeit, forTemporalitat as the Sinn van Sein-is, however, contaminated by the metaphysical
system in which Sinn as the Bedeutung of the word "Sein" would yield us a concept we could
use for the regulation of our representations. I call the economy of such contamination the
"Sinnsfrage, • since its undecidable oscillation could only be stilled by posing the question of the
sense of sense, the Sinn van Sinn.
Because we have no answer even here as to what is intended by the word "seiend"
Heidegger tells us that we must "pose anew die Frage nach dem Sinn van Sein.· Heidegger then
asks if we even experience the perplexity that engulfs the interlocutors in Plato's dialogue.
Keineswegs, he answers, "no way,• a literal translation of the Greek aporia, the root of Plato's
verb eporekhamen which ends the quotation from the Sophist. We thus have no way even to
reach the Greek aporia; we are confronted with an~ of aporia.
In response to this double Impasse Heidegger tells us that we must "first of all
reawaken an understanding for the Sinn of this question." Heidegger's phrase "den Sinn dieser

..E!:film" is ambiguous. It could mean "Sinn as it operates in the question of the Sinn of Being,· or
it could very well mean "the Sinn of the question of the Sinn of Being." To say that we need to
reawaken an understanding for the Sinn of the Frage nach dem Sinn van Sein, is thus a first
posing of the Sinnsfrage in conjunction with the Seinsfrage. Then, Heidegger continues, the
"concrete working out" of the Sinn of "Sein,• the goal of the text, can proceed. Why does
Heidegger italicize and place between scare quotes "Sein"? As we mentioned above, our
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awareness of our use of the word "Sein" is an important clue to the status of the Seinsfraqe, but
Heidegger wants the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt not to be confused with the Sinn/Bedeutunq of
the word "Sein,• even though they both are undecidably at work within each iteration of the mark
"Sinn."
The first paragraph of the first page ends with Heidegger telling us of the
"provisional goal" of the work: "The interpretation of time as the possible horizon of any
understanding of Being.·

Heidegger's Introduction, entitled "The Exposition of the question of the Sinn van
~. •

begins by explaining the necessity of a explicit retrieval of the question of Being because

the question of Being, the question of the Sinn of Being, has been today forgotten. Heidegger
shows that the dogmatic assertions that Being is a) the most universal concept, b) is indefinable,
and c) is self-evident, do nothing to dismiss the question of Being, even though they serve to
plunge it into an obscurity that reinforces its having been forgotten. That Being is self-evident for
Heidegger means only that we "live already in an understanding of Being,• so that precisely
because this understanding is an enigma, and the "Sinn of Being is still veiled in darkness,· the
question of the Sinn of Being must be retrieved (4). Not only is an answer lacking to the question
of Being, the question itself has not yet even been posed correctly: "the question itself is obscure
and without direction [richtunqlos]" (4). If we recall that Heidegger saw part of his task on the
first page as calling for a revival of a Sinn of the question of the Sinn of Being, and that here the
question is lacking direction, we see here a first hint of Sinn as "direction," an acceptation of Sinn
that I will trace in its workings in the text of Sein und Zeit.
Heidegger continues in #2 by exploring the formal structure of the question of
Being. Here Heidegger explains the hermeneutic necessity of some already accessible clue for
guiding our questioning. He claims the question of Being must also have such a clue: "The Sinn
van Sein must already be available to us in some way" (5). Heidegger then alludes to the results
of #1 by saying that "we always already animate ourselves [wir bewegen uns] in an understanding of Being.• Here we see a first mention of the "movement• of Dasein. In the rest of this chapter

66
I will show the necessity of the scare quotes as well as the economy within which Heidegger
attempts a distinction between Casein's Bewegtheit and the Bewegung of present-at-hand
entities. Out of such a preconceptual understanding, Heidegger continues, uarise both the explicit
question of the Sinn von Sein and the tendency toward Its concept" (5).
Next Heidegger reinforces the preconceptual nature of our understanding of Being
as he tells us that 'We know not, what 'Being' means• ('Wir wissen nicht, was 'Sein' besagt"] (5).
Heidegger here means to reinforce the distinction between, on the one hand, our~ rcass
wir je schon in einem Seinsverstandnis leben"] (4) and Bewegtheit
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["wir bewegen uns immer

schon in einem Seinsverstandnis"] (5) in an understanding of Being and, on the other hand, our
lack of an explicit conceptual grasp of the Sinn von Sein. Even though we cannot fix
conceptually what the "is" bedeutet, even though we do not even know the horizon within which
such a Sinn can be fixed, Heidegger continues, the vague average understanding of Being is a
fact In need of investigation.
Even though our understanding of Being can fluctuate and grow so dim as to move
itself [sich bewegen] to the border of a mere acquaintance with a word, such a movement needs
an explanation that the investigation into the Sinn von Sein cannot be expected to give at the
outset. Here again we see the interlacing of movement, Casein's understanding, and the Sinn
von Sein. Heidegger here attempts to control the economy of Sinn, the Sinnsfrage, by
characterizing our knowledge of the Bedeutung of the word "Sein" as a degeneration of the living
movement that makes up Dasein's full understanding of Being. The investigation of the average
understanding of Being needs the development of the concept of Being so that it can then work
out which distortions of an explicit illumination of the Seinssinn are "possible and even inevitable.•

Next Heidegger alerts us to the preponderance of "theories and opinions" about
Being. Here we see the necessity of the Destruktion. since these theories hide their role as
sources of the dominant understanding of Being operative today. Here we can see the fact that
while the tradition has certainly entertained many determinations of Being, it has never posed the
question of the horizon of those determinations, the question of the Sinn von Sein.
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Section #2 continues with the threefold formal structure of the Seinsfrage: Das
Gefragte, "what is asked about," ..ssilll; das Erfragte, "what is to be found out by the asking," der
~inn van Sein; das Befragte, "what is interrogated,· das Seiende selbst (6). Being, Heidegger

explains--that which determines beings-is that upon which [woraufhin] beings are understood.
Thus the Being of beings "is" not a being, so the "Is" must be used in scare quotes when applied
to Being. Being thus demands its own mode of exhibition, different from that which discovers
beings. Likewise, the Sinn of Being, which as we will see is that upon which [woraufhin] Being
is understood, demands its own conceptuality. We must note that posing the Seinsfrage in terms
of Sinn is already beyond the metaphysical move of determining a Being for an entity, because
we have asked about the horizon of such determination. Thus the Seinsfrage always operates
on the third "level,· has always already made the turn, taken the step back. The move from the
Marburg period science of Being to a thought of Seinsqeschichte and from there to a topology
of Being is not the turn in this sense but represents a radicalizing movement (more historical,
more concrete) on the same "level."
In determining which being is to be interrogated Heidegger runs up against the
Aristotelian problem, as repeated by Brentano, that Being is said in many ways, to on legetai
pollachOs, which Heidegger renders as "Aber 'seiend' nennen wir vieles und in verschiedenen
Sinne" (6). The scare quotes alert us to the undecidable play within each iteration of the mark
"Sinn" between our linguistic naming of Being and our living movement in a preunderstanding
of Being. Heidegger then provides a list of these Sinne: Dass- und Sosein. Realitat. Vorhandenheit. Bestand. Geltung. Dasein. "es gibt." and then asks from what entity is the Sinn of Being to
be read off, and in what Sinn does it have a priority (7)? Thus Heidegger ls forced to ask about
the Sinn of Dasein's priority in the question of the Sinn of Being, another instance of the
Sinnsfrage.
In the next paragraph the Sinnsfrage takes another turn. If the question of Being is
to be explicitly posed in its full self-transparency, Heidegger writes, then we must explain the way
of sighting of Being, of understanding and conceptual grasping of Sinn, and the preparation of
the choosing of and gaining access to the exemplary entity. Here we find a double twisting of
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~inn. First in the question of the Hinsehen auf Sein: we will soon see (146-47) how Heidegger

must pose the structure of metaphoricity-which precisely concerns the metaphysical definition
of metaphor as a transfer from sensible to intelligible-by means of scare quotes and statements
of authorial intention warning against misunderstanding, in order to subordinate bodily Sinne,
e.g., the "sight" of the eyes, to the various "sights" of disclosedness.
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Secondly, in the paragraph

under discussion here, Heidegger tells us that the role of Sinn in understanding must be clarified
in order to pose the question of the Sinn of Being, that is, that the Seinsfrage is dependent upon
the Sinnsfrage in Sein und Zeit (7).
Such dependency cannot be conceived as a vicious logical circle, Heidegger
explains, in a famous passage about hermeneutical preconception. Entities can be tactically
determined in their Being by the various discursive practices that make up our everyday
movement within a preunderstanding of Being without our having made ready an explicit concept
of the Sinn of Being. Again Heidegger appeals to a vorgangigen Hinblicknahme auf Sein to show
that were are not caught in a circle, but in a "noteworthy 'back and forth relation·· of what is
asked about (Being) to questioning as the mode of Being of an entity (8). The "essential
pertinence [Betroffenheit]" of the questioning to what is questioned belongs to the Sinn of the
Seinsfrage, that is, to the Sinn of the question of the Sinn of Being (8). Again we see Casein
described in directional terms ("back and forth") when it is a matter of clarifying the Sinns~/Seinsfrage relation.

In #3 Heidegger tells us that regional ontologies remain naive in their inquiries into
various determinations of Sein for entities if they leave undiscussed the Sinn van Sein (11 ). As
we have mentioned above, Heidegger articulates many modes of Being. As granted a priority
with regard to the Being question, the Being of Casein is to be explored in an existential analytic
that will provide a fundamental ontology. However, Heidegger's goal in Sein und Zeit is not so
much fundamental ontology as "ontology proper: Fundamental ontology is only propaedeutic
to ontology proper, the working out of the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt. As we will see. fundamental
ontology concludes as Heidegger isolates a Being for Casein, which he will call care, and a Sinn
for that Being, which he will call Zeitlichkeit.
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Ontology proper, then, is the search for the Sinn
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von Sein Oberhaupt as Temporalitat.

Of course we must not gloss over the complexities of Sein und Zeit. In this work
Heidegger tirelessly repeats that Being is always the Being of beings, and is nothing outside
Dasein's understanding of Being. The relation of Temporalitat to Zeitlichkeit is then the relation
of the Sinn von Sein Oberhaupt to the Sinn von Sein of Dasein.

Here we see the peculiar

intertwining, the back and forth implication, of the question of Being and Dasein. In #4
Heidegger expresses this implication in an extremely contorted phrase that indicates the antic
priority of Dasein:
Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship toward that Being--a relationship which is itself one
of Being.... Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being.
(Zu dieser Seinsverfassung des Daseins gehOrt aber dann, dass es in seinem Sein zu
diesem Sein ein Seinsverhaltnis hat. ... Seinsverstandnis ist selbst eine Seinsbestimmtheit
des Daseins.) {12)
Some of these intricacies are worked out in #5. Here Heidegger specifies that the ontological
analytic of Dasein is to serve as a freeing of the horizon for an interpretation of the Sinn von Sein
Oberhaupt. The preontological understanding of Being will serve as a clue: Dasein has a
tendency to understand itself from out of the world. Such a world-understanding, Heidegger
writes, exerts a "backpressure" [ROckstrahlung] on Dasein's self-interpretation {16). In Sein und
Zeit the difference between scattered inauthenticity and gathered authenticity will be played out
in the difference of projections. Heidegger will develop this point as the difference between
spatial, scattered presence-at-hand (accessible to falling temporality) and authentically temporal,
gathered Dasein.
Dasein's everydayness is chosen as the access to Dasein which allows it to show
itself from itself in the way it is "proximally and for the most part" {16). The existential analytic that
will reveal Dasein's everydayness is of course oriented only toward the working out of the
question of Being. As such it will be only provisional, bringing out only the Being of Dasein,
without interpreting the Sinn of this Being. Once the horizon for the most originary interpretation
of Being is prepared ·the existential analytic will need to be repeated.
This repetition will reveal the Sinn of Dasein's Being as Zeitlichkeit. This is not the
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answer to the question of Being--Zeitlichkeit is not the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt--but is the
ground for the winning of an answer to the question of Being. Heidegger's task is to explain
time as the horizon of the understanding of Being from Zeitlichkeit as the Being of the entity that
has an understanding of Being as part of its Being. Doing so, Heidegger explains, presupposes
that one fulfill the demand to delimit [abzugrenzen] Zeitlichkeit from the vulgar understanding of
time (17). This delimiting is two-fold: we must explain how the traditional time concept and the
vulgar understanding of time arise from Zeitlichkeit, and we must restore to the vulgar time
concept its rights to operate within a limited and derivative domain (18).
Heidegger opposes this treatment of the vulgar time-concept to Bergson, for whom,
claims Heidegger, time as intended in the vulgar time-concept is space (die mit ihm gemeinte
Zeit sei der Raum) (18). Although I will not be able to pursue the point here, we can note that
this is not quite what Bergson says in the~. where time as we ordinarily conceive it is called
the phantom lie fantOmeJ of space.
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Bergson will appear again several times in Sein und Zeit

as well as in Basic Problems; I will deal a bit more with Heidegger's reading of him in my
treatment of the latter work.
Next Heidegger begins a very important, but complicated, paragraph. Again we
must pay close attention to the way Heidegger uses quotation marks. Heidegger writes:
"Time" has long functioned as an ontological--or rather an ontical-criterion for naively
discriminating various realms of entities. A distinction has been made between ''temporal"
entities (natural processes and historical happenings) and "non-temporal" entities (spatial
and numerical relationships). (18)
Here Heidegger introduces quotation marks to help him distinguish between ontological and
ontlcal. "Time,· in quotation marks, vulgar time, is not the time to which primary reference is
made, although it is homonymic with original time. "Time" is ontical, and hence derivative upon
Zeitlichkeit, which Heidegger will later call original time (426).
Here we can see the importance of the delimiting of the vulgar concept of time.
Without the assured purity of Zeitlichkeit the entire project of establishing a Sinn van Sein
Oberhaupt is threatened. That it is threatened precisely by the Sinnsfrage is visible in the
following sentence from the paragraph under discussion: "The fact remains that time [no
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quotation marks in original], in the sense of [im Sinne van] 'being in time,' functions as a
criterion for distinguishing realms of Being" (18). Here we see that time has various senses, one
of which, "being in time" has served the tradition for the purpose of determining Sein in various
ways. This determination of Being by a derivative sense of time needs to be replaced in the
question of the Sinn van Sein Qberhauot by the primary sense of time, Zeitlichkeit. But how is
the Sinn of time to be decided before the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt, if the very notion of Sinn is
abysmally reduplicated in a Sinnsfrage?
We must let the full exposition of the Sinnsfrage wait for a moment. Heidegger now
distinguishes between zeitlich and temporale, because the Bedeutung of "zeitlich" has been preempted by pre-philosophical and philosophical language use for the sense of time as "being in
time.• Heidegger wishes to reserve temporale for the "originary determination of the Sinn of Being
[die ursprOngliche Sinnsbestimmtheit des Seins]." Thus the exposition of the problematic of
Temporalitat will provide the concrete answer to the question of the Sinn of Being (19). This
answer will not take the form of mere sentences, since the propositional content is prey to an
empty passing on. Here we find a first mention of the problem of the author's intention in the
face of textual dissemination. Heidegger continues that the answer to the question of the Sinn
of Being will find its most proper Sinn in the form of a concrete ontological investigation within
the horizon laid bare (19)--time, or more precisely, that Sinn of time we call Temporalitat.
I now turn to #6, the "Task of a Destruction of the History of Ontology,• where
Heidegger specifies that he is after the possibility of metaphysics when he questions after the
Sinn of Being. Heidegger first makes clear that the destruction is oriented by the question of
Being. Its target is not the ontology of the ancients, but the sedimented way of reading these
texts that results in today's occlusion of the question of Being. Thus the target is the "handeddown content [Oberfieferten Bestandes] of ancient ontology," which is to be "destroyed" by
referring it to the "originary experiences" by means of which ''the first and continually guiding
determinations of Being were made" (22; trans. modified). With even more clarity, Heidegger
repeats that "Negatively, the destruction does not relate itself to the past [zur Vergangenheit),
but its critique aims at 'today' and the prevalent way of treating the history of ontology" (22-
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23).
Heidegger then briefly touches upon Kant and Descartes as problematic texts for
which the destruction of received readings will lead us onto the path of the question of Being.
Descartes' dependence on medieval conceptions becomes significant only, Heidegger writes,
when the destruction leads to the Sinn and boundaries of ancient ontology considered in light
of the question of (the Sinn of) Being (24). Considering ancient ontology in terms of the
problematic of Temporalitat will show that the ancient interpretation of Being proceeded in terms
of "world" and "nature" in its widest Sinn. Thus we can see how the understanding of Being was
taken from "time" (25).
The quotation marks, as I have remarked above, indicate that Heidegger will attempt
to invert the contemporary, sedimented assumption of the primary term involved in these
homonyms. Thus the everyday, vulgar Sinn of world (totality of present-at-hand entities), nature
or time (succession of nows) will be considered as derivative upon the originary Sinn of world
(network of bedeutsam relations), nature or time (Zeitlichkeit).
Heidegger continues-in a passage discussed by Derrida in "Ousia and Gramme" -that the "external document" for the fact that ancient ontology understood Being in reference
to time is the determination of the Sinn of Being as parousia or ousia, which means (bedeutet),
when considered ontologically and temporally, "Anwesenheit" (25). In ancient ontology, then,
entities were grasped (gefasst) in their Being as "presence" ("Anwesenheit"; Heidegger's
quotation marks), or in other words were understood with regard (mit ROcksicht) to one
determinate mode of time, the "present" ("Geqenwart") (25; italicized and in quotation marks in
the original).
Here we can see that Sinn is used as the pivot of a understanding projection. In this
passage, however, Heidegger's metaphorics suggest projection as a flashlight rather than the
movingness of Dasein; hence understanding was largely described in visual terms ("with regard
to": mit ROcksicht auf). Or at least what seem to be visual terms, those oriented to the bodily
eyes. As we will see, Heidegger will redetermine the primary term with regard to sight and
senses.
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In #7, the "Phenomenological Method of Investigation," only one important instance
of the Sinnsfrage occurs. In subsection C, "The Fore-Conception of Phenomenology,· Heidegger
writes that the privileged Sinn of "phenomenon" is that which constitutes the "Sinn and ground"
of that which shows itself, that is, that which in an extreme Sinn remains hidden {35). And this
is of course nothing other than

the~

of beings, which can remain so hidden that it becomes

forgotten and the question about it and its Sinn is excluded (35). Here we see that

many~

of phenomena are to be distinguished so that the Being of beings, which provides many Sinne
for beings, enabling them to be understood in the manifold ways enumerated above, is itself to
be questioned with regard to its Sinn, the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt.
The Existential Analvtic
The Introduction concludes with #8, the outline of the projected treatise. Heidegger
then moves through the existential analytic. It is most important for us to focus upon his analysis
of worldhood, because his establishing the term "significance" (Bedeutsamkeit) for the context
of relations that is the world insures that discourse

~

can remain one of the three-fold equi-

originary constituents of the "there,· the ..Qsl- of Dasein. The characterization of world as
bedeutsam thus maintains the link with Sinn as meaning. After Chapter 1, which expounds the
task of the preparatory analytic, Chapter 2 names Being-in-the-world as the basic state of Dasein.
Chapter 3 then analyzes the worldhood of the world, Chapter 4 analyzes "who" is in the world,
and Chapter 5 analyzes "Being-in as such.•
While Chapter 1 does not concern us here, there is one point in Chapter 2 which
we need to address.

In #12, "A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World," Heidegger

distinguishes, again with the help of quotation marks, the type of spatiality appropriate for
Dasein, an existential spatiality made possible only by Dasein's Being-in-the-world {56). Since
Being-in-the-world will ultimately have its Sinn in Zeitlichkeit, Dasein's spatiality will ultimately
have to be reconceived on the basis of Zeitlichkeit. Heidegger will later make it clear that this is
not a "deduction" of pure space from pure time (367), but as we will see he will not be able to
purify the language used to describe Zeitlichkeit from all spatial reference-at least not without
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posing the Sinnsfrage.

Chapter 3, which articulates the "World hood of the World, requires more detailed
ff

consideration. Heidegger's world analysis is famous for its precision an".i complexity. It is divided
into three parts, in which he analyzes environmentality and worldhood in general, contrasts his
notion of worldhood with Descartes' interpretation of the world, and concludes with a discussion
of Dasein's spatiality. In its broadest outlines Heidegger's analysis undercuts any relation of
subject and object by showing Dasein's already-being-in-the-world as the ground for any
encounter between Dasein and another entity. The analysis of environmentality and worldhood
in general consists of four sections, # 15-18. The first discusses the Being of entities encountered
within the world, the second, the manner In which the worldly character of the environment is
announced, the third, reference and signs, and the fourth, involvement, significance and the
worldhood of the world.
In #15 Heidegger shows how a totality of equipment is structured as a network of
"assignments" or "references" (Verweisungen). The mode of Being of tools is then called "readyto-hand" (Zyhandenheit). The ready-to-hand subordinate themselves to the field of references,
which is accessible to circumspection, Umsicht. As thus subordinated, tools withdraw from
consideration in favor of the work to be done. In #16 Heidegger then shows how because of this
withdrawal only a non-assignable tool becomes conspicuous, obtrusive, or obstinant. Since the
Being of tools ls determined by references, an unusable--hence obvious-tool reveals its
assignments, as disturbecf. The cluster of disturbed assignments reveals in turn the context of
the tool <Zeugzusammenhang) as a totality sighted beforehand in circumspection. And,
Heidegger concludes, with this revelation of the context of tools the world announces itself.
In #17, then, we learn that signs are addressed to a "spatial" Being-in-the-world that
is always already "directed" (ausgerichtet) (79). Here we see two important themes we will take
up In more detail shortly, the necessity of quotation marks and the notion of directionality,
Richtung. Then, in #18, Heidegger gives his definition of worldhood. He begins by reminding us
that the ready-to-hand are determined by references; another way of saying this is to say that
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the character of their Being is "involvement,• Bewandtnis. The totality of these involvements is
finally oriented by the "for-the-sake-of-which,• the Worum-willen, a possibility of Dasein. Not only
does Dasein assign its tools to a series of references, but Dasein also assigns itself, that is, a
possibility of itself, along the paths of the totality of assignments. Now that wherein Dasein makes
these self-assignments is the upon-which (Woraufhin) of a prior "letting-be-encountered-asinvolved. •This wherein/upon-which is world, and the structure of that upon which Dasein assigns
itself is worldhood.

0/Je will

see Woraufhin at two other crucial points, the definition of Sinn at

151 and the discussion of the horizonal schemata at 365.)
Heidegger then gives the briefest of forecasts of the upcoming analysis of
understanding. Dasein makes its assignments (of itself, thereby letting entities be encountered
as involved) by an understanding projection into the context of relations. The relation-character
of the relations that are assignments is that of "signifying,· be-deuten. The totality of relations
(Bezugsqanze) is then called "significance,• Bedeutsamkeit. This disclosing significance is an
existential constituent of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Since, as we will see, the articulation of
these relations is

named~.

discourse, and Sinn is the terminus or pivot of these projections,

Sinn will govern Being-in-the-world.
As we tum now to Heidegger's discussion of Descartes in sections #19-21, we must
keep in mind that Heidegger enters into his confrontation with Descartes in order to clarify his
own approach to the phenomenon of. world. I will concentrate on the notion of spatiality
Heidegger sees in Descartes. Heidegger begins by claiming that "Descartes sees the extensio
as basically definitive ontologically for the world" {89). Since extension is identified by Descartes
with spatiality, the Cartesian ontology of the world will be useful as a foil to the notions of
Dasein's spatiality, which Heidegger will develop later. This spatiality will be shown to be
grounded not in the extension of entities encountered within the world, but in Dasein's Beingin-the-world. In #19, "The Determination of the World as res extensa" Heidegger presents textual
evidence as to Descartes' distinguishing of the ego coqito from the res coroorea. Both are
substances; the distinguishing characteristic of the res coroorea is extension {90), that which
maintains itself throughout changes in shape, and motion (Bewequnq) {91 ). In #20 Heidegger
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takes up the Cartesian determination of world via a discussion of substance--that which is in
need of nothing--in terms of his own question of the Sinn van Sein. Descartes distinguishes three
substances, God as the ens perfectissimum and the ego cogito and the res coroorea as the two
typP.s of ens creatum. The Sinn van Sein held in "common" among these three types of Being
is left unexplored by Descartes, Heidegger claims (93), and since " 'Being' is not in fact
accessible as an entity, it Is expressed through attributes--Oefinite characteristics of the entities
under consideration, characteristics which themselves a r e" (94). Here we see Heidegger's
posing of the question of metaphoricity that Derrida examines in detail in "White Mythology" and
''The Retrait of Metaphor." Now, significantly, for Descartes the attribute of an entity that serves
to express the "unexpressed yet presupposed Sinn van Sein and substantiality" is extensio (94).
We will soon see the link of extension and presence-at-hand in the metaphysical determinations
of the Sinn van Sein.
#21 is Heidegger's "hermeneutical" discussion of the Cartesian ontology of the
world. Heidegger here shows that the mode of access to the substance characterized by
extension is that of knowing, Erkennen, lntellectio, in the sense of mathematico-physico
knowledge (Erkenntnis). This mode of access is dependent upon Dasein's Being-in-the-world;
it in fact does not allow the entities encountered within the world to show themselves as they are,
but instead prescribes for them the aspect they will show. (This account of scientific knowing
forecasts the account in #69b of thematization as a priori projection of the Being of a region of
beings.)
The Sinnsfrage appears here in all its problematic complexity. Heidegger writes that
Descartes remains bound to traditional ontology in deciding the mode of access to entities within
the world as "noein, 'intuition' in the widest sense (der 'Anschauung' im weitesten Sinn)" (96).
Thus, according to Heidegger, it is on the basis of a certain Sinn of intuition that Descartes
presents his "critique" of sensation (sensatio, aisthesis) versus intellectio. The most famous
instance of that to which Heidegger refers here is the reduction of sensibility via radical doubt
as Descartes performs it in the Meditations. (As we will see, Heidegger will himself soon be
caught up in the Sinnsfraqe in deciding the question of the role of the senses, die Sinne.)
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Heidegger continues his investigation of Descartes by claiming that for Descartes,
the idea of Being (Seinsidee) is "constant presence-at-hand (standige Vorhandenheit)" (96). If we
recall the point made above that the attribute of an entity that expresses the Sinn van Sein for
Descartes is that of extensio, we can see clearty here the link between Vorhandenheit and
extension. As we will see in discussing #69b, extension can characterize spatiality only in virtue
of an overturning (Umschlag) of the understanding of Being that lets tools be encountered in
everyday falling commerce with the entities of the wortd. This will mean Descartes' determination
of Being takes its bearings from a falling self-interpretation of Dasein in terms of the entities
encountered within the wortd. This orientation leaps over the phenomenon of the wortd and the
spatiality of tools as they are encountered on the basis of the spatiality of Dasein, which is
founded on its Being-in-the-wortd. As a result, the inappropriateness of Descartes' orientation to
presence-at-hand will become clear only after "we have assigned to the concept of Being in
general the horizon within which its intelligibility becomes possible" (100). Again the economy
of the Seinsfrage appears: the question of the Sinn van Sein can harden into an answer in the
form of the elucidation of a concept, or it can be freed into an investigation of ecstaticohorizonal Sinn as direction of movement.

34

Let us now explore Heidegger's discussion of Dasein's spatiality as distinguished
from the spatiality of the present-at-hand, #22-24. The two key terms for Heidegger's discussion
of Dasein's spatiality are Ent-fernung and Ausrichtung. The former is awkwardly translated by
Macquarrie and Robinson as "de-severance,· while the latter is rendered as "directionality."
In #22 Heidegger tells us that the ready-to-hand has the character of "nearness,•
35

Nahe. The near tools do not just cluster about, but belong to various "regions," Geqende. These
regions are ordered by the concern of Dasein, so much so that even the sun--which will play an
important role in the relation of primordial time to the ordinary time concept--has its place
assigned to it by Dasein's concern (103).

36

Eartier Heidegger had determined the Being of the

ready-to-hand as "involvement,· Bewandtnis. He combines the two definitions when he writes that
the "discovery of regions beforehand is co-determined by the totality of involvements
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(Bewandtnisganzheit) for which the ready-to-hand, as something encountered, is freed" (104).
When Heidegger then moves to discuss space he tells us that space--as discovered
in circumspective Being-in-the-world as the spatiality of the totality of tools--belongs to entities
as their "places." He continues: "Bare space itself is still veiled over. Space has been split up
(aufgesplittert) into places· (104). Bare space, the space within which present-at-hand things are
encountered in their extension, is founded on Dasein's spatiality, which is itself founded on
Dasein's Being-in-the-world.
Next in #23 Heidegger discusses the "Spatiality of Being-in-the-world." In order to
explain what he means by this properly existential spatiality Heidegger begins with a discussion
of the term Ent-fernung, which denotes dissolving of distance, the bringing close of something.
Dasein has an essential tendency to nearness, that is, an essential tendency to bring things into
the circle of circumspectively close ready-to-hand, oriented by concernful Being-in-the-world
(107). This nearness does not mean that Dasein is "here"; rather, Dasein comes back (zuri.ickkommt) to its "here" from a "there" of circumspective involvement (107-108). Zuri.ickkommen will
also be used to describe Dasein's ecstatic movement in the discussion of the horizonal schemata
of temporality.
Dasein also has the character of directionality, Ausrichtunq. As we noted above,
Richtung is one of the Sinne of Sinn. One must not forget, Heidegger warns, that directionality
belongs to Ent-fernung, and is founded on Being-in-the-world. These two characteristics of
spatiality are needed to pose the question of #24, "Space and Dasein's Spatiality.· Heidegger
shows here how it is only in virtue of Dasein's spatiality that the ready-to-hand can be
encountered in their spatiality. And this means that the freeing of a totality of involvements is at
the same time the freeing of the spatial belonging-together of the ready-to-hand. Thus in
significance, Bedeutsamkeit, lies an essential co-disclosedness of space (11 O). Here we see Sinn
as meaning and Sinn as direction brought closely together. As Heidegger will make clear in
#69b, the space of physics is only discovered in a neutralizing of significant, worldly spatiality.
Only when significant places become neutral points can calculation proceed with confidence.
Extension is thus derived from Dasein's spatiality, which is founded on Being-in-the-world, and
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which will be reinterpreted finally in terms of Zeitlichkeit.

At this point we are finally in a position to discuss the inscription of the Sinnsfrage
in the structure of the existential analytic. First, I will discuss how Heidegger attempts to quiet
the Sinnsfrage-to manage its economy-by subordinating Sinn as "the senses• to Sinn as
existential meaning. Then, in the next subsection, on the

-remporal Recapitulation,• I will discuss

Sinn as direction as it comes to complicate even further the Sinnsfrage posed between Sinn as
meaning and Sinn as sensory.
Heidegger's attempted subordination of Sinn as sensory to Sinn as (existentially
redetermined) meaning occurs in Chapter 5 of the First Division. The course of the existential
analytic takes us-after Chapter 4, the investigation of the -Who" of everyday Dasein--to Chapter
5, the analysis of "Being-in as such.• Here I explore #29 on Befindlichkeit, #31 on understanding,
and #32 on understanding and interpretation. I will use two John Sallls essays to focus my
discussion of the relation of Sinn as meaning and Sinn as sensory. The most recent of the two,
37

-Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible"

traces an undecidability between the first two

acceptations, those of meaning and sensation. Sallis shows a Platonic investment in Heidegger's
analyses of the tool as granted a Sinn by a system of relations determined as a system of
meanings, that is, a Verweisungsganzheit determined as Bedeutsamkeit. As Sallis succintly puts
it: "the operation of the senses is founded, primarily upon disposition, more generally upon
38

disclosedness as such. " ·Sallis concludes his analysis in a way pertinent to my point here:

If the sensible Is freed from the yoke of meaning, if it is not assimilated to disclosetiness,
then the simple unity of the Heideggerlan question cannot but be disrupted, ... It will not
be possible then, to enclose the Heideggerlan question within the compass of time, which
as temporality extends no further than disclosedness. 39

In an otherwise insightful analysis Sallis makes no mention of a possible third sense
of Sinn, that of directionality, which would complicate the matters under discussion even further.
He splits Sinn into two "senses• (the necessity of these quotation marks should be wellestablished by now) "existentially determined meaning• and •an irreducibly sensible shining• and
speaks of their being twisted together in a way that would fracture the unity of the attempt to
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isolate time as Sinn in the sense of "existentially determined meaning." As I will show, this latter
sense of the Sinn van Sein is even further fractured by Sinn as directionality. Here I refer to the
40

problem raised in one of Sallis' earlier essays, "Language and Reversal,"

where he writes: "the

connection of the arialytic of Dasein to the question of the meaning of Being remained largely
implicit..<1i The following extended quotation outlines my discussion:
. . . (our movement within language) is . . . that ground-movement through which
intelligibility is already delivered up to our understanding, always already granted. But what
is this understanding that is always already granted? Sein und Zeit gives the answer:
"Understanding of Being has always already been taken for granted in projecting upon
possibilities." This understanding ... is taken for granted, however, not in the sense that
man as a subject is always in possession of a representation of Being, but rather in the
sense that it is always granted to man in that he "stands in the openness of the project
42
of Being. "
Here Sallis distinguishes between two interpretations of Sinn as that upon which Seinsverstandnis
is projected. The first is what could be called the metaphysical interpretation of Sinn as meaning,
one in which the "meaning of Being• is a representation expressed in a statement. The second
interpretation would be that of Sinn as the direction of Dasein's Beweqtheit constitutive of the
"openness of the project of Being." At stake here is Heidegger's "temporal" rewriting (Sinn as
direction) of the existential rewriting (Sinn as "pivot" of a existential self-projection) of the
common acceptation of Sinn (Sinn as intended meaning of a "flashlight"-projection). The
necessity felt by Sallis of indicating the proper sense of Sinn in order to still the oscillation
between Sinn as direction and Sinn as meaning in the question of the Sinn van Sein will be the
topic of my next sub-section. There I will show that yet another sense of sense is twisted into
the mark Sinn. This third acceptation, that of directionality, comes to operate as Heidegger
rewrites Sinn in the temporal recapitulation from existential meaning to Dasein's Bewegtheit.
With these questions in mind, let us pick up the thread of Sein und Zeit as
Heidegger privileges Sinn as meaning (albeit rewritten as "pivot" of a self-projection) over the
Sinnlichkeit of "the senses.• In #29, "Being-there as State-of-mind" (Befindlichkeit) Heidegger first
grounds the senses on Befindlichkeit and then determines Befindlichkeit as a mode of disclosure
(Erschlossenheit). Heidegger writes:
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And only because the "senses" (die "Sinne") belong ontologically to an entity whose kind
of Being is Being in the world with a state-of-mind (die Seinsart des befindlichen ln-derWelt-seins hat) can they be "touched" by anything or "have a sense for" ("Sinn haben fOr")
something in such a way that what touches them shows itself in an affect. .. Existentially.
a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world (eine erschliessende
Angewiesenheit auf Welt), out of which we can encounter something that matters to us.
(137; Heidegger's italics)
We must pay special attention to Heidegger's use of quotation marks here. In placing ·~·
between quotation marks Heidegger broaches, without thematizing it, a reverse metaphorics. He
implies that the use of Sinn to mark the "senses• is dependendent upon Sinn as intelligibility-"intelligibility" that has, to be sure, been rewritten as "disclosedness." Positing such dependency
amounts to a reversal of the classic determination of metaphor as a transfer of a name drawn
from the sensible realm to an entity of the intelligible realm.
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This move is even more

complicated than a reverse metaphor based on an etymological claim-such as claiming that
44

conceptual grasping is primary with regard to physical grasping --for the attempted reverse
tranfer is directed at the very markers used to make the distinction from which "metaphor"
derives its traditional "sense" (and of course here my own discourse is under suspicion.)
Heidegger's becoming enmeshed in the problematic of metaphoricity, as Derrida
would call it, is even more pronounced a few pages further in #31 "Being-there as understanding." Let us note only in passing here what will become more important to us later, namely that
Dasein projects itself. Heidegger tells us that •... any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected
itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting• (145). Dasein's understanding is thus best not seen
with the image of a flashlight projecting a ray outward from a fixed point, but as a selfmovement. Here, however, I am not so much concerned with the best images for understanding, as I am with Heidegger's wrestling with the metaphoricity of the Sinnsfrage. Let us follow
what he has to say about the sense of sight. He writes: "In its projective character, understanding
goes to make up existentially what we call Dasein's 'sight' (Sicht)" (146). We must note here that
Heidegger does not place quotation marks around his word "Sicht" at this point in the text--as
Macquarrie and Robinson do--although he does italicize it. Heidegger then claims that Dasein

.1§ its various "sights," as they are existentially In Daseln's disclosing:
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With the disclosedness of the 'there' (no quotation marks in original) this sight is
existentially; and Dasein is this sight equiprimordially in each of those basic ways of its
Being which we have already noted: as the circumspection of concern (Umsicht), as the
considerateness of solicitude (ROcksicht), and as that sight which is directed upon Being
as such (Sicht auf das Sein als solches), for the sake of which any Dasein is, as it is. (146)
Although Dasein is purported to be the various sights of its disclosedness, the description of
Dasein in terms of sight Is confusing.

Sight requires light, yet Dasein's movement-which

functions as Lichtuna-is that which lets (antic) light appear to Dasein through the sense of
vision, by granting the open space for play of light and dark. And this self-movement of Dasein
as Lichtung conditions even "intuition," the "sight of the mind," as we see when the quotation
marks soon reappear around "Sicht":
We must, to be sure, guard against a misunderstanding of the expression "sight" CSicht";
Heidegger's quotation marks). It corresponds to the "clearedness" (Gelichtetheit; no
quotation marks in the original) which we took as characterizing the disclosedness of
the "there" (Qg; no quotation marks in the original). "Seeing" (Das "Sehen"; Heidegger's
quotation marks) does not mean (meint) just perceiving with the bodily eyes, but neither
does it mean pure non-sensory (unsinnliche) awareness of something present-at-hand
in its presence-at-hand.(147)
heidegger's attempt to avoid identifying "sight" with either vision or intuition by positing its
correspondence with Gelichtetheit refers us to an Important passage from #28, "The Task of a
Thematic Analysis of Being-in." Here Heidegger touches upon the problematic of metaphoricity,
just as he did earlier in the discussion of Descartes. Heidegger has recourse to the notion of
figurative language when he confronts the necessity of naming-across the antic-ontological
difference-the relation of, on the one hand, access to antic entities, to, on the other hand, the
ontological disclosedness that makes such access possible. Heidegger writes:
When we talk in an ontically figurative way (die ontisch bildliche Rede) of the lumen
naturale in man, we have in mind (meint) nothing other than the existential-ontological
structure of this entity, that it .§ in such a way as to be its "there.• To say that it is
"illuminated" ("erleuchtet") means that .M Being-in-the-world it is cleared (gelichtet) in
itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing (Lichtung).
Only for an entity that is existentially cleared (gelichteten) in this way does that which is
present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its very nature,
Dasein brings its "there" along with it. If it lacks its "there,· it is not tactically the entity
which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness.
(133)
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What is it of Dasein that is expressed metaphorically as lumen naturale? Just as (physical) light
allows for the vision of the eyes, Heidegger must here be identifying "natural light" with that which
allows Dasein to "see," in other words, with the clearing self-movement that opens the "there."
Several questions arise here. If "natural light" is a metaphor when applied to the condition of
Dasein's "sight" --which as I have just shown Heidegger leads us to think in an inverted
metaphorics--what would be the metaphoric status of "natural light" in its opposition to the
"super-natural light,• the divine illumination, of the Augustinian tradition? Further, what of the
rewriting of "natural light" as Dasein's being "illuminated" (".er1euchtet")? Is the relation of conditioned ("illuminated") to condition (Lichtung and "clearing") thinkable as a metaphoric relation?
If we allow the condition-conditioned relation to be expressible by metaphor, then it is Lichtung-the condition for (sensory) access to things in (antic) light-that ultimately allows Dasein's
"illumination" ("natural light") to be metaphoric with relation to everyday "light.• Then if one
wished to say further that this "illumination" is in turn metaphoric with relation to Gelichtetheit and
Lichtung
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one would have to posit that the classical determination of metaphor as transfer of

name from sensible to intelligible is transformed into a transfer from antic phenomena to
ontological condition. 46
To return to the determination of "sight" we should recall that Heidegger explicitly
denies that "sight" means a "pure unsinnliche apprehension,"

or "intuition" (Anschauen).

Heidegger makes this distinction, removing sight from the sinnlich/unsinnlich determination, so
the sense of sight is here not merely a reversed metaphor, but instead inverts the very terms
used to determine the sense of "metaphor"-as I have called it, an "inverted metaphorics. •
Heidegger continues:

In giving an existential signification (Bedeutung) to "sight," (Sicht; no quotation marks in
original) we have merely drawn upon the ~; italicized in original) peculiar feature of
seeing, that it lets entities which are accessible to it be encountered unconcealedly in
themselves. Of course, every "sense" (jeder "Sinn") does this within that domain of
discovery which is genuinely its own. (147)

Here Sinn must be put in quotation marks, for as we have seen above (137) Sinn as sensory has
been grounded upon Sinn of disclosedness-"sensory sense" is now a transfer of Sinn from its
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primary sense as disclosedness. Heidegger next appends a fascinating few sentences that will
play an increasingly important role in my interpretation. He writes:
But from the beginning onwards the tradition of philosophy has been oriented primarily
toward 'seeing' as a way of acce~s to entities and to Being. To keep the connection with
this tradition, we may formalize 'sight' and 'seeing' enough to obtain therewith a universal
term for characterizing any access to entities or to Being, as access in general. (147)
This forma[ization, as we have seen, broaches the Sinnsfrage, for it necessitates the privileging
of Sinn as meaning, which controls disclosedness, over the Sinnlichkeit of the senses. Such
privileging becomes more explicit later, in #70c "The Zeitlichkeit of Falling." There Heidegger
writes:
Like the concept of sight, 'seeing' will not be restricted to awareness through 'the eyes of
the body.' Awareness Nernehmen) in the broader sense (im weiteren Sinne) lets what is
ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand be encountered 'bodily' in themselves with
regard to the way they look. (346)
Here we see that a privileged Sinn must be indicated for the awareness that subordinates the
senses to disclosedness. Heidegger had earlier played out these distinctions in The History of
the Concept of Time. At p. 80 of that lecture course he distinguishes categorial intuition from
sensory perception (sinnliche Wahrnehmung), and at p. 95-96 spatiality is termed a sinnlich
concept. Here is the key for my interpretation. If spatiality is sinnlich--even

tt

in the sense of a

Kantian form of intuition, as is the case here--it must be subordinated to disclosedness, which
is ultimately to be grounded in temporality. These subordinations will not be complete however,
as spatial reference will be irreducible in the terms used in the description of temporality. This
irreducible spatial "reference" occurs because terms iterable in discussions of space are also
iterated in the description of temporality, thus inscribing a "haunting" whose formalization I call
the "economy of time."
Heidegger's #32, "Understanding and Interpretation," contains the only thematization of the acceptations of Sinn that will be twisted into each iteration of the mark. Sinn here is
a component of the existential understanding, which is Heidegger's first way of rewriting Sinn as
"meaning": Heidegger has already moved from Husserl's scheme of intenti~nalityto the condition
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of possibility of that intentionality, what he calls Being-in-the-world.
Sinn is that wherein the intelligibility (Verstandllchkeit) of something maintains itself. That
which can be Articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, we call "Sinn.• ... Sinn
is the "upon-which" (Woraufhin) of a projection in terms of which something becomes
intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a foreconception. . . . Sinn must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the
disclosedness that belongs to understanding. Sinn is an existentiale of Casein ... (151)
Here we encounter Sinn as the "terminus· or "pivot• of a projection (in John Caputo's felicitous
phrase from Radical Hermeneutics): this is Heidegger's first, existential rewriting of Sinn as
•meaning.· We should read here Vorsicht In the redetermination given it above.
Heidegger then discusses the Sinn von Sein in these terms (152), as not what is
profound (tiefsinnig) or standing behind Being, but Being itself in so far as it enters Into the
understandability of Casein. The Sinn of Being can never be opposed to beings or to Being as
the "ground" of beings, because any "ground" is only accessible as .filnn, even when Sinn has
dissolved into the Abgrynd of Slnnlosigkeit. Here Heidegger once more distinguishes between
the metaphysical search for grounds and the destructive investigation of the Sinn of Being,
which first makes possible any positing of grounds, or Indeed for any nihilistic giving up of the
search for grounds.
Heidegger then discusses the hermeneutic circle at 152-53. Understanding has an
existential Sinn that must be properly determined. The circle in understanding belongs to the
structure of Sinn, which Is grounded in the existential constitution of Casein. Casein itself has an
ontological circle-structure.
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The Temporal Recapitulation
In this section my reading Is oriented by the little-known acceptation of Sinn as
"direction."
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I will discuss the way Sinn as direction functions in the Sinnsfrage/Seinsfrage

economy to disrupt the purity of the description of temporality by installing an irreducibly spatial
haunting.

49

Sinn will take on an acceptation as the direction of Casein's ecstatic contortions as

it moves back and forth from its horizonal schemata. Insofar as the existential analytic has
revealed Casein as thrown projection, Sinn in its acceptation of "meaning• is repeated here as
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the "pivot" of a self-projection is temporally retreived to become the direction of Dasein's
movement.
On the third acceptation of Sinn, note Reiner SchOrmann's treatment of this point
from his Heidegger on Being and Acting:
If this is the case [that Heidegger's late writings attempt to elaborate the traits of a plural
economy of presencing], it is clear that the "phenomenological destruction of the history
of ontology" promised in Sein und Zeit, can be fully understood--and carried out--as a
deconstruction only from the standpoint of Heidegger's last writings. Only then does it
become apparent how time can be "der Sinn des Seins•: not the "meaning" of being, but
its directionality: the "sense" as the direction in which something, e.g., motion, takes place
(this acceptation of both the English and the French sens-'sense' of a river, or of traffic-stems, not from Latin, but from an Inda-European verb that means to travel, to follow a
path). Not the "signification" of being for a man and hence "a human accomplishment" (a
misunderstanding that Heidegger says threatened the deconstruction in its first phase, that
of a destruction in Sein und Zeit), but the directionality of the orderings by which
constellations of presencing produce themselves. Not the sens unique, the one-way street
of the epochs unfolding across the ages either (a misunderstanding that threatened during
the phase of "the history of being"), but the multiple presencing in which things present
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emerge from absence....
One should note here SchOrmann's use of "not ... but ... • constructions designed to protect a
proper meaning for Sinn in the phrase "der Sinn des Seins. • My questions here are: how can one
accomplish such prescription--in this case, literally a "writing down beforehand"? Doesn't this
amount to a writing down before writing, for is it not writing that we have to consider in order
to take into account the possibility of misunderstandings and their threats? Can one keep the
Latin and Inda-European heritages separate as they merge in the single mark "Sinn''? What
happens when we no longer look for the regulation of a polysemy (for wouldn't this be the
question about a Sinn van Sinn Oberhaupt?) but for the articulation of a disseminative economy?

In Part One, Division Two of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger breaks off the existential
analytic to ask if the foregoing interpretation, which culminated in the analysis of care as the
Being of Dasein, was adequate. He answers that it was not, for it could not guarantee the
authenticity and totality of the entity under discussion. To remedy this, Heidegger undertakes the
analyses of guilt and death, and determines that the authentic totality of Dasein lies in its
"anticipatory resoluteness, [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit]."
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On the basis of this last set of analyses Heidegger then sets out to determine
Zeitlichkeit as the "ontological Sinn" of care, the Being of Dasein.
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#65 begins with the warning

that the "unbroken discipline" of the existential analytic must be brought to bear to keep the
mode of BeinQ of Dasein from becoming perverted [verkehren] by being sighted in the ''wholly
indifferent mode of Vorhandenheit" (323). This reference to "indifference" points back to an earlier
passage in which-In the discussion of jQgQ§ as misinterpreted as present-at-hand-Heidegger
says of Vorhandenheit:
this Sinn of Being is left undifferentiated and uncontrasted with other possibilities of Being,
so that Being in the Sinn of a formal Being-something becomes fused with it simultaneously, and we are unable even to obtain a clear-cut division between these two realms. (160)
If we recall the Vorhandenheit-extensio relation developed in Heidegger's analysis of Descartes,
we see here that the issue is one of distinguishing Dasein's mode of Being from that of the
spatial. Dasein's Being is care, and as we will see, the Sinn of that Being is Zeitlichkeit. The
overall goal of Sein und Zeit is to exhibit the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt as Temporalitat. The
descriptions of these temporal phenomena must be kept separate from that of the spatial. Now
spatiality is three-leveled, including the spatiality of Dasein, of the ready-to-hand, and of the
present-at-hand. The spatiality of Dasein grounds that of tools, while Dasein's spatiality is
grounded in its Being-in-the-world, which is in turn grounded in temporality. Tools are accessible
to falling temporality, while for authentic temporality tools fall away as anticipatory resoluteness
holds itself in the mode of anxiety. Finally, as #69b points out, presence-at-hand is derived from
a certain Umschlag of falling temporality (361). As thus several steps removed from original
temporality, Vorhandenheit would fatally corrupt or pervert descriptions of the phenomenon of
original temporality.
Heidegger asks, in #65, 'What are we seeking ontologically with the Sinn of care?
What does Sinn signify [Was bedeutet Sinn; Heidegger's italics]?" (323). He gives three answers:
first, he refers us to the analysis of understanding, and repeats the definition first given at 151:
"Sinn signifies the Woraufhin of a primary projection" (324). Then Heidegger develops the second
answer to the Bedeutung of Sinn as he tells us that Sinn is that which makes possible the
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phenomenon to be understood. The projected in this case is the Being of Dasein, and that uponwhich the projection is made is that which makes possible the constitution of Dasein's Being as
care in the unity of its articulation.
For his third answer Heidegger discusses .$inn and the understanding of Being,
repeating the definition of Sinn as •upon-which,· but this time putting the priority on ~
verstandnls. "Taken strictly [Streng genommen]; Heidegger writes, "Sinn means [bedeutet] the
Worauthin of a primary projection of the understanding of Being" (324).
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Heidegger here

spends a few paragraphs on Sinn as an existential of Casein. He concludes that the question
about the Sinn of the Being of a being thematlzes the Worauthin of the understanding of Being
that grounds the Being of beings (325).
How can one understand that upon which the Being of Casein is projected? In other
words, the question is, what Is the Sinn of the Being of Casein? The Being of Daseln is care, and
the Seinssinn of Casein is the self-understanding Casein Itself, Heidegger concludes (325). To
answer the question of the enabling of the Being of Dasein in more detail, Heidegger then
discusses SeinkOnnen in its reliance on Zukynft, Being-guilty as grounded in Gewesenheit, and
the situation as grounded In Gegenwartigen. Care is the unity of "ahead-of-itself-Being-alreadyin-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered withing-the-world)" (192). The authentic
mode of care is anticipatory resoluteness. The temporal elements of Zukunft, Gewesenheit, and
Gegenwartigen make the separate elements of care, ·ahead-of-itself,• "Being-already-in,• and
ffBeing-alongside• possible, while the unity of these three temporal elements, Zeitlichkeit. which
Heidegger defines as a "gewesend-gegenwartigende Zukunft einheitliche Phanomen" (326), thus
makes care possible as a unified phenomenon.
After having shown how temporality makes care possible, Heidegger turns to the
Bedeutung of the mark "Zeitlichkeit. • This Bedeutyng must be kept clear from the vulgar timeconcept by a rigorous policing of the terminological use of these expressions (326). Violence is
unavoidable here (327). Why? Because of sedimented Bedeutyngen. Heidegger writes
concerning the expressions "before" and "already" as they function in the definition of care:
"ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-alongside {entities encountered within-the-
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world).• If these expressions are taken solely in their vulgar senses. in which time is conceived
on the basis of the flow of nows, the Being of Dasein would be conceived in vorhanden terms.
If the expression 'before' and 'already' were to have a time-oriented signification [zeithafte
Bedeutung] such as this (and they can have this signification also), then to say that care
has temporallty would be to say that it is something which is 'earlier' and 'later,' 'not yet'
and 'no longer.' care would then be conceived as an entity which occurs and runs its
course 'in time.' The Being of an entity having the character of Dasein would become
something present-at-hand. (327)
Terminological vigilance will keep vulgarity and originality separate, Heidegger hopes. Yet, as we
will see, Heidegger must use a language oriented to the ready-to-hand from which, via an
Umschlag, the present-at-hand is accessible. In this regard, it Is important to note here that
Heidegger concedes that the terms he wishes to redetermine do also carry these vulgar
,emporal significations.· I am concerned here with the economy of this "also.· It seems the
marks "ahead" and "before• can operate on both sides of the boundary separating vulgar from
originary. Heidegger's attempted redetermination is thus limited by the sedimentation which
thereby yields possibilities of non-fully-controllable iteration. Because of this. an economy of
interpretation is set up that can account for the possibility of misunderstanding positively, in
terms of dissemination, or that attempts to fix terminology by means of the metaphysical
distinctions of vulgar versus originary.
If the terminological distinctions that express the conceptual distinction between
originary temporality and vulgar time were to collapse, the entire project of fundamental ontology
would be threatened. If this is not to be so, Heidegger writes, the ,em poral signification [zeithafte
Bedeutung] of these [orlglnary] expressions must be different feine andere]" (327). The "ahead"
and "before" indicate the future, Zukunft, which grounds the self-projection that constitutes
"existentiality." Of existentiallty Heidegger then claims: "Its primary Sinn is the future, Zukunft"
(327). Clearly the Sinnsfrage is at work here. Only by distinguishing between Sinne of temporal
expressions can Heidegger clarify existentiality and thus kept the description of temporality clean
of vulgarity. Yet here Sinn must not only be read as the Bedeutung of the mark "existentiallty,"
but must also be read as "directionality." so that Zu-kunft is taken literally, as "coming toward.•
But if this is so, then the spatiality of direction must be taken into account in the determining of
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temporality, and not as derivative upon temporality-as Heidegger implies when he grounds
Dasein's spatiality on its temporality.
Heidegger next broaches once again the question of metaphoricity. He tells us that
Zeitlichkeit "is" not a being. It is not, but it iemporalizes itself [zeitigt sichJ (328). The question
that concerns my project in this dissertation then is: How describe temporality, which is not a
being. with a language oriented to beings? Indeed, how describe it with a language oriented to
the spatiality of those ready-to-hand entities accessible in falling temporality? At this point
Heidegger describes how the directional characteristics denoted in the prefixes~ (from the·Auf-

.§km-:6.!J" of the authentic future,

~-kunft),

auf (from the "ZurOck auf of the authentic having-

been. Gewesenheit), and bei (from the "Begegnenlassens van• of the present, Gegenwart) reveal
Zeitlichkeit as the ekstatikon pure and simple (329). Here Heidegger's analyses are perhaps at
their most radical, showing how any notion of the subject as self-identical substance must be
completely rethought on the basis of an ecstatic "outside-itself.· Now this "itself does not preexist the ecstases, but is precisely constituted by the unity of their "movements.• Heidegger tells
us first that Zeitllchkeit is the "originary 'outside-itself' in and for its very self [an and fOr sich
~·

(329). He continues that Zeitlichkeit is not a being, that "first steps out of itself, but its

essence is temporalizing in the unity of ecstases [Sle ist nicht vordem ein Seiendes, das erst aus
sich heraustritt, sondern ihr Wesen ist Zeitigung in der Einheit der Ecstasen]" (329). The "itself
of the "outside-itself thus comes to be through the temporalizing of the ecstases; since the issue
here is the constituting of temporalitv, it would make no sense to postulate an entity that, preexisting, spins time out of its already constituted "self." And because of this delay, a language
oriented to supposedly-present entitles can only be metaphoristically used in describing that
which renders entities accessible.
In Chapter I we have seen how Derrida calls espacement, one of the workings of
3

differance, the "opening to the first exteriority in general ...s Does not Heidegger himself inscribe
such an opening in the Ausser-sich of temporality? Of course. To what then does Derrida
object in Heidegger's description? It must be Heidegger's refusal to name the Ausser-sich a
spatiality in order to safeguard a privileging of time over space. Let us see how Heidegger
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attempts such safeguarding.
Continuing his discussion of temporality, Heidegger tells us that vulgar time is the
result of a levelling off of this originary ecstatic temporalizing (329). This levelling is nonetheless,
in its existential Sinn, grounded in a specifically determinate temporalization, that of inauthentic
temporality. If this is so, continues Heidegger, then we are justified in naming Zeitlichkeit as
"originary time [ursprQnaliche Zeit]" (329). Now precisely this equation seems to evoke Derrida's
severest strictures. If Heidegger himself holds that "time" is a vulgarly understood metaphysical
concept, why would he turn around and assimilate his most radical analyses to this concept?
The addition of the adjective "originary" to "time" in the equation of Zeitlichkeit and originary time,
Derrida seems to say-since "originary" is caught in a metaphysical opposition to "derivative" -is not enough to wrench Zeitllchkeit from the system governing the mark "time.• Let us recall his
words in "Ousia and Gramme":
Time is that which is thought on the basis of Being as presence, and if something-which
bears a relation to time, but is not time-is to be thought beyond the determination of
54
Being as presence, it cannot be a question of something that could still be called time.
In Chapter 11 claimed Derrida was here referring to his notion of differance. However, Derrida's
strictures are obviously also applicable to Heidegger's "temporality. • Of equal concern to me in
this dissertation is the fact that Derrida also writes about the metaphysicalness of posing the
question of Being in terms of Sinn. How is Heidegger's definition of Zeitlichkeit as the Sinn of
Dasein and Temporalitat as the Sinn van Sein Qberhaupt related to Derrida's strictures on both
Sinn/~

and the mark "time"? I can answer this question only after the discussion of the

horizonal schemata in #69c.
The finitude of originary temporality is the final topic of #65. This finitude is not a
breaking off [Aufhoren], but a character of temporality itself. Heidegger tells us here that
"Primordial and authentic coming-toward-oneself is the Sinn of existing in one's ownmost nullity"
(330). Here we find a preview of the reading of Sinn as direction that I will pursue in more detail
in the discussion of #69c. The sentence must be read both as "Primordial and authentic comingtoward-oneself is what existing in one's ownmost nullity means" and "Primordial and authentic
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coming-toward-oneself is the direction which the movement that is existing in one's ownmost
nullity takes."

Chapters 4-6 of Division Two attempt to develop the full contours of Dasein's
temporality by exploring temporality and everydayness, historicality, and within-time-ness as the
origin of the vulgar concept of time. Chapter 4 discusses the temporality of disclosedness in
general, of Being-in-the-world and the problem of transcendence, of Dasein's spatiality; and
concludes with the zeitliche Sinn of Dasein's everydayness. Section 68 is divided in four subsections, dealing with the temporality of understanding, Befindlichkeit, falling, and discourse. I
cannot enter their analyses here. Section 69 is entitled "The temporality of Being-in-the-world and
the Problem of the Transcendence of the World.· #69a, "The temporality of circumspective
concern,• cannot detain us here. #69b "The zeitliche Sinn of the way cicumspective concern is
modified into theoretical discovery of the present-at-hand within-the-world" contains an important
discussion of the way the understanding of Being that reveals the ready-to-hand must undergo
an Umschlag in order to reveal the present-at-hand.
Heidegger begins #69b by announcing that the discussion of the ontological
genesis of the theoretical comportment will investigate science as a mode of existence, that is,
of Being-in-the-world (357). Asserting a mere disappearance of praxis will not do, Heidegger
continues, but one must begin by acknowledging the subordination of circumspection (Umsicht)
to the primary understanding of the totality of involvements (Bewandtnisganzheit) (359). After a
discussion of the grounding of the as-structure in the temporality of understanding, Heidegger
sets out to analyze an "elementary assertion• and its modification. To understand the genesis of
the theoretical comportment, he continues, we must understand that the change from a sighting
of the ready-to-hand to a sighting of the present-at-hand is the result of an Umschlag of the
understanding of Being involved therein. This Umschlag not only overlooks the tool-character
of the ready-to-hand, it also overlooks the "place· that belongs to each ready-to-hand tool (361).
The place becomes the "spatio-temporal position lRaum-Zeit-Stelle]," a·"world-point ["Weltpunkt";
Heidegger's quotation marks]" (362). Such a dissolution of the tool-place connection means the
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entities of the environment are "released [entschranktJ," and the totality (8!!) of the present-athand becomes thematized (362). Heidegger concludes by showing how the transcendence of
Dasein must underlie both the objectifying thematization of the present-at-hand and that of which
it is the Umschlag, circumspective concern. The transcendence of Dasein is then to be shown
as grounded in temporality, the object of the next sub-section, #69c.
When we tum to #69c, "The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World,•
we see the problem is the ground of the unity of world and Dasein, that is, the way significance
holds together the "for-the-sake-of-which" and the "in-order-to." The unity of significance is
grounded in temporality, so that the "existential-temporal condition for the possiblity of the world
lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon· (365). At this
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point Heidegger introduces the concept of horizon as providing a direction for Dasein's ecstatic
movement:

Ecstases are not simply raptures In which one gets carried away. Rather, there belongs
to each ecstasis a 'whither' [Wohin] to which one is carried away. This 'whither' of the
ecstasis we call the horlzonal schema· (365).

The ecstases are given paths, are set upon tracks; Dasein is not a simple ripping open. An
undirected rapture, an EntrOckung without a schema, would be too close to a maddening, a
VerrQckung. Zeitllchkeit would have no sense, in both the senses of meaning and direction.
Indeed, horizon will now be linked to Sinn via the notion of "terminus· or "pivot" [Woraufhln]: "The
horizon of .Z:eitlichkeit as a whole determines that whereupon [Woraufhln] factically existing
entities are essentlally disclosed" (365). We must remember here the movement beneath
intentionality to Being-in-the-world. Dasein is its projects, Heidegger constantly reminds us; we
cannot understand Dasein's projections in terms of intentions issuing from a subjectivity, but
must see Dasein's Being in Its ecstatic movement. We should recall here the definition of Sinn
just given: 'Taken strictly, Sinn means the Woraufhin of a primary projection of the understanding
of Being" (324). The understanding of Being discloses beings by a self-projection of Dasein. Such
a project--considered temporally-involves Dasein ecstatically projecting itself upon Sinn as its
ecstases take the paths laid out for It in advance by the horizonal schemata. How do the
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schemata provide for such disclosure? They provide a point from which Dasein can rebound and
come back to entities. Heidegger explains:

Factical Dasein, understanding itself and its world ecstatically in the unity of the 'there'
comes back from these horizons to the entities encountered within them. Coming back
to these entities understandingly (Das verstehende Zuruckkommen auf . . . ) is the
existential Sinn of letting them be encountered by making them present. (366)
Here we can see most clearly the doubling of Sinn as meaning and Sinn as direction. One must
read the last sentence both as "coming back to entities from horizons is what letting them be
encountered means" and as "coming back to entities from horizons is the direction of Dasein's
movement that lets entities be encountered.•
At this point we can see most clearly the spatiality that inhabits Heidegger's
descriptions of temporality. Zuruckkommen, which is here used to describe Dasein's temporality,
was previously used to describe Dasein's spatiality in its achieving of a "here" from its ''there."
Heidegger writes: "Das Dasein ist gemass seiner Raumlichkeit zunachst nie hier, sondern dart,
aus welchem Dort es auf sein Hier zurOckkommt ... • (107). 56 When we compare this passage
from the discussion of Dasein's spatiality to the preceding from the discussion of Dasein's
temporality we can clearly see the spatial-temporal undecidable economy of zuruckkommt, its
irreducible possibility of iteration in both spatial and temporal contexts.
The ZurOckkommen corresponds to one of the features of Dasein's spatiality, Entfernung. The "Wohin" and "Woraufhin" we noticed in the descriptions of the temporal schemata
install a directionality, an Ausrichtung--the second feature which Heidegger has developed in
the analysis of Dasein's spatiality-at the heart of temporality.
As iterable in spatial contexts, ZurOckkommen and Wohin/Woraufhin show that the
supposed purity of temporality is haunted by spatiality. We must not leap to the conclusion that
this haunting is accomplished in the name of the spatiality of the present-at-hand. Heidegger's
descriptions of temporality disrupt metaphysical, Vorhanden, notions of the subject via its
ecstatics; the schemata direct the ecstatics, providing a unitary out and back movement. Now
this "out" (to the schemata) and "back" (to entities) Is a movement without a fixed starting point.
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Strictly speaking, it "is" not a "movement" but a "temporalizing" of ecstases along a certain path.
However, such ecstatics cannot be conceived purely temporally.
temporalizing cannot totally reduce the spatiality of movement,
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The descriptions of

for the ecstases must be given

a direction, made to make sense. They must have something to bounce off and come back to
entities in disclosing them, for Dasein is essentially with the entities it discloses.

Without

schemata to direct the ecstases, Dasein could not be alongside other entities. It would not then
be Dasein, essentially falling. But the necessity of providing directions for the ecstases provides
an additional threat to the attempt to isolate the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt as Temporalitat, as
terms iterable in spatial discussions find their way into the description of temporality.
The haunting of temporality by terms iterable in spatial contexts doubles the
haunting in which Sinn as Bedeutung threatens the radicality of Sinn as direction. Here we must
consider Derrida's strictures on the mark Sinn/sens. As we remarked above, he writes in "Ousia
and Gramme" that Sinn/sens is irreducibly bound to the system of presence:
... ~ (in whatever sense it is understood: as essence, as the meaning [signification]
of discourse, as the orientation of the movement between arcM and telos) has never been
conceivable, within the history of metaphysics, otherwise than on the basis of presence
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and as presence.
Has Derrida exhausted all the ways Sinn works in the text Sein und Zeit? Sinn as direction
orienting Dasein's ecstases is haunted by Sinn as meaning, it is true, but is Sinn as direction
inherently metaphysical? Is the direction provided by the schemata thinkable as "orientation of
the movement between~ and ..m!.Q§"? When Dasein exists authentically, it is its projects .M
possiblities; realizing a telos is precisely reducing possibility to actuality, is bringing a being into
its entelecheia. Dasein's keeping alive the possibility-character of its projected possibilities,
especially when it concerns Dasein's "ownmost possibility,· cannot be thought within the system
of arcM and telos. Do not the resources of the mark Sinn thus allow it to disrupt metaphysical
conceptuality? Consider here Mer1eau-Ponty, who, in the section of temporality of The
Phenomenology of Perception, sees sens as inherently ecstatic:
In all uses of the word sens, we find the same fundamental notion of a being orientated
or polarized in the direction of what he is not, and thus we are always brought back to a
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conception of the subject as ek-stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence
59
between the subject and the world.
Sinn reins in the ecstases, tames them, makes them make sense, yet all the while in an economy
marginal to metaphysics. For Bataille's nobles, it may be so, any check on expenditure would
be vulgar, any making sense metaphysical. But Derrida is not Bataille, and surely neither is
Heidegger. Would Heidegger not reply that Dasein must find its way among beings, and for that
it needs to encounter them by making sense? Can this not be described in a way that avoids
madness as well as total vulgarity? Is not Heidegger's project that of making some new sense?
Does it then finally make sense to see Sinn in the system of arche and telos?

I have maintained that Sinn as direction-as it functions in the description of
temporality--is a haunting of time by space as predicted by the "formal rule" of "Ousia and
Gramme.· I have called the articulation of such irreducible haunting "the economy of time.·
What does Heidegger himself have to say about the relation of time and space in Sein und Zeit?
#70 concerns the temporality of Casein's spatiality. Heidegger is concerned in the beginning
of the section that the analyses of spatiality seem to want to impose themselves as co-originary
with those of temporality. Heidegger writes, obviously disapproving such pretension on the part
of spatiality:

Thus with Casein's spatiality, existential temporal analysis seems to come to a limit, so that
this entity which we call "Dasein" must be considered as "temporal" "and also" as spatial
co-ordinately finder Nebenordnung). (367)

Why the disapproval?

What happened to the praise of analyses that preserve the Gleich-

ursprunglichkeit of phenomena and deride the desire for an origin? Preparing the way for the
analyses of Das In-Sein als solches Heidegger writes:
The phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of consititutive items has often been disregarded
in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and
anything from some simple "primal ground." (131)
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Granted that temporality, due to its ecstases, could never have been a "simple" Urgrund,
Heidegger must still explain why spatiality is consigned the status of a pretentious Nebenordnung
rather than that of an authentic Gleichur-sprunglichkeit.
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Rather than admit the equality of Dasein's spatiality with that of its temporality,
Heidegger states that we must ground the "specific" spatiality of Dasein in temporality: "Dann
muss aber auch die spezifische Raumlichkeit des Daseins in der Zeitlichkeit grunden" (367). Now
this does not mean a "deduction· of space from time, he clarifies, nor does it mean the
"dissolving" (auflosen) of space in pure time {367). Dasein can only be spatial as care in the Sinn
of tactical-falling existence, Heidegger writes, and thus only because Dasein as Zeitlichkeit is
ecstatico-horizonal can it take along with itself a space.

Thus Dasein's spatiality is to be

grounded in ecstatic temporality. To repeat our earlier question: Why does Heidegger refuse to
grant the Ausser-sich of ecstatic temporality the status of a spatiality, and why does he insist on
calling ecstatic temporality an "originary time"?
The ecstatic temporality of Dasein's spatiality, Heidegger continues, renders
understandable the independence of space from time, but it also renders understandable the
"dependence" of Dasein on space. This dependence is visible, Heidegger tells us, in the "wellknown" phenomenon that Dasein's self-interpretation and the stock of significations [Bedeutungsbestand] of .language are dominated by "spatial representations ["raumlichen Vorstellungen";
Heidegger's quotation marks]" (369). Such a priority of the spatial in the articulation of significations [Bedeutu.ngenl and concepts, Heidegger tells us, is grounded in a mode of Being of
Dasein:

Temporality is essentially falling, and it loses itself in making present; not only does it
understand itself circumspectively in terms of objects of concern which are ready-tohand, but from those spatial relationships which making-present is constantly meeting in
the ready-to-hand as having presence [als anwesend], it takes its clues for Articulating that
which has been understood and can be interpreted in the understanding in general. (369)
The spatial relationships of the ready-to-hand, we recall, are those of nearness, place, and region
(#22). These are grounded in Dasein's Being-in-the-world, whose spatiality is directional (#23).

Now if "spatial representations" are linked to falling temporality, and falling is a necessary
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structure of Dasein, then we must ask that Heidegger give a positive account for the spatiality
in the descriptions of Dasein's temporality. Heidegger attempts to ground Dasein's spatiality on
its temporality, yet we find the very description of temporality using terms iterated in the analysis
of Dasein's spatiality. Evan if one grants that Heidegger has avoided the encroachment of
Vorhandenheit into the description of Dasein, we must claim that he cannot reduce all spatiality. As such, his discourse is haunted. He has attempted to isolate a notion of originary time from
any "spatial" descriptions, but they will not be kept out.
The following schema thus seems to be In place: falling, scattered, spatiallydominated Dasein is gathered to itself in authentic temporality. But the "itself is an "outsideitself that Heidegger refuses to call a spatiality, refusing thus to recognize an originary timespace.

At this point we can partially conclude that Derrida in "Ousia and Gramme" was not

as nuanced as he could have been about the economy of Sinn/sens. However, he did predict
the haunting of temporal descriptions by spatial terms we have unraveled with the help of the
economy of Sinn and that we have called the economy of time, in which we have seen
Heidegger is enmeshed.

To finish our discussion of the Sinnsfraqe at work in Sein und Zeit let us consider
Heidegger's treatment of historicality. Providing an interpretation of historicality, Heidegger writes,
will be a "more concrete working-out" of Zeitlichkeit (382). In beginning the descriptions of
historicality Heidegger tells us the preceding analyses of temporality depended on grasping
Dasein in its authentic totality. Yet death, which provides for Dasein's totality in its "Beingtoward-the-end, • provides only one "end" of Dasein. Birth is the other end that must be taken
account of. The question is, how is Dasein "between" its two ends, birth and death?
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Heidegger

considers the vulgar response, that the connectedness of Dasein "consists" of a sequence of
experiences (373). Heidegger then proposes the notion of Dasein's unique Being as the
"between" that connects birth and death as Dasein's "stretching" [Erstreckunq] (374). Heidegger
writes at 375:
The movement [Bewegtheit] of existence is not the motion [Bewegung] of something
present-at-hand. . . . The specific movement fBewegtheit] in which Dasein is stretched
alone and stretches itself along [erstrecken Sicherstreckens] we call its historizing ~

hehenJ.
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Historizing, like the analyses of temporality of which it is the concretion, must be kept clear of
terms derived from Vorhandenheit. Yet is Bewegtheit clear of all spatiality? Does not the Weg
mark a Being-on-the-path?
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Such a path need not be a straight line, of course. Heidegger soon

differentiates the directionality of Dasein's happening from the direction a movement along a
straight line takes, that of arriving, lingering and departing:
The movement of historizing [Bewegtheit des Geschehens] In which something "happens
to something• is not to be grasped in terms of motion as change of location [Bewegung
als Ortsveranderung] .... And because, further, the ordinary understanding of Being
understands "Being" as presence-at-hand without further differentiation, the Being of the
wor1d-historical is experienced and interpreted in the sense of something present-at-hand
which comes along, has presence, and then disappears [wird das Sein des WeltGeshichtlichen im Slnne des ankommenden, anwesenden und verschwinden Vorhandenen
erfahren und ausgelegt]. (389)
The Sinn of Bewegtheit is not that of a straight-line, but of a self-stretching-between two ends·
-which, at each encounter with entities, moves out and back along the paths of its ecstases. The
Weg of Bewegtheit is not that of the hands of a clock. But, we may ask, is the essentlality of heit the price Heidegger must pay to make such a distinctlon?
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Vulgar and Primordial Time
We are now in a position to investigate Heidegger's analyses in Division Two,
Chapter 6. Heidegger has set up his treatise in such a way that he must redetermine the
significations oriented to vulgar time so that the descriptions of originary temporality be kept
clear. At this point in his text Heidegger sets out to show the derivation of vulgar •t1me· from
originary temporality. Vulgar time is to be shown as a "genuine• fechtesJ temporal phenomenon;
although derivative, it is not a spatializing of time, but is temporal through and through. Despite
its temporal nature, vulgar time understands itself in terms of Vorhandenheit, whose spatiality is
one of extension.
Chapter 6 of Division Two has the following structure: #78 details the incompleteness of the analysis so far; #79, Dasein's temporality and our concern with time; #80, this
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concernful time and within-time-ness; #81, withln-time-ness and the genesis of the vulgar
concept of time; #82, the contrast with Hegel; and the concluding section of Sein und Zelt, #83,
the question of fundamental ontology and the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt.
#79 details three structures of concernful time: datability, spannedness, and
publicness. In this section "time" is defined as "the making-present which interprets Itself-that is,
that which has been interpreted and is addressed in the 'now' • (408). Heidegger explains that
such self-interpretation is made possible by ecastico-horizonal temporality, which consitutes the
"there.· As thus constituting the "there" temporallty is always Interpretable and thus familiar to us
in the "there· (408). However, our familiarity with "time" does not preclude that primordial
temporallty, and its temporalizing the origin of expressed time, remain unknown and unconceived
(408).
How does this definition of "time" relate to that of Derrida, who sees "time" as the
mark of the limits within which the trace has been determined? Derrida sees "time• as the mark
of the effacement of the trace; Heidegger sees "time" as a derivative self-understanding of
temporallty as originary time. For Derrida, "time• cannot but be metaphysical, for it is conceived
in terms of the present, which, as consituted by the arche-trace, can only be seen "as such" by
an effacement of the trace. For Heidegger, "time" is vulgar, for it is understood on the basis of
the now as present-at-hand, a conception only possible in an Umschlag from the falling
temporallty that allows the ready-to-hand to be encountered. Falling temporallty, while genuinely
temporal, is inauthentic compared to the authentic temporallty of anticipatory resoluteness. Both
inauthentic and authentic modes are ways in which temporallty temporalizes itself, but inauthentic
temporallty understands itself in terms of what it allows to be encountered, while authentic temporallty should understand itself only on its own terms. However, since temporallty is not a being,
but temporalizes itself, its description broaches the problem of metaphorlclty since it must
proceed with a language oriented to the ready-to-hand.
Derrida focuses on the equation of temporality and originary time. Why this
equation? If falling temporallty is essential, the question goes, why call Its self-interpretation
vulgar? Why attribute originarlty to that which must, essentially, be supplemented by a falling
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temporality which "genuinely" misinterprets itself? Why not cast mis-interpretation as metaphoricity?65
Now the three structures of falling temporality-datability, spannedness, publicness-are tied to Dasein's ecstatics, historicality, and Being as Mitdasein, respectively. Datability
reflects (is the Widerschein of) the ecstatic constitution of temporality, in that temporality is for
the most part falling into a making-present of entitles within the wortd, thus allowing for the
dating of a time by its relation to an occurence. Spannedness involves the ecstatic stretching of
historical temporality, which I discussed above. Publicness is grounded in Mitdasein; here we use
the time that Is there for everyone.
In #80, on time-reckoning, we learn that the sun, the natural clock, provides an
Mhour" that is ready-to-hand (413). Eventually, through a discussion which is not to be confused
with a historiography of time-pieces, Heidegger shows that the movement of the clock is interpreted as a present-at-hand manifold of nows. The saying •now" of telling the time, Heidegger
maintains, is a dating with the character of measuring. As such, it reveals time as a vorhandene
Jetzt-mannigfaltigkeit (417). The move from the sun to the clock completes the publicness of
time. Now, temporality makes the disclosure of space possible, so that concernful time is bound
up with an place (Ort). In this way, dating is possible, so that, regarding the alleged spatialization
of time, Heidegger claims that making-present and measurement make accessible the change
of location of a spatial thing (417). Thus the temporality of disclosure is prior to the time revealed
in the measuring of motion-hence the necessity of distinguishing Bewegtheit from Bewegung.
Now the final question becomes: How does the everyday conception of time block an
understanding of primordial temporallty? The everyday concept, Heidegger answers, understands
time from out of entities encountered within time.
#81 explores "Wlthin-time-ness and the genesis of the vulgar concept of time.·
Heidegger begins by showing that the understanding of time that develops from clock-time is
that expressed in Aristotle's definition of time. He continues to claim that all subsequent
philosophies of time conform to Aristotle. Now the ordinary understanding of time conceives time
as a stream of nows. Such an understanding is possible only when datability and significance
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are covered-over, so that the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality is levelled-off (422).
The now becomes understood as present-at-hand (423). In doing so, inauthenticity shows itself
as a looking-away from finitude, and so grounding the misunderstanding that is vulgar time (424).
Such inauthentic looking away also explains the covering-over of the genesis of vulgar time.
Casein falls in among entities and eventually comes to understand itself in the terms offered by
these encounters.
I have dealt sufficiently with #82, the object of ·ousia and Gramme," in Chapter I.

#83 describes the breaking off of the project of Sein und Zeit. How is the disclosive
understanding of Being possible in a way suited to Casein, asks Heidegger? Casein's originary
temporality must make possible the ecstatic project of Being, Heidegger reminds us, but how
is this to be interpreted? Is there a way from originary time to the Sinn of .12.@ing? (437) Does time
reveal itself as the horizon of Being? What is the trouble with the system of Sinn/time? We have
seen how Sinn as direction is haunted by Sinn as meaning; we have also seen how Sinn as
direction is a spatial haunting of the description of Casein's temporality. Such doubling, or
haunting, prompts the Sinnsfrage so that the question of a Sinn of Being in general is haunted
by Casein's temporality being implicated In the metaphoricity of Casein's "movement.• This
haunting Is accompanied by another: Sinn as the Bedeutung of the word "Sein· threatens to
provide a hardened, metaphysical answer to the question of Being in terms of a concept that can
control our representations, that can give a meaning to "Being.· Because of these intertwinings,
Casein's Zeitlichkeit is described in irreducibly spatial terms, despite the attempt to ground
Casein's spatiality on its temporality. Just as Derrida had predicted, the attempt to provide a pure
temporal description of Casein's Zeitlichkeit prior to the posing of the question of Temporalitat
as the Sinn von Sein uberhaupt is haunted by the repressed member of the pair "time/space,•
a haunting indicated by the spatiality of direction.
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NOTES

1.Heidegger distinguishes between Zeitlichkeit and Temporalitit. The English convention is
"temporality" for Zeitlichkeit and "Temporallty" for Temporalitat. Because capitalization in English
is often used for emphasis this convention runs the risk of thinking Temporalitit is somehow
more important than Zeitllchkeit, which Is not the case. In this dissertation I will retain the
German word Temporalitat, but translate Zeitlichkeit as "temporality."
2.See here David Krell's Intimations of Mortality.
3.Sallis, "Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible," Research in Phenomenology, XVII (1987),
p. 4.
4.Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 172-73.
5. This acceptation does not come across very strongly in English. According to JQwm
Etvmoloqisches WOrterbuch the contemporary German Sinn combines the Bedeutungen of two
separate roots, that of the Latin sensus and the neuhochdeutsch sinnan. The OED tells us that
the English "sense" is derived from the Latin sensus. while JSlyg§, claims sinnan has the same root
as the germanlsch .fil!:!p§, "Reise. Weg. •
For Sinn as directionality compare the French sens unigue and Italian senso unico for "oneway street." I will discuss all these acceptations of Sinn later in this chapter.
6.See the "The Double Session,• in Dissemination. as well as "Signature Event Context" and
"Limited Inc,• in Limited Inc.
7.Heidegger, Wegmarken p. 325. Heidegger complains about the understanding of Entwurf as
vorstellendes Setzen.
8.Derrida, Maraes, 58-59/51-52; translation slightly modified.
9.See here also the conclusion of "Form and Meaning" (Marges 206/172), where the sense of
Being and the form of presence are linked, with the economy of their circulation seen as able
tv be disrupted by a notion of the trace, such as it Is inscribed in the text of Plotlnus. Derrida
also devotes a note to Plotlnus at the end of ·ousia and Gramme.•
10.Derrida, Marges, pp. 392-93/328. David Wood uses this point to structure his The
Deconstruction of Time.
11.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 36.
12.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 369.
13.See Cassell's German-English Dictionary under Bedeutung: "3. sense, acceptation (of a
word)."
14.J.L Austin, How To Do Things With Words (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); John
Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1970).
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15.Franz Brentano, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (Freiburg
im Breisgau, 1862). See page 25: "In eir:iem andem Sinne spricht man van Wahrheit, wenn man
van dem urtheilenden Verstande, in einem andrn, wenn man vond der Wahrheit einfacher Vorstellungen und Deflnitionen redet, oder wenn man die Dinge selbst wahr nennt. •
16.See Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical Biography"
in Heidegger: The Man and
the Thinker. ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent, 1981).
17.Gottlob Frege, "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung: Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophiche
Kritik, Vol. 100 (1892), 25-50. Translated as "On Sense and Reference· by Max Black in Geach
and Black, eds. Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (London: Basil
Blackwell, 1970).
18. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersychungen. Hussertiana XIX/1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1984).
19.Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, p. 58.
20.Husserl, ldeen zu einer reinen Pha.nomenologie und Pha.nomenolgischen Philosophie, Erstes
Buch: Allegemeine EinfOhrung in die reine Phanomenologie, Husserliana Ill (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1950).
21.Thomas Sheehan, "Time and Being 1925-2T in Thinking about Being, ed. R.W. Shahan and
J.N. Mohanty (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984).
22.Heidegger, Loglk: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, GA 21 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), p. 191;
Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes, GA 20 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979), p. 190.
23.Heidegger, PGZB, p. 193.
24.Heidegger, PGZB, p. 196; Heidegger's italics.
25.Heidegger, PGZB, p. 194.
26.That is, Heidegger in Introduction to Metaphysics still constructs narratives of a premetaphysical origin victimized by the hardening terminology of Plato and Aristotle. These
narratives are undercut within the text of Introduction to Metaphysics, however, by the analyses
that show that~ contains always already within it~.
27.I touched upon the latter essay in discussing Derrida's treatment of it in "Ousia and Gramme•
(Chapter I).
28.This mention of the perverse reading appears in the long footnote concerned with the way
affirmative Zusagen undercuts the privilege of the question. Of Spirit, p. 153 /134.
29.Sein und Zeit operates with the hermeneutic strategy thematized within it. That is, Heidegger
will, in using several terms, rely upon the vague preunderstanding of the words he can assume
to be at work in his audience. Heidegger will then in the course of the work rewrite, redetermine
thematically, these terms. A tension is then set up between the received meaning and the
redefined term. As we will see, this tension between received and redefined meaning is especially
severe when the term to be redefined is Sinn itself, one of whose received meanings is of course
"meaning."
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30.David Krell has pointed out in an unpublished class lecture the relation between Heidegger's
interchangeable use of the verbs leben and sich bewegen and Aristotle's definition of entities by
~ as those having the arche of their kinesis within themselves. See Physics 81 and
Heidegger's commentary on that text.
31.See here Sallis, "Twisting Free: Being to an Extent
Sensible.·
32. Heidegger is not totally consistent here. In the table of contents he calls Zeitlichkeit the
"ontological Sinn,• while care is called the "existential Sinn" of Daseln. Of course, care is also,
as the Being of Dasein, an ontological determination.
33.Bergson, Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience (Paris: Felix Al can, 1938), p. 75.
34.See here Heidegger's marginal note: "Verstandlichkeit: sic! wobel freilich 'Verstandlichkeit' auf
Verstehen als Entwurf und dieser als ekstatische Zeitllchkeit."
35.This is the key term in a discussion of time/space at the end of the essay "Das Wesen der
Sprache" in Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfulllngen: Neske, 1959). English translation "The Nature
of Language" in The Way to Language. tr. Peter Herz and Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper
& Row, 1971 ). See also Emil Kettering, Nahe: Das Denken Martin Heidegqers (Pfullingen: Neske,
1987).
36.ln Chapter Ill I discuss the role of the sun in the Aristotelian economy of time.
37.Research in Phenomenology. XVII (1987).
38.Sallis, "Twisting Free," p. 8.
39.Sallis, "Twisting Free,• p. 17.
40.ln Martin Heidegger in Europe and America, ed. Edward G. Ballard and Charles E. Scott (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).
41.Sallis, "Language and Reversal," p. 141.
42.Sallis, "Language and Reversal,• p. 146. Emphasis added.
43.There is a long history here, starting with Aristotle's Poetics and continuing through Cicero,
Ouintillian, Donatus, Augustine, and Aquinas, to name only the most prominent.
44.See here the etymologies of Begriff and con-cipere.
45.See here Sein und Zeit, pp. 350-51 for the equation of original light and Zeitlichkeit.
46.See here Derrida's "The Retrait of Metaphor."
47.See Caputo's Radical Hermeneutics here.
48.See Kluge: Etymologisches Worterbuch where the corresponding neuhochdeutsch sinnan
means "reisen. streben. qehen. • See also the French "sens unique· and the Italian "senso unico"
for "one-way street.· Littre list "direction" under the 21st definition of~· See note 5 above.
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49.Heldegger himself never thematizes the acceptation of Sinn as direction in Being and Time.
although he does make it the object of several fascinating paragraphs in the 1953 essay on
Georg Trakl, "Die Sprache im Gedicht, • in Unterwegs zur Sprache. See also Derrida's
commentary on this passage in De !'esprit.
50.SchOrmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, p. 13.
51.Richardson at this point equates Sinn and Being, no doubt taking his lead from SZ 31, where
the Being of a being is seen as constituting, although as hidden, the Sinn and ground of that
which does show itself.
52.See Caputo's Radical Hermeneutics for the distinction between primary and secondary
projections.
53.Derrida, Of Grammatology. p. 70. See above, p. 56.
54.Derrida, Marges, p. 69/60.
55.See here Richardson, p. 88.
56.See also the following passage setting up the attempt to ground Casein's spatiality on its
temporality: "Es [DaseinJ bestimmt je seinen eigenen Ort so, dass es aus dem eingeraumten
Raum auf den 'Platz' zurOckkommt, den es belegt hat" (Sein und Zeit, p. 368).
57.1 will show In Chapter Ill how In the Aristotelian text any movement refers to spatial movement
as the key term of its economy.
58.Derrida, Marges. p. 58/51.
59.Maurice Mer1eau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London:
Routledge and Paul, 1962), p. 430.
60.See here Nietzsche's strictures on levelling of Rangordnungen in Beyond Good and Evil.
61.Heldegger is careful to place "between" [Zwischen) in quotation marks so that he might use
sous rature a "spatial" term.
62.Heidegger does not make this distinction at 147 of Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit,
although he does express some hesitancy about the use of Bewegung: "Und dleses Sichvorweg-sein als ZurOckkommen ist eine eigentOmliche Bewegung, wenn ich so sagen dart, die
das Dasein selbst standig macht. •
63.Here we come to the dissemination of semantic kernels. Derrida will even come to discuss
the dissemination of letters in "The Double Session.·
64.See here Derrida's interrogation in De l'esprit of Heidegger's statement that "the essence of
technology is nothing technological.•
65.Derrida's "Retrait" essay shows Heidegger moving toward such an understanding. To
complement the analyses of "Retrait" one could compare the self-evisceration of the end of wzeit
und Seinw ("Ein Hindernis dieser Art bleibt auch das Sagen vom Ereignis in der Weise eines
Vortrags. Er hat nur im Aussagesatzen gesprochen.· [Zyr Sache des Denkens, p. 251) with the
discussion of "ontlschen Modelle" In the "Protocol to a Seminar" CZur Sache des Denkens, p. 51 ).

CHAPTER Ill
THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY
AND THE ECONOMY OF TIME
Introduction
1

The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is the text of a lecture course given by
2

Heidegger in Summer Semester 1927, just after the publication of Being and Time. It was the
first release of the Gesamtausgabe, volume 24, in 1975. Thus, although typescripts of the course
may have been available prior to publication, Derrida most likely had no idea of its contents
when he wrote "Ousia and Gramme• in 1969. This is unfortunate, for we could have expected
many interesting comments had he had the chance to read Basic Problems. since Heidegger
devoted a substantial portion of the course to a detailed analysis of Aristotle's text on time in
Physics IV 10-14.

3

In this chapter I will continue with the articulation of the economy of time by
presenting a reading of Heidegger's reading of Aristotle. I will show how the very same spatial
haunting I have called "the economy of tlme"-articulated by Derrida's "formal rule"-is at work
in Basic Problems. I will do so by showing how Heidegger's attempt to purify Aristotle's time
discourse of any spatial elements necessitates his overturning of three Aristotelian economies
of m~anlng, those of proteron kai· husteron, metabole, and kinesis. All these overturnings
4

attempt to reduce space, but the allegedly purified discourse on time is haunted by the possible
iteration pf its key terms (in Heidegger's case, Obergang) in the economy of spatial motion,

.J2b.Qrg, that Aristotle shows is primary in the economy of kinesis. Heidegger attempts to regulate
these economies by distinguishing between the proper (formal and non-spatial) and improper
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(spatial) Sinn of key terms, but I show how this attempt is caught up in the Sinnsfrage, the
economy of which itself contains an irreducible spatial moment. As I have claimed in Chapter
I, the formal rule of the margin is one of "submission (to) and subtraction (from)" the system of
Being as presence. The formal rule can thus be said to articulate the submission to the selfeffacing of the trace (which allows for presence) and the subtraction from that system (the
hollowing out of presence by the trace that must be able to be read from the inscription of [the
desire for] presence). The self-effacing of the trace-which, as differance, articulates time/space-allows for time to appear, but as always haunted by the repressed member of the pair, space.
In showing how Heidegger's attempt to purify Aristotle's time discourse of spatial elements is
haunted by space I will have shown that the reading of Aristotle in Basic Problems fits Into what
Derrida calls "the epoch of Sein und Zeit, • since I will have shown that its key terms-as capable
of iteration in an economy with an irreducible spatial moment-are undecidably spatial/temporal.
In other words, I will have shown that Basic Problems falls under the sway of the "formal rule"
of the occlusion of "the problem of the written trace" that governs the project of the question of
the Sinn of Being. 5
I will round out the chapter with a short comparison of the reading of Aristotle in
"Ousia and Gramme· and Basic Problems.

The Outline of the Course

As Heidegger's note on the first page of Basic Problems tells us, the course was
intended as a "new working out of the third division of the first part of Being and Time· (1 ). As
such, it was to work out "Time and Being,· and thus provide the concrete answer to the question
6

of the Sinn of Being. The outline of the course calls for three parts. The first lays out four
traditional theses about Being; the second was to have tied them to four fundamental problems,
but Is cut off after the discussion of the first problem. The third, which never appeared, was to
have laid out the scientific method of ontology and the idea of phenomenology.
The four traditional theses are those of Kant, the medievals via Aristotle, the
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moderns, and logic. According to Heidegger, the four theses may be expressed by the following
propositions: Kant says Being is not a real predicate, the medievals via Aristotle that essence and
existence belong to the Being of beings, the moderns that res extensa and res cogitans are the
divisions of Being, and logic that the copula may be usRd to address all beings (20). The basic
problems corresponding to these are those of the ontological difference, the fundamental
articulation of Being, the unity of the modes of Being, and the truth-character of Being (22-25).
The four theses are discussed in depth, but only the first of the corresponding
problems, that of the ontological difference. Is discussed. It is in the discussion of the problem
of the ontological difference that the analysis of Aristotle's text on time appears. How does
Heidegger manage to reach Aristotle in Basic Problems. when Being and Time is cut off before
the historical dlscussions?

7

Let us consider the starting point of the two investigations: In Being
8

and Time Heidegger starts from the oblivion of the question of Being, while in Basic Problems
Heidegger sets out to investigate the possibility of phenomenological ontology as scientific
philosophy, as the science of Being (#3). Being and Time thus aims at awakening the question
of Being via phenomenological investigation of the entity that has the Being question as a mode
of its Being.

After the phenomenological task is completed, Being and Time was to have

attempted an historical destruction. Basic Problems, in contrast, includes destruction as one of
the moments of Its phenomenological investigation from the beginning. It investigates the
question of Being with three moments of phenomenology that are at work simultaneously.
Heidegger calls them reduction, construction, and destruction (31). Reduction moves from a
being to Its Being (29); construction is the •projecting of the antecedently given being upon Its
Being and and the structures of Its Being• (29-30); while destruction [Destruktion] is "a critical
process In which the traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be employed, are deconstructed [ein krltischer AbbauJ down to the sources from which they are drawn• (31). Such
destruction is necessitated by the way traditional concepts pervade philosophy. Thus in Basic
Problems the confrontation with the tradition, which is certainly not lacking in Being and Time,
even though it is deferred, Is brought to the forefront and is part of the investigation from the first.
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What of the unity of the project of Basic Problems? How are the two parts
connected to each other and how are the four problems related to each other? Heidegger writes
in Basic Problems that the four problems basic to the science of Being cannot be seen as
unified, nor cannot even be seen as problems, if the "fundamental question [Fundamentalfrage]
of the whole science of being has not been put and answered: the question of the Sinn of Being
in general" (21). This is the question to which the second part of the course will be devoted. At
this point Heidegger also reminds us that the question of the Sinn of Being is tied to the
possibility of the understanding of Being, that is, the horizon upon which the understanding of
Being is projected (21 ). The investigation of this horizon presupposes an analytic of Dasein which
has revealed that temporality makes possible the understanding of Being (22). From this
conclusion grow the four problems: the ontological difference, the basic articulation of Being,
the unity of Being's modifications, and the truth-character of Being (22-25). The unity of the these
questions thus is tied to the question of the Sinn of Being, the "fundamental question• of ontology
as science. Heidegger here projects a continuation of #4 of Being and Time that would show
how ontology has an "antic fundamenr (26). Such a project opens the path that will eventually
result in the overturning (Umschlag) of ontology in(to) metontology, as sketched out in The
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. 9 The problem of metontolgy is the problem of the irruption

of Dasein in the midst of beings as a whole, das Seiende im qanzen. Heidegger's radicality here
belies Herman Rappaport's claim that Basic Problems is ·a conservative version of Being and
Time."

10

The Analysis of Aristotle's Text on Time

That Heidegger construes the four basic problems as grounded in the question of
the Sinn of Being is made clear by the title of Part Two of Basic Problems of Phenomenology:
"The Fundamental Ontological Question of the Sinn of Being in General.• The subtitle of Part Two
is "The Basic Structures and Basic Ways of Being.· Chapter One, the only one to appear, is "The
Problem of the Ontological Difference [Differenz]." It is important to clarify the order of grounding
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Heidegger lays out here if we are to understand how the analysis of Aristotle fits into the text of
Basic Problems. Heidegger shows in the introduction to Part 2, Chapter 1 how the possibility of
ontology, that is, philosophy as science, "stands and falls" with the possibility of a carrying
through of the difference [Unterschiedyng] of Being and beings (322). The Unterschied in turn
depends upon the conceptualizing of the understanding of Being [in den Griff bekommen].
Here we see the problem of (sclentifically) objectifying that upon which (everyday)
projections project. This entails the objectifying of that upon which Being is projected, or in other
words, a rendering explicit of what had served as the Implicit term of the projection that makes
up our vague everyday understanding of Being. Heidegger explains that "It is in the objectification of Being as such that the basic act constitutive of ontology as a science is performed"
(398). The problem is this: since objectifying is scientific understanding, upon what is one to
project the objectifying projection that seeks to understand everyday projection (437)? Heidegger
will deny an infinite regress and refer us to the problem of the finitude of time: that is, death.

11

Understanding the understanding of Being means clarifying how understanding
belongs to the being who understands, that Is, Dasein. Thus the •ontological analytic of the
existential constitution of Dasein" is third in the series of grounding analyses necessary for the
possibility of ontology as scientific philosophy, the science of Being (322). Heidegger reminds
us that such an analytic is subject to the demand that it ground the ground-structures of Dasein
12

in their "unity and wholeness. "

Heidegger now tells us we must presuppose the essential result

of the existential analytic as an "already established result" (323). The result we are to take up
is that "the constitution of Dasein's Being is grounded in temporallty [ZeitlichkeitJ (323). But
precisely because we are simply taking the term over as a result, we have no guarantee that we
will hear it correctly. Here we see the problem of floating assertions, cut off from grounding
intuition, as analyzed by Heidegger In Sein und Zeit.

13

So, Heidegger continues, we must find

a way to win an understanding of what temporallty means [besagt] (323). This way is to take up
the vulgar concept of time and show that it presupposes temporallty. This will show that the
ontological condition of possibility of the understanding of Being is temporality, which also makes
possible the other problems of ontology (323). When temporallty [Zeitlichkeit] is explicitly shown
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as the ground of ontology Heidegger calls It Temporalitat (324).
The order of groundings is then as follows: Ontology is grounded on ontological
difference, which is grounded on the understanding of Being, which is grounded in Zeitlichkeit.
Zeitlichkeit in its turn is both presupposed as the result of the existential analytic and is to be
seen again from the reading of the vulgar time concept. Heidegger adds that the whole project
is one of seeing Being in its temporal [temporalenJ determination (324). Following this pattern

of grounding Chapter 1 has four sections, #19-22, that work their way from (19) vulgarlyunderstood time to temporallty [Zeltlichkelt] to (20) temporallty as the ground of Casein's
transcendence to (21) temporallty [Temporalitat) as the ground of the understanding of Being
to (22) the ontological difference. Thus #19 is entitled "Time and Temporallty [Zeit und
Zeitlichkeit],· #20 Zeitlichkelt und Temporalitat, #21 Temporalitat und Sein, and #22 ·seing and
beings. The Ontological Difference.•

#19 contains the analysis of Aristotle, as subsection a) ·Historical orientation
regarding the traditional concept of time and a delineation of the common understanding of time
that lies at the basis of this concept.• Subsection a) has two further subdivisions, (alpha) •outline
lAufriss] of Aristotle's treatise on time,• and (beta) ·111terpretative exposition [Auslegung] of
Aristotle's concept of time." Subsection b) then deals with "The common understanding of time
and the return to original time,· with 4 subdivisions dealing with clock time, expressed time, the
derivation of expressed time from existential temporallty, and finally the "derivation of the
structural moments of now-time from ecstatic-horizonal temporallty. The mode of being of falling
as the reason for the covering up of original time.• The analysis thus proceeds from the common-time-to the original-temporallty-the opposite path from that taken in Being and Time. 14
In chapter 19 Heidegger distinguishes between the vulgar understanding of time and
its conceptual expression in philosophy. He does not so much here mean to emphasize the
difference between a vague projection and the scientific objectifying of the Sinn of that projection
as he means to claim that the conceptual expression retains the vulgarity of the experience it
articulates.

15

Its vulgarity would consist in its missing the originality of the phenomenon of which

it is a derivative. To articulate this claim Heidegger has recourse to a very traditional schema
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of expression. He writes that the conceptual expression is a stamping [Pragung] of the
phenomenon of time (326). Heidegger will also claim that the ancients (Aristotle and Augustine)
have already put forth the essentials of the content of the traditional concept of time (327), and
that they have said the essential that can be said from within the vulgar 1 1nderstanding of time
(329). He then asks whether the interpretation we find in the traditional concept of time has been
to the measure of the phenomenon, and whether the originality of the phenomenon has been
grasped (326). The ordering here Is: 1) vulgar understanding of time; 2) traditional concept of
time (the expression of the vulgar understanding); 3) the phenomenon of time; 4) the original
phenomenon of time; 5) original time (327).
After these distinctions Heidegger moves on to #19a, "Historical orientation to the
traditional time concept and the characteristic of the vulgar understanding of time that underlies

1t.• He mentions Plotinus, Simpllcius, Thomas Aquinas and Suarez as having provided classic
commentaries on Aristotle's time discourse, or as having provided treatises on time in their own
right. Heidegger then discusses Bergson, in what we have come to recognize as his cavalier
way. He claims Bergson misunderstands the Aristotelian understanding of time in his attempted
confrontation with Aristotle's concept of time (328-29).

We wDI come back again to the

way Heidegger attempts to control the economy of undecidably spatial/temporal terms with just
such a recourse to a distinction between proper interpretation and misunderstanding. I should
make clear here once again that I do not believe one can or should always avoid the attribution
of a misunderstanding. I only wish to account positively for the possibility of the so-called
spatializlng of time. In my own terms, I wish to account for the Irreducible spatial moment of the
economy of time, the way supposedly purified discourses about time or temporality (when it is
equated with original time) operate with terms haunted by the possibility of their iteration in
spatial contexts. This does not mean one who simply equates time with space (as Heidegger
claims Bergson does, but, as we have seen in Chapter II, he is far from doing) is not
misunderstanding when attributing such an understanding to Aristotle. Such an equation--of time
with space-would amount to a discourse of space purtfied of all temporal terms, and would
simply be the mirror image of a discourse that attempted to purify time of all spatial terms. What
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is needed, and what I attempt to do in this dissertation, is to articulate the economy of time.
We must note at the outset that Heidegger denies himself a detailed interpretation
of Aristotle's treatise. He proposes at first a brief presentation of the outline of Aristotle, then to
illustrate the concept with a selective reading of Aristotle. Thus in the encounter with Aristotle
Heidegger will only "select a few characteristic propositions In order to illustrate by them the
traditional time concept" (329). He will preface his interpretation with a "short account of the
structure of the Aristotelian treatise on time· (329), to which we now turn.

Heidegger's Aufriss of Aristotle's Time Treatise

At first, it Is Important to note that Heidegger provides no context for the time
chapters, dealing neither with its place in the Physics nor with the relation of the Physics to the
rest of the Aristotelian corpus. This is strange, since Heidegger scrupulously provided the context
for his discussion of the historical doctrines in the first part of Basic Problems.

16

Later I will

suggest that Heidegger must ignore or overturn several of Aristotle's economies of meaning in
order to read the Aristotelian treatise on time as a clue to Dasein's temporality. Perhaps the
failure to provide a context is related to the violence of these overturnings. In any case, I shall
give a bare sketch of the context of the Aristotelian discussion of time. Ross claims the following
structure for the Physics:
What we find, then, Is two main parts of the Physics. (1) books I-iv, referred to as .!SJ
phusika or ta peri physeos. (2) books v, vi, viii, referred to as ta peri kinese¢s, but also
included in ta physika in a wider sense of that term. There is also (3) a comparatively
17
isolated book, book vii.

Following this outline, the first four books deal with the concept of phusis. The first book sets the
method of study as that of the study of principles, specifically matter [hule or hupokeimenon],
privation {antikeimenon or steresis]. and form [morpM or eidos or arche Ms ho logos]. 18 The
second defines the relation of physics to mathematics and first philosophy by defining the field
as studying those beings with the~ of their kinesis or stasis within themselves. 19 The second
book continues with the doctrine of the four causes, upon which Heidegger will comment many
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times in the course of his writings.

20

The third book shows how the study of kinesis involves the

study of the infinite, place, the void, and time, and undertakes the study of kinesis and the
lnfinite. 21 The fourth book takes up the study of place, the void, and time. According to Ross'
schema, book four concludes the discussion of~. while books five, six and eight discuss
klnesls. Book five discusses the different types of change (metabole), essential and accidental.
It is Important here at the outset to make clear how Aristotle sets up these economies. Fuller
discussion with textual references will follow. Aristotle specifies three types of essential changes:
generation {genesis], destruction [phthora), and motion [kinesis]. Motions are understood
according to the doctrine of the categories. Substances (first category) move, according to three
succeeding categories: quality (alteration), quantity (increase or decrease), or place (locomotion)
fphora]. Books 6 and 8 then discuss problems in the theory of motion involving continuity and
divisibility, infinity, contact and the doctrine of the unmoved mover. As we noted above, Ross
considers Book 7 an ear1y, immature effort that moreover does not fit the flow of the discourse-an "excrescence" in his words.

22

Heidegger, as we noted above, does not provide any context for the time treatise,
but begins with Physics 4.10. Heidegger's outline proceeds by way of the division of Aristotle's
time text into chapters. Heidegger's first treatment is straightforward and unexceptional, except
for one strange assertion we will discuss shortly. Since many detailed commentaries are available
on Aristotle's time treatise

23

I will not attempt to duplicate them, but will only sketch out

Heidegger's sketch. These few pages provide a most useful overview of Aristotle's discussion
before plunging Into the details. Heidegger points out first that in the first chapter under
consideration (Chapter 10: 217b 29-218b 20) Aristotle devotes unequal attention to his two
guiding questions, whether time belongs among beings or non-beings, and what the physis of
time might be. This is true enough, but then, after Heidegger notes that the form of the
discussion is that of the aporia,

24

he most oddly claims that a positive answer is given by

Aristotle in the last chapter at 223a16-224a17. What is strange about this claim is that Physics
4.14 does not seem to offer anything like a "positive answer" to the question of time's Being or
non-Being. Chapter 14 certainly does answer the question of time's dependence on the soul, but
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it does not address the question of the Being of time arising from the non-Being of its parts.
Martineau notes his perplexity at this point: "But I have never succeeded, in reading and
rereading this passage, and all of chapter 14, in all its senses, in finding anything which
25

resembles such a 'positive answer,' nor even anv sort of answer, even indirect."

We should

recall here that Derrida also denies such an answer is ever given; in fact he uses this lack to set
up his analysis of the "evaded question:
To what could Heidegger be referring? Why would he say such a thing? At 335
Heidegger will only say Aristotle picks back up again the first problem: "Where and how is time?"
Why this way of putting Aristotle's question whether time belongs to beings or non-beings? As
we will see Heidegger uses Aristotle's question of the relation of time and the soul as a bridge
to discussing the grounding of oridinary time in Dasein's temporality (350).
Heidegger very briefly explores the way Aristotle sets up the two aooriai (330-32).
In discussing the way Aristotle sets up the first~ we should note that Heidegger uses the
equation of ein Vorhandenes

and~

first set up in Being and Time #6:

With reference to the first question, whether time is a being [etwas Vorhancienes] or a me
on, the latter determination appears to suggest itself. How should time exist as a whole
[als Ganze vorhanden sein}, an~. if the parts that go to make it up are non-existent
[nichtseiend sind] and are so in different ways? (330-31)
Here we see the ambiguity of !Q..QQ and~ which Heidegger will explore in Introduction to
Metaphysics, "Hegel's Concept of Experience; and elsewhere. 26 Heidegger exploits the
ambiguity of ~ by showing how it can be iterated In contexts that intend either a being, or
the Being of that being. Here we see an undecidability of a term across the ontico-ontological
difference.
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At this point it might be helpful if I give here a bit more of Aristotle's detail on the
first~. that of time's Being as threatened by the non-Being of its parts (217b 30-218a 30).

As both Derrida and Martineau note, but Heidegger does not, the discussion is "according to the
exoteric doctrine" [dia tOn exOterikOn logOn]. The discussion of whether or not time belongs to
beings seems to indicate that it does not, or at best hardly does. The discussion centers on the
determination of the now as a part of time. Three possibilities ensue from this determination: the

117

now can be considered as a part of time, as not a part of time, and as both same and different.
Each of these ways of considering the now, however, leads to its own paradox. If one takes the
now as a part of time three consequences follow: first, the parts of time, past and future, are not;
second, any time would have to be composed of past and future, but that which is composed
of non-beings cannot share in ..Q.Yfil§; third, a thing with parts must have existing parts, and time
is with parts, yet the past and future are not. If one takes the now as not a part of time, we find
that, since the part measures the wh.ole, and the whole is composed of parts, then time does not
seem to be composed of wholes. Considering the now as same or different, Aristotle says about
the now as different: that two different parts cannot exist hama,
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but the earlier one must be

destroyed. Yet it cannot be destroyed in itself, nor in another now. One cannot consider the now
as same, though. No divisible and finite thing has only one limit, yet the now is a limit, and a
limited time can be taken. Furthermore, if to be hama is to be in the same now, prior and
posterior would not be different.
The next discussion concerns the phusis of time. Heidegger runs through the
historical answers which Aristotle considers and rejects. They need not concern us here. The
upshot of the consideration of the tradition for Aristotle is that time is not a motion, but is equally
not without motion. Thus he concludes, time must be something in connection with motion.
Aristotle uses the genitive, ti kineseos. Two terminological notes should briefly detain us here.
One is Heidegger's use of Bewegung to translate Aristotle's kinesis. We should recall here Being
and Time's distinction between the Bewegung of a thing and the Beweatheit of Dasein as I
discussed it in Chapter II. Second, Heidegger here tells us of the Aristotelian equation of kinesis
and metabole. He writes, "For kinesis Aristotle says equally metabole" (332). Metabole, Heidegger continues, is the most general concept of motion, literally [wortlich] Umschlag. Umschlag
is an extraordinarily rich term for Heidegger. He had used it in #69b of Being and Time to
describe the change from Zuhanden to Vorhanden projection, and he will come to use it in The
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic to describe the self-collapse of ontology into metontology,
as the question guiding his research moves of its own weight from Dasein to that of Dasein in
the midst of Beings as a whole, das Seiende im ganzen.

29

The equation of kinesis and meta bole

118
we note in this passage will be crucial for Heidegger in attempting to skew the economy of
kinesis and hence purify the economy of time of its spatial moments.
Heidegger merely records the result of Aristotle's second chapter on time (Chapter
11: 21 Sb 21-220a 26), the famous definition of time, touto gar estin ho chronos. arithmos
kineseos kata to proteron kai husteron (219b 1-2). In its standard English translation, this line
reads "this then is time, the number of motion according to the prior and posterior.• Heidegger's
German reads "das namlich ist die Zeit: ein Gezahltes, das im Hinblick und !Ur den Hlnblick auf
das Vor und Nach an der Bewegung sich zeigt; oder kurz, ein Gezahltes der im Horizont des
FrOher und Spater begegnenden Bewegung" (333). Hofstadter renders this as: "time is this,
namely, something counted which shows itself in and for regard to the before and after In motion
or, in short, something counted in connection with motion as encountered in the horizon of
earlier and later.• We will see how the translation of proteron kai husteron by "before and after"
and "earlier and later" will be a main focus of Heidegger's Auslegung of Aristotle and how this
double translation allows Heidegger to skew the economy of kinesis.
For Heidegger, Aristotle's third chapter (Chapter 12: 220a 27-222a 9) defines in
greater detail the connection between motion and time. Here arises the phenomenon of "being
in time,• or "intratemporality. • The numerical character of the now is discussed here as well as
the phenomena of rest and that which is outside time (334). The fourth chapter (Chapter 13: 222
a 10-222b 29) then sets out "the unity of time in the manifoldness of the sequence of the nows.•
Here the now is seen as constitutive of time's continuity. The fifth chapter (Chapter 14: 222b 302248 17) concludes the Aristotelian treatise on time by discussing the relation of the "earlier and
later" to the "before and after." In addition to this question the relation of time and the psyche.
the problem of simultaneity, and the purest measure of time in the circular locomotion
[kuklophoria] of the outermost heaven are also addressed here. Significantly for us, Heidegger
does not follow up in his Aus!egung on the last topic he mentions here in the Autriss, that of
circular locomotion. We will come to explore fully the consequences of the role circular
locomotion plays In Aristotle's economy of time when we discuss the privilege of phora in the
last book of the Physics.
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Heidegger closes the sketch with his standard claim about Aristotle's paradigmatic
role for the tradition of metaphysics:
all the central problems which were thereafter discussed in the course of the further
development of philosophy are already marked out. It can be said that subsequent times
did not get essentially beyond the stage of Aristotle's treatment of the problem-apart
from a few exceptions in Augustine and Kant, who nevertheless retain in principle the
Aristotelian concept of time. (336)
As we have seen in Chapter I, Derrida takes issue with this move, by demonstrating the
marginality of all texts, Aristotle's included. The margin is articulated by the formal rule-all texts
have exceptions (are subtracted from) the system of presence governing what Heidegger calls
"the Aristotelian concept of time.• One might even say Derrida articulates the way exceptions are
the rule.
Heidegger's Auslegung of Aristotle's Time Treatise
Next Heidegger embarks on his Aysleguna of Aristotle's treatise on time. He
remarks that he will not keep strictly to the text, but by a "free discussion· and by "carrying the
interpretation somewhat further, we shall try to focus more clearly on the phenomenon as
Aristotle sees it" (336). In this sub-section I shall trace the overturnings of three Aristotelian
economies licensed by this freedom with the text. Those three are the economies of proteron
kai husteron, metabole, and kinesis. It is Important to note at the outset that Aristotle sees these
economies, like the all-important economy of Being centered on the phrase to on legetai
pollakhOs,
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as regulations of a polysemia. As Derrida shows in distinguishing polysemia from
31

dissemination in 'White Mythology, "

Aristotle's conception of signification in the Metaphysics'

discussion of the principle of non-contradiction assumes that "not to mean one thing is not to
32

mean at all. "

Thus univocity is the telos of the regulated polysemia,
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even if, as Aubenque

claims, such univocity is never to be reached in the science of Being qua Being. I will be pointing
to the dissemination resulting from the possibility of Iteration in contexts other than the one an
author might attempt to designate as governed by a proper Sinn. Let me stress that dissemination does not entail the loss of all meaning, but the proliferation of meaning. Instead of no
meaning we find ourselves faced with too much meaning to be fully controlled by intentions
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made possible by inscription within a text-but this does not entail no control whatsoever.
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Heidegger starts the Auslegung by citing Aristole's definition of time: touto gar estin
ho chronos. arithmos kineseos kata to proteron kal husteron. Martineau notes here that
Heidegger skips the Interpretation of the way Aristotle sets up the aporial. This is a crucial
difference with Derrida, which we will explore later. In the body of his Interpretation Heidegger
discusses six topics: 1) the example of the moving pointer, 2) the translation of proteron kal
hysteron by "before and after" and by "ear1ier and later,• 3) the experience of motion, 4) the
identity and difference of the now, 5) the numerical character of time and the now as transition,
and 6) time and the soul. I will show the way the overturning of the three Aristotelian economies
undergirds Heidegger's interpretation as he moves through these six points.
Heidegger first takes up the connection of time with motion via the example of the
moving pointer. I will not discuss in detail Heidegger's points in this passage, since they will
come up again later. By means of his own phenomenological descriptions, Heidegger shows that
time is not a property of the pointer. Heidegger here reminds us that Aristotle distinguishes
between the moving thing and motion, and that time belongs to motion [Bewegung], even
though it is certainly not identical to motion {337). Heidegger next reminds us that Aristotle has
specified that time is a number, and precisely the number as counted, not as counting. 34 He then
calls upon us to attempt an experiment, asking, "What can I count about the motion of the rod?"
(339) After some patient investigation Heidegger concludes that time is •read off [ablesen] from
the motion of the pointer" (340). Heidegger bolsters this conclusion with the the example of the
sun attended to by the human being in "natural, everyday existence [der Mensch im nat0r1ichenalltaglichen Dasein]."
Here I must mention the extraordinary role played by the sun in Aristotle, even
though I will not be able to explore completely the circle of the heliotrope and its role in the
economy of time. For Aristotle, the sun, along with the moon and planets, Is moved by the first
heaven, which is in turn moved by the prime mover. The movement of the sun, as analyzed in
De Generatione et Corruptlone, causes generation and destruction (336a 32-33; 336b 17-18). In
the Physics Aristotle will even say that "both man and the sun beget man" (194b 13-14). We
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should also recall here that Heidegger tells us that the path of the sun lays out "regions of life
and death" for Oasein.
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I will return to discuss the sun when I analyze the role of circular

locomotion in the economy of kinesis and hence of time later in this chapter.
The second topic discussed by Heidegger is that of the translation of oroteron kal
husteron. This is the first Aristotelian economy in which we shall have to trace Heidegger's
Intervention. The importance of the proteron kal husteron devolves upon the question: What is
the horizon for the telling of time? Heidegger translates Aristotle's definition of time as saying that
"time is something counted in connection with encountered motion with a view to the before and
after [Vor und Nach], in the horizon of the earlier and later [FrOher und Spater]" (341). The
looked-for horizon is thus that of the "earlier and later." We must carefully note here that
Heidegger has translated proteron kai husteron with two phrases: "before and after" and "earlier
and later." Webb points out Heidegger's unique choice of the temporal "earlier and later,"
claiming that the standard English translators Barnes, Wlcksteed and Cornford, and Hussey all
use "before and after.• Apostle, on the other hand, has "prior and posterior.•
Heidegger claims that it is "not necessary" to translate proteron kai husteron by the
"indifferenr set of terms "before and after" (342). Now Aristotle himself sets up an economy for
proteron kai husteron at Metaohysics 5.11, 1018b8-19a 14. Things are said to be prior when they
are: 1. things nearer some beginning [archel; 2. things prior in knowledge; 3. the attributes of
pr:ior things; 4. things prior by phusis or .QYfilsl. Within the first area, "things nearer some~•
Aristotle will name: a). place [!QRQ§]; b). time; c). movement [kinesis]; d). power [dunamis]; and
e). arrangement [taxis]. The economy as Aristotle lays It out thus shows, among others, both
spatial and temporal moments. We can thus call proteron kai husteron undecidably spatial /temporal. However, Aristotle does not leave the economy just as he lists it, but he attempts
to determine a primary "sense"
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for proteron: the prior sense of prior, we might say. In the

Metaphysics Aristotle claims that the primary sense of proteron kai husteron is 4). things prior
by phusis or .QYfilsl (1019a 11 ). However, in the Physics' time treatise Aristotle will say that
croteron kai husteron is primarily [proton] in !@.Q§ (219a 15). Thus we can say that in the
determination of kinesis the order of relata is accomplished primarily by reference to some arche,
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and that that arche is a .!ru2.Q§-or better, in some .!ru2.Q§.
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In Heidegger's terms then, "before and after" represents ordering by reference to
topos and "earlier and later" ordering by reference to time. Heidegger will go against Aristotle's
aconomy by privileging the temporal sense of "earlier and later" over the topos-directed, or
"lndifferenr sense of "before and after.• However, could not one show that even "before and after"
[Vor und Nach] is not •indifferent: but "undecidable" with regard to space and time? Surely
common usage testifies that "before• IYQr) can be used to mean "prior" or "in front or while
"after" [Nach] can mean both "posterior" and "In back of.938 Now Heidegger cannot bring himself
to completely censure the translation of proteron kai husteron by "before and after.· Such a
translation does have its "specific rights in accordance with the phenomenon [bestimmtes
sachliches Recht]" (342; translation modified). Thus Heidegger has set up what he will later call
a "wavering" (349) in Aristotle's text between these two meanings of proteron kai husteron, i.e.
"before and after" and "earlier and later." I will show how such "wavering,• despite Heidegger's
explicit intention, acknowledges the undecidability of proteron kai husteron and hence the
irreducible spatial haunting in the economy of time.
For now let us follow Heidegger as he notes that the translation by "earlier and later"
appears impossible, for "earlier" and "later" are themselves "determinations of time· (341).
Aristotle's time definition thus seems tautologous, defining time by means of two sets of temporal
determinations, so that in essence the formula reads "time Is time." For Heidegger, however, this
is not tautologous, as is shown by a comparison of what Is intended by "earlier and later" [was
sie meinen] with what is intended by the subject of the definition (341). "Perhaps," Heidegger
continues, "the second term 'time' means [ggtJ something different and more original
[UrsprOnglicheres] than what Aristotle means [meintJ in the definition itself" (341). This seeming
tautology in not in fact a tautology, but "betrays the inner coherence of the Aristotelian time
phenomenon, that is, of time as commonly understood, with the original time which we are
calling temporality" (341 ). Here we can clearly see Heidegger's recourse to assertions about
Aristotle's intention-obviously a strategy caught up in the Sinnsfrage-to regulate the
undecidability of proteron kai husteron. I will return to this point shortly, but for now, let us
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continue following Heidegger's text.
Heidegger continues by noting that if we understand the way "earlier and later"
refers to temporality as original time, then we can allow "earlier and later" to translate proteron
kai husteron. Such a translation, the result of our more authentic [einigermassen] understanding
of Aristotle, is also the result of our Interpreting Aristotle's definition "In conformity with its original
approach [gemass ihrem Ansatzr (342). It Is this Insistence on the propriety and originality of
only one moment of an economy of Interpretation that one could confidently predict would have
attracted Derrida's strictures had he read Basic Problems at the time of his writing of "Ousia
and Gramme.•
Heidegger concludes this section of the discussion by demanding that the origin

of vulgar time In temporality should be revealed (342). He approaches this by investigating the
way proteron kai husteron directs our vision in the counting of time. He first takes up the
translation by "before and after" to allow this to justify the translation by "earlier and later.•
With the question of translation as his bridge Heidegger moves on to discuss his
third point, how time becomes visible in the experience of motion. Here the second of our three
Aristotelian economies come into play, that of metabole. Heidegger here assimilates two
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concepts Aristotle rigorously distinguishes, kinesis, "motion,• and metabole. "change. "

Heidegger writes: "To motion [Bewegung] in general, kinasis or metabole. there belongs
kinoumenon kinetai: a moving thing is moving, is in motion" (342-43). What is the economy of
metabole In the Physics? For Aristotle, kinasls, change "from a subject to a subject" (225b 2),
is itself a species of metabola. change. The other species of metabole are genesis. "generation,•
the change "from a nonsubject to a subject,• and phthora, "destruction,• the change "from a
subject to a nonsubject • Aristotle provides an extended discussion at Physics E 1, 225a 1-b9.
A key phrase that clearly shows the subordination of kinasis to metabole occurs at 224a 35:
"Since every motion [kinasis] is a kind of change (metabole tis)."
To be sure, Heidegger's assimilation of kinasis and metabola in the time discussion
is not entirely without foundation in Aristotle's text. Aristotle does claim that "in the current
discussion it is not necessary to distinguish klnesis and metabola" (218b 19-20). For Heidegger,
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such an equation removes the reference to space in the discussion of time, leaving us with only
the formal sense of change.

However, Aristotle does use kinesis almost exclusively in his

discussions of time; and--as we will see in exploring the economy of kin$sis-.Q!:1Qm is the primary
term in the economy of both kinesls and metabole. one to which all other terms for motions and
changes make reference as subordinate in one way or another. In other words, Aristotle will
make clear that all other motions and changes depend upon phora. a type of motion, for their
existence. Thus the attempted assimilation does not hold once one takes Into account Aristotle's
other texts on the economies of kinesis and metabole. Now if one would wish to bring the
ontico-ontological difference to bear at this point, by saying, as Heidegger will say in the 1931
lecture course on Metaphysics Theta, that kinesis refers to the Being of beings as well as to
specfflc antic motions, one would be forced to address the issue of a term undecidable across
the ontological difference. The only way to decide such undecidability would be by recourse to
an ostensibly proper Sinn for the term, and this would fall prey to the Slnnsfrage. In any case,
I will show that the reference to phora as the primary term in the economies key to the definition

of time is irreducible.
We should also note here that although Aristotle seems to use kinesis generically
in the time discusssion at 223a 32, a closer examination of the latter quote reveals things are not
that clear. Aristotle writes, using the middle voice throughout, which renders the verbs
undecidably active/passive, and necessitates orthographic gymnastics in English translation, that
"and indeed [is] generate[s/d] in time and [is] destroy[s/ed] and [is] grow[s/n] and [is]
alter[s/ed]. In so far as these are kinesis. in that respect there is a number of each motion [kai
gar gignetai en khronOI kai phthelretal kai auxaneitai kai alloioutai kai pheretai; Mi oun kinesis
esti, tautei estin hekastes kineseOs arithmos]." Now this "in so far" makes problematic the claim
that kinesis is intended as a genus here. Rather. Aristotle seems to be indicating that to some
extent the other forms of metabole can be seen as similar to kinesls in this particular field.
Why would Heidegger, normally the most careful of readers, assimilate the species-kinesis-to the genus--metabole-or at best, privilege the assimilating text (218b 19) over the
distinguishing one (225a 35)?

In order to answer this question we must discuss ·our third
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economy, that of kinesis. In discussing time, Aristotle, and Heidegger too, for that matter, almost
always interprets kinesis in terms of Its primary instance, J2l::!Qr.e, "motion with respect to place.·
Why is this? What is the privilege of .Q.!:JQ.m? What is its role in the economy of kinesis? For
Aristotle, there are four types of kinesls: locomotion [phora], growth, decay, and alteration.
Locomotion is for Aristotle paradigmatic: he says in the discussion of topos at Physics 4 1, 208a
31-32 that "the most common and most important motion, which we call 'locomotion,' is a
motion with respect to place [kal tes kinese0s h0 koine malista kai kuriotate kata topon estin, Mn
kaloumen phoran] ...40 See also in this regard 243a 39 where J2!:lQ.m is called "first of motions
[prOte tOn kineseonr; 260a 28 where J2bQ!§ is called "the motion that is necessarily first [tauten
anagkaion einal protenr; 261a 28 where phora is called "first among motions [ton kineseon M
phora prOter; and 266a 1 where kinesis kata topon is called .kY.d.Q§. We will return to consider
Aristotle's arguments for the primacy of JlbQ!§. If we would follow them, these arguments would
lead us into the circle of the heliotrope. Unfortunately, this path must remain untrodden for us
in this dissertation. For now let us rejoin the Heideggerian text.
As we have seen in our exposition of the context of the discussion of Aristotle,
Heidegger needs to read the Aristotelian time treatise in a way that will enable him to elucidate
a clue to the ecstatic temporality he names original time. Furthermore, as we have seen in
Chapter II, Heidegger needs to ground spatiality on temporallty in order to safeguard his project
of investigating the question of the Sinn of Being in general. The key here is this: the Aristotelian
economies, with their emphasis on the primacy of .QbQm, make plain the Irreducible reference
to space In the measurement and experience of time because any Iteration of kinesis contains
a reference to the primacy of ..Qb.Qm. The discourse that seeks to define and describe time uses
terms haunted by the possibility of their Iteration in spatial contexts. These defining and
describing terms are inscribed in economies with irreducible spatial moments-irreducible
precisely because the possibility of iteration in spatial contexts cannot, de jure, be completely
controlled. Heidegger attempts such control, but can do so only by trying to determine the
proper Sinn of kinesis as completely formal. But this recourse to Sinn founders on the spatialify
inscribed in the Slnnsfrage.
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Let me expand on how this point can be seen in terms of the Sinnsfrage. Here we
will come upon the key term in Heidegger's analysis: Obergana. He will use this term both
generically, to indicate pure change-Over rumschlag) and specifically, to indicate locomotion,

.Q..l:lQ.ra. He will als" use It to indicate the characteristic of the now as •open on both sides,• as an
Obergehendes (352). Heidegger finds himself compelled to distinguish the proper Sinn for kinesis
as non-spatial by assimilating It to metabole. He writes: "The most general character of motion
[Bewegung] is metabole, that is, a tum or change [Umschlag], or better, a transition [Obergang]
from something to something" (343). Previously Heidegger had used Oberaang in the discussion
of motion with regard to place: locomotion; in Greek, .Q..l:lQ.ra. He writes at 337: "We say: Its
change of place [Qrstveranderung], that Is, the transition [Obergang] from a position [Stelle] to
another." Obergang also appears in discussions of locomotion at 338 and 343 Qine 15). Let me
be clear: I do not mean to claim that Obergang Is "spatial"-I.e., that It "has a primarily spatial
sense"-but that it is used both generically as equivalent to Umschlag--metabol0-and specifically
with regard to locomotion-phora. It can be iterated in either context: it is undecidable. The only
way to decide this generic/specific undecidability is by claiming to identify a proper, non-spatial,
Sinn. But Sinn, as we have shown, cannot reduce the spatiality of direction. The irreducibility of
spatiality in the economy of Sinn will be of the utmost importance in the discussion of now as
transition, where Heidegger will also use Obergang.
Heidegger continues: "The simplest form of motion [Bewegung], of transition
[0bergang] and the one most frequently used by Aristotle in his analysis of motion, is ..12.!JQ.m,
transition [0bergang] from one place (!QpQfil to another, change-over [Umschlag], change of
place [Ortsveranderyngr (342; translation modified).
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Here Heidegger uses Obergang both

generically and specifically. He also says ..12.!JQ.m is the "simplest.• This characterization of phora
is not strong enough to do justice to the Aristotelian economies. We have seen how Aristotle has
called ..12.!JQ.m the "most important" kinesis. I will return to this point in discussing circular
locomotion.
Let us trace the way the Slnnsfrage limits Heidegger's discourse In this passage.

Of the remaining three types of kinesis we have isolated In Aristotle's economy, allolOsis,
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qualitative alteration, auxesis. quantitative increase or growth, and phthisis, quantitative decrease
or decay, 42 Heidegger mentions only the first, to reinforce the point that their common ·characteristic is that of change ek tines eis ti. "from something into something (else)" (343). Heidegger
calls alloiOsis merely "another form of motion,• not mer'ltioning Aristotle's showing of its
dependence on J2.t:l.Qm later in the Physics. Heidegger remarks that alloiOsis does not have the
Sinn of transition of place:
Another form of motion [Bewegung5form] is, for example, alloiosis, becoming different in
the sense [Qas Anderswerden in dem SlnneJ that one quality changes [umschl8gtJ to
another, one particular color to another, and here too there is an advance ek tinos eis ti,
away from something toward something. But this "away from something toward
something." does not have the sense of transition from one place to another [hat nicht den
Sinn des Uberqanqs von einem Ort zum anderen]. (343)
Thus ek tines eis ti is "not necessarily to be grasped spatially"

(343). Heidegger calls the

structure of motion named by Aristotle as ek tines els ti "dimension,• and he reminds us to
''tak[eJ the concept in a completely formal sense, [in einem ganz formalen Sinn] in which spatial
character is not essential. Dimension expresses [meint] a general notion of stretch [Dehnung];
extension in the sense [im Sinne] of spatial dimension [Ausc!ehnungJ then represents a particular
modification of stretch" (343).
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Such recourse to Sinn obviously falls under the purview of the

Sinnsfrage as I have articulated it in Chapter II.
Two terminological notes must be made here. First, Heidegger tells us that the
determination of ek tinos els ti must be kept clear of "spatial representation• [raumlichen
Vorstellung]. as Aristotle himself had done (343). This is the very phrase Heidegger used in Being
and Time to describe the way falling temporality dominates everyday language. Heidegger writes
in Sein ynd Zeit that "die Selbstauslegung des Daseins und der Bedeutungsbestand der Sprache
Oberhaupt weitgehend von 'raumlichen Vorstellungen' durchherrscht ist. .M In a way, this
dissertation is an extended commentary on that single phrase. Second, Heidegger uses a term,
Erstreckynq, he had reserved in Being and Time for Dasein's Geschehen. to describe the
complete formality of ek tines eis ti. In reading Heidegger's text, it is most disconcerting to
realize that Heidegger does not stay with the Dehnung / Ausdehnung distinction developed here
as the discussion progresses. At 344 he uses Ausciehnyng in two places where Dehnung would
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have been more appropriate. First: "When we experience motion in a moving thing, we
necessarily experience along with it suneches, continuity, and in this continuity itself ek tinos eis

.!!. dimension in the original sense, stretching out (extension)

[Dimension im ursprOnglichen Sinn.

Erstreckung (AusdehnungU- (344). Second: "Extension [Ausdehnung) and continuity are already
implicit In motion" (344). Heidegger has set up Dehnung as the genus and Ausdehnung as the
specific modification. But here he uses Ausdehnung genertcally, so that we are led to read it as
another example of a term undecidable across a generic / specific economy, just as we had
previously read Obergang. Here as well, as we might expect, the Sinnsfrage arises. Heidegger
tells us that only a completely formalized Sinn of •dimension" will remove spatiality. But this
appeal to a formal Sinn presupposes a determination of which Sinn of Sinn is pre-eminent. As
we have learned, the economy of interpretation set up by each iteration of the mark Sinn
includes an irreducible moment of the direction of Casein's self-projective movement. Indeed.
as we recall from Chapter II, Heidegger claims this is the primary acceptation of Slnn.

45

Since

Sinn as direction is Irreducibly spatial, that Is, each iteration of Sinn contains an irreducible
reference to its possible inscription in a spatial context (such as Heidegger himself had inscribed
it in the discussions of Richtung), then at least some aspect of spatiality will come to haunt the
notion of "dimension,• even if, concesso non date, it Is only in the way we attempt to purify the
concept of space by projecting it upon a formalized~.
Heidegger next discusses the Aristotelian concept of suneches, continuity, which
also belongs to stretch. Meaethos. extendedness, is not primarily spatial, we learn. 46 I must note
here In passing what I will shortly discuss in detail, that Aristotle insists that only phora is
continuous (261a 32), and indeed, only circular phora (265a 11-2). But the infinite circular .Q.!:!Qm
(of the sun) is caused by the prime mover, ousia as pure self-presence. We will thus have only
come to see the full contours of the Aristotelian economy of time when we have examined the
heliotrope.
Heidegger reminds us that the Aristotelian concepts are linked in a specific relation
Aristotle names "following,· akolouthein, which "expresses the foundational a priori connection
of motion with continuity and extendedness" (344-45). Recognizing this relation, Heidegger tells
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us, is the key for avoiding "defective interpretations" such as those of Bergson, "who said that
time as Aristotle understands it is space.• Earlier, Heidegger had said that missing the formality
in the formal sense of meaethos led Bergson into his misunderstanding of Aristotle, for he took
the dimension-character of motion in tenns of spatial dimension fraumliche Ausdehnung) (34344). We have already remarked, in Chapter II, that Bergson says clearly that time as ordinarily
conceived is the phantom of space. In the discussion of akolouthein Bergson is said to have
"[taken] continuity in the narrower sense of the extensional magnitude of space" {343-44). I would
say Bergson's phrase implies that time is haunted by space; Bergson's phrase thus articulates
the economy of time, and Is as such marginal to the system of presence. Even if one were to
take Bergson's text vulgarly-as stating that time is equal to space--as Heidegger does, the
possibility of (mis)interpretlng time as space is an Irreducible possibility which follows from the
Aristotelian economy of time, given the role of~ in the economy of kinesis. The articulation
of that irreducibility is the formal law of the haunting of time by space, the articulating of the
economy of time. As I have previously insisted, recognizing such haunting does not entail the
complete abandonment of all distinctions between proper and improper senses, but it does
require the recognition that the spatiality of Sinn in the Sinnsfrage marks the final, irreducible
haunting of time by space.
Let us return to Heidegger's text. He continues his discussion by noting that the
motion from which time is read must be ordered, from there to here in the horizon of the prior
and posterior. At this point he sketch~s the grounding of Aristotle's time understanding in
ecstatic temporality by showing how it is precisely the retention of the prior and the expectation
of the posterior which enables us to see transition as such. Saying "now" assigns time to the
clock; the clock gives us the how-many of the nows. A note at this point reads "Vorgabe ist im
Grunde die dreifach ekstatisch horizontale Struktur der Zeitlichkeit. Sie gibt sich die Zeit var"
(348). Expectation, retention, and enpresenting are to be seen as original (even if not authentic)
temporality. I will not be able, given the constraints of the dissertation format, to pursue this
thematic at this point. Let me simply note that the fact that Heidegger attempts such grounding
is not as important for my project here as the fact that, as I have shown, the discourse of
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ecstatic temporality is composed of terms haunted by the possibility of their iteration in spatial
discussions. We need only recall here the definition of ecstatic temporality as "ursprunglich
'Ausser-sich' an und fOr sich selbst."

47

At this point Heidegger picks up his second topic again, that of the translation of
proteron kai husteron. As he laid out for us, the translation by "earlier and later" interprets the
translation "before and after" (349). He explains this relation of interpretation by adding that the
first translation (before and after) is literal [.die wOrtllche Auffassung]. while the second (earlier
and later) already includes a large element of Interpretation [die zweite schliesst schon
weitgehend eine lnteroretation in sich] (349). Here Heidegger admits that Aristotle states that
proteron kai hysteron means primarily sequence of places (219a 15). This determination has a
"non-temporal sense· runzeltlichen Sinn], Heidegger claims, but he also claims that "the
experience of before and after in a certain manner presupposes the experience of time
[Zeiterfahrung], the earlier and later" (349). Heidegger then mentions the economy of proteron
kal hysteron as developed by Aristotle In the Metaphysics. He then writes an astounding
sentence to which we have referred earlier: "Aristotle wavers in the time interpretation in the
conceptual determination of proteron kal husteron lln der Zeitabhandlung schwankt er in der
Bedeutungsauffassung des oroteron-husteront (349). With this acknowledgement of "wavering•
Heidegger admits that the economy of proteron kai husteron includes a spatial moment and is
thus undecidably spatial/temporal. To reduce this undecidability Heidegger once again has
recourse to the determination of a proper Sinn. He writes: "Most often he takes it directly as
earlier and later and not so much as before and after rMeistens nimmt er es direkt als FrOher und
Seater und nicht so sehr als Var und Nachi- (349). I have had to modify Hofstadter's translation.
Hofstadter's version reads: "Most often he takes it directly as earlier and later and not so much
In the sense of before and after.· It would have made my task easier if Heidegger had in fact
written "Im Sinne" but he writes only "als. • Nevertheless, the recourse to Sinn is implied by the
phrase "he takes" [nimmt er], as well as by Heidegger's previous claim that "before and after" has
an "unzeitlichen Sinn.·
At this point it may be useful to recall that Heidegger needs to keep Aristotle's time
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pure of space, because Aristotle's understanding of time is to serve as the vulgar self-expression
of temporality and hence as a clue to the temporality which can be read off of Aristotle's treatise.
As we recall from Sein und Zeit, Casein's spatiality is to be grounded on temporality, so spatial
terms are to be kept out of the discussion of temporality. Yet In discussing Aristotle Heidegger
acknowledges that the translation of proteron kai hysteron as "before and after" in sequence of
places Is both set forth by Aristotle and has Its "specific rights in accordance with the
phenomenon Cbestimmtes sachllches Recht]" (342). Although he acknowledges this wavering he
attempts to regulate its undecidability and thereby reduce its spatial moment via a determination
of proper Sinn.
To see the full implications of this attempted regulation and reduction we must here
complete our exploration of the Aristotelian economy of kinesis and phora. Aristotle is far more
insistent than Heidegger lets on about the primacy of 12.!:!.Qm in kinesis. As we noted earlier, at
243a 1O Aristotle calls 12.!:!.Qm the "first• ~ among motions, and at 260a 28 Aristotle says

12.!:!.Qm Is "necessarily first.• In the latter passage, in the context of examining continuous motion,
Aristotle presents several arguments why 12.!:!.Qm Is presupposed in all other types of kinesis, how

it Is prior in time and in nature, and how the prime mover Is the principle

~]

and causes the

motion that Is first among motions (260a 20-261a 31). One could object here that Aristotle's
privileging of 12.!:!.Qm depends on the demonstration of ontic dependence and that Heidegger is
after the ontological Sinn of kinesis. But here Heidegger is caught by the undecidability of
kinesls. as iterable in contexts Intending both antic motion and the Being of beings. If one
attempts to regulate this undecidability by means of distinguishing the proper (ontological) Sinn
for kinesls one is caught in the Sinnsfrage; if one calls kinesls an antic metaphor one Is caught
in the metaphorlcity of meta-pherein. 48
At this point let us take up Aristotle's arguments about the primacy of phora in the
economies of kinesis and metabole. I will focus on Physics Book

a (Theta)

Chapters 5-1 o.

Aristotle is here looking for continous motion, that caused by the first (unmoved) mover. Theta
5 (2568 4-258b 9) gives an argument for the unmoved mover. Aristotle distinguishes three
moments of a motion: that which is in motion, that which moves another, and that with which
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the mover moves another (256b 15-16). That which moves another without being an instrument
of motion must be immovable (256b 22). Aristotle then turns to consider self-movers (257a 32ff),
showing that •it is impossible for that which moves itself to move itself in its entirety" (257b 3).
Thus, even within a self-mover there must be division into moved and mover (257b 14), and that
which causes a motion must be In actuality (257b 10), since a motion is an incomplete actuality
of the movable (257b 8). Thus self-movers must be split, containing both that which is moved
and that which, being unmoved, Is the mover of that which is moved (258a 19).
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It would be

very interesting, though far beyond the scope of this dissertation, to begin here to analyze this
splitting In terms of auto-affection. Such a possible analysis will come up again In Heidegger's
reading of the famous hama gar klneseos aisthanometha kai chronou (219a 2-3).
We turn now to Theta 6 (258b 10-260a 19), where Aristotle tells us that the first thing
moved by the unmoved mover must also be eternal (260a 2). Ross at this point claims that
Aristotle here has proven only the eternity of successive generation, but presupposes the
unquestionability of the observation of the unceasing rotation of the heavens.
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Now the

unmoved mover always causes one and the same motion and in the same manner (260a 5). This
brings us to Aristotle's cosmology. The order of causation is: prime mover, unmoved movers,
first heaven, sun/moon/planets, generation (260a 1-19). We have already had cause to mention
the role of the sun in generation.
In Theta 7 (260a 20-261 b 26) we finally tum to the economy of kin0sis. Aristotle
presents three arguments for the primacy of J2!:!Qm in the economy of kinesis: 1) there can be
no increase without a previous alteration (260a 29), but there must be something that causes the
alteration (260b 1). This something must move to come closer in space to the altering thing
(260b 3-4). For example, alteration from potentially to actually hot presupposes locomotion, the
bringing nearer of the actually hot (260b 3). 2) The next argument concerns condensation and
rarefaction as principles of change of quality. Aristotle claims that Ncondensation and rarefaction are, respectively, coming closer and going further" (260b 11 )--and these are obviously
locomotions (260b 13). Aristotle further maintains that the magnitude of that which is Increasing
and decreasing Is change with regard to place (260b 14). 3) The final arguments contain a
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reference to the economy of proteron kai husteron we explored above. Aristotle reminds us that
priority is granted when the following conditions are met: a) independence b) priority in time c)
proximity to ~. Regarding each condition, Aristotle argues that locomotion must be
considere!i prior to other changes a) if other changes cannot exist without locomotion, but it can
without them. And this is precisely what Aristotle shows, arguing that:
For there is no necessity for an object in locomotion to be increasing or to be in the
process of generation or destruction, but none of these [changes--Apostle's addition] can
exist if there is no continuous motion, which Is caused by the primary mover. (260b 2629)
The continuous motion caused by the prime mover is the locomotion of the heavens, as Aristotle
will show shortly. Aristotle has thus shown here that

.Q.!::!Qm serves as the prime term in the

economy of metabole, via its primacy In the economy of kinesls.
Secondly, regarding b) primacy in time: Aristotle claims that the only motion
possible in eternal things is locomotion, so there is an obvious priority of time in that case (260b
29). Aristotle here also brings up the example of generation.
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Locomotion appears last in the

development of generated things, but generation itself requires the previous locomotion of the
parents (261a 4). Thirdly, c) although locomotion appears last in generated things, this is so
because it is closer to the substance toward which the generated thing is developing (261 a 15).
Also, locomotion is the least departure from ..QY§Ja-that Is, the thing moving with regard to place
changes itself less than the thing changing its qualities or magnitude (261 b 22). But finally,
Aristotle says the clearest proof that locomotion is prior to other causes because of its proximity
to ousia is that self-movers cause locomotion above all: "malista de delon hoti to kinoun auto
auto malista tauten kinei kurios, ten kata topon• (261 b 24). Recalling here the split nature of selfmovers-into that which is moved and that which is the (unmoved) mover-we can understand
the relation of the previous claim to the next sentence: "the self-mover is the principle of things
in motion and of movers and that among things in motion it is the self-mover which is first [kaitoi
phamen touto einai ton kinoumenon kai kinounton arcMn kai proton tois kinoumenois. to auto
auto kinoun]" (261a 25-26). The self-mover referred to here would be the first heaven, which
provides the principle of motion for the sun/moon/planets, and which is moved by the unmoved
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movers that provide the principle of motion for the self-movers; all this system is of course
oriented toward the prime mover.
Next Aristotle moves to show which of locomotions is primary (261 a 29). This
demonstration will show the primary locomotion t0 be both continuous and eternal (261a 31).
Two arguments appear here: 1) All motions other than the locomotion caused by the prime
mover move from opposite to opposite (261a 34); these will come to rest in a contrary (261b3).
2) Similarly with changes, Aristotle shows that things cannot change in opposite directions at
the same time (261 b a). Thus the motion caused by the prime mover, that of the first heaven,
the primum mobile, is the primary term in the economy of .Qb.Q.m, which is in turn primary in the
economies of kinesis and metabole.
We now move to Book Theta chapter a (261b27-265a 12) where Aristotle discusses
the infinity of continuous circular locomotion. He first spells out three types of locomotion:
circular, rectilinear, and the combination of the two. Now rectilinear continuous motion is
impossible, since it must turn back along the line, and it must stop before turning back (262a 15).

.bQ.gQ§ can be used here, Aristotle continues, not just sensation.

The~

is this: any middle is

one numerically, but two in formula; that is, the middle is the beginning of one segment and
the end of the other (262a 22). The scheme of potency/actuality emers here: any point is
potentially a middle, but the act of division implies stopping one motion and beginning another,
so using the middle point as an end and a beginning implies a stop {262b 7). This argument
about the potentiality of divisive limits and the necessity of a stop when actuating such limits will
come up again In the discussion of the ldemity and difference of the now, to which Aristotle turns
in his discussion of Zeno's paradoxes. Similarly to a point, a moment as dividing limit is
numerically one but two in logos, the end of one segment of time and the beginning of another
(263b 15). As we saw in Chapter I, Derrida deals at some length with these arguments; we will
pick up the discussion later when we return to Heidegger's discussion of the now.
We return to the question of circular locomotion as infinite and continuous (264b
9-29). In Book Theta Chapter 9 (265a 13-2668 9) Aristotle comes to address how it is that of
locomotions the circular Is primary~ (265a 14). Circular locomotion Is simpler and more
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complete than other locomotions, Aristotle claims (265a 17). In rejoining itself in completing the
circle such locomotions eliminate the need for a stop, as we saw was necessary for rectilinear
motions.
The discussion of Theta 1O shows that the prime mover is unmoved, and also hac;
no parts and no magnitude-hence it is not in a !QJ2Qi; it has reduced space (267b 18-25; see
also Metaphysics 1073a 5). Now the motion caused by the prime mover-that of the first heaven,
the primum mobile-must obviously have a magnitude that is single and continuous (267a 2225). Since circular locomotion is regular its mover (the prime mover) is unchanging, provoking
movement as the object of desire (267b 2-5; see also Metaphysics 1072b 4: kinei de hos
eromenon). Aristotle continues that the prime mover operates at the circumference of the
universe, although not in a place (267b 9).
Two things are shown by the primacy of J2bQm in the economy of kinesis. First, one
cannot reduce the reference to space in the Aristotelian discourse on time: any iteration of
kinesis or metabole refers to J2bQm as the prime instance that regulates its economy. Thus in the
Aristotelian text time Is haunted by space. Secondly, any iteration of .QbQm refers to circular

.Q!J.Q.ra, and through it to the prime mover. Thus the economy of kinesis is oriented to the prime
mover so that .Q!J.Q.ra, which installs an irreducible spatial moment in the economy of kinesis,
and hence of time, is in turn oriented to the reduction of space in pure self-presence outside
space (and time). In Derrida's terms, time is here submitted to the system of presence oriented
to the prime mover. Time and space are as desirous of being reduced.

To return to Heidegger after this long excursus, we see that he acknowledges the
economy of translation of proteron kai husteron by acknowledging the "wavering" in Aristotle, yet
he tries to regulate the undecidability by means of a scheme which opposes the original to the
vulgar, the properly understood to the misunderstood. As we have pointed out repeatedly in this
chapier in referring back to Chapter II, this attempt is caught up in the Sinnsfrage. The "wavering"
which Heidegger finds in Aristotle allows him to enter the discussion of the time-line analogy. The
economy of kinesis as directed to the primary term .QbQm seems to set up an analogy of the. now
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to a point: phora is continuous along a line, with points dividing the line. Similar1y, time, as
number of kinesis, would seem to be continuous and divided by the now. As Derrida shows in
"Ousla and Gramme,• this relation between continuous and divided can only be settled by the
dynamis-energeia scheme. Here division by points is only potential (thus an infinity of points, the
bad infinite, exists only potentially; this is Aristotle's answer to Zeno's paradox of the tortoise and
Achilles). The good infinite is the circular motion caused by the prime mover, as we saw in our
discussion of Theta 8. Similar1y, time is analogous with the line only accidentally.
This is the crucial argument for Derrida. That the now is limit only accidentally
means that the gramme is captured as gramme in act. Thus time is submitted to system of desire
for presence, but is of course also subtracted in that very gesture, for the effacement of the
trace that allows for presence-the prime mover is here seen as a mark that has separated itself
52

in theological illusion --can also be read from the inscription of presence.
At this point in the text Heidegger moves to discuss briefly his fourth topic, that of
the now as same and different {349). Now as we recall from Chapter I, Derrida makes a great
deal of the auto-affective structure of the now. Heidegger, on the other hand, brushes over this
topic in little over a page. I will deal with the importance of this difference In emphases later.
Briefly, Heidegger shows how the now can be seen as a limit only accidentally. Nows are both
different, and as now, the same (350). Heidegger explains this via a distinction of essence and
existence whereby the essence of the now is to be always the same, while its existence is
different (350).
We now move to the fifth point, concerning the numerical character of time. As we
recall, this Is also one of Derrida's foci. Here Heidegger asks: Why does Aristotle stress the
numerical quality of time? He answers his own question: To avoid the misunderstood analogy
of time with the line. According to Heidegger, the spatial interpretation-that is, time understood
as a line-is a misunderstanding: "This talk of time as a sequence of nows should not be
misunderstood and transferred (Obertagen} to the spatial in the sense (in dem Sinne] by which
one says time is a line, a series of points" (351; translation modified). According to the by now
well-known strategy Heidegger here tries to manage the economy by identifying some Slnne as
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proper, others as misunderstandings. The Sinnsfrage. of course, arises here, but so does the
structure of the metaphor re-mark in Heidegger's use of Obertragen. Now, Ober-tragen is a
possible German translation [Obersetzung] of meta-pherein. As of course is "translation" or
"0bersetzung. •
Heidegger establishes his ruling out of the simple application of the time-line
analogy by his Interpretation of the now. The now Is not a point, he claims, because it is both
beginning and end: ·seinem Wesen nach Anfang und Ende 1st" (351). Thus the now as such
refers to the no-longer and not-yet: "In the now as such there is already present [liegt schon] a
reference [Verwelsung] to the no-longer and the not-yer (351 ). Because of this reference to what
it is not the now has dimension within Itself, Heidegger claims: •Es hat in sich selbst die
Dimension, die Erstreckung nach elnem Noch-nicht und Nicht-mehr" (351) Now Webb claims
Heidegger's characterization of the now as transition anticipates Derrrida's inscriptions of "trace"
or "differance..s3 To be sure, the way the now is described as constituted by reference to what
it is not is the first step in Derrida's discussion of the trace in Hussert. But this negativity is still
understood with reference to presence. The past and future are understood as negative modes
of presence.
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Derrida's point is that this understanding is only possible by the erasure of the

trace of radical alterity, of absolute past and future, a past and present that could never be
understood by reference to the present, and hence could never be called "not-yet" or •nolonger. •
As we rejoin Heidegger we see a crucial terminological choice that will pull the
discussion of the now into the same sort of (haunted) economy of undecidability we have
explored above. Heidegger wants to purify the now of spatial understanding and thus
delegitimize the time-line analogy. In the process of doing so he elucidates the dimensioncharacter of the now, and thus claims the now has the character of transition: "Because of this
dimensional content [Dimensionsgehaltes) the now has within itself the character of a transition
[in sich den Charakter eines Oberganges]" (352; Heidegger's italics). With the use of Obergang
we are led to see here a spatial /temporal undecidability. The mark Obergang, as we have
seen, is "spatial"-that is, it can be Iterated within a generic/specific undecidable economy of
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metabole and ..Q.!J.Qm. Now in this passage Heidegger also iterates it in the "temporal" economy
of the now. The possibility of its iteration in both economies haunts any iteration of Obergang.
Let us follow the way this haunting makes possible the analogy of time and the line that
Heidegger tries to rule out via his use of Obergang.
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As transition, the now Is both beginning and end. Time is a number as determining
as transition the point's extremes (354). Here we run into a textual controversy: Heidegger's note
four says simply nRoss. • But the Ross edition of Aristotle's Physics was first published in 1936.
Hofstadter speculates Heidegger may have used Bekker or Pratl.
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The difference is this: At 220a

16 Ross reads tes grammes while Bekker and Prantl read tes autes, referring to 220a 15 hos tes
autes stigmes. Ross writes in his commentary that the reading of tes autes, as referring to .!IDi
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stigmas, point, "makes no sense. •

The measurement of motion [ObergangJ by time is made possible by time's (now's)
Obergangscharakter (357). Here again we see Obergang as undecidably spatial and temporal.
Such undecidability is the condition for the analogy of time and the line. The time discourse
cannot be purified; the analogy asserts itself ever and again. As one can read in Kant, In the
Transcendental Aesthetic.
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We must acknowledge In the mark Obergang an irreducible reference

to possible inscription in spatial use.
The sixth topic can now be addressed, that of time and the soul (357). Here the
lnterpretatioi:i focuses on the famous phrase: hama gar kinesees aisthanometha kai chronou.
Heidegger discusses this relation of time and the soul in terms of an opening to the discussion
of Casein's temporality as grounding ordinarily-conceived time. We can perhaps see an opening
to space in general in the splitting of self-affection here. Heidegger writes of the passage of
subjective states: "The actions are not intrinsically spatial but they pass over into one another,
one changes into the other" (358). The German needs to be read in its entirety: "Die Verhaltungen sind in sich nicht raumlich, aber sie gehen ineinander Ober, eine schlagt in die andere
um.• Here we might begin to see Obergang and Umschlag as undecidable-or haunted--terms
betraying the opening to space in general in the self-affective sphere of pure subjectivity. These
hints would have to be rigorously read against the Derridean analyses in Speech and
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Phenomena to which I refer in Chapter I.
At the end of his interpretation Heidegger stresses that the key to properly
understanding Aristotle is the proper understanding of akolouthein: ontological connection of
founding which subsists among time, motion, continuity, and dimension. Aristotle approaches
the mode of measuring time in just the way it is prescribed in the natural understanding of time
and In the natural experience of time Itself. Because of this, Heidegger hopes to be able to pass
from his interpretation of Aristotle to a discussion of ihe original concept of temporality" (361 ).

Comparison of Heidegger and Derrida's Readings

of Aristotle
We have seen how Heidegger concentrates on two major points among the six
topics he discusses. Those two are the proper understanding of akolouthein which grants the
proper ontological order of concepts, and the economy of translation of proteron kai husteron
as "before and after" and "earlier and later" which reveals the relation of original temporality to
vulgar time. Making these points entails overturning three Aristotelian economies, overturnings
themselves limited by the Sinnsfrage.
Derrida, on the other hand, focuses upon the aporetic structure of Aristotle's
treatise. For Derrida, Aristotle does not solve the aporia of time's Being, nor does he thematize
the determination of Being as ousia that sets up the aporia, although he does solve the aporia
of time's~. However the solution to the latter aporia, via the dynamis/energeia schema, is
governed by the prior determination of Being as .2Yi!a., that is, by the evasion of the question of
the determination of time's Being that precisely sets up the first, unsolved, aporla of time's
Being.
The major difference in the two interpretations occurs at 220a 16. Derrida's reading

of "line• enables him to go on to define time as the name of the limits within which gramme (the
possibility of the trace) is effaced by its determination via the system of potentiality/actuality as
the gramme in act. Heidegger's reading of "point• enables him to exploit the extra-metaphysical
moment of the now's openness, but only on the basis of determining a proper Sinn for certain
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expressions. Heidegger insists on the proper understanding of Aristotle's time terms as nonspatial--thus leading us· to see original temporality as extra-metaphysical-as opposed to the
misunderstanding of these terms as spatial, which would set up a metaphysical spatialized time.
Nevertheless, he does set up the "wavering· in Aristotle's thesis. Derrida, on the other hand, tries
to articulate the economy of possible interpretatipn on which a metaphysical interpretation might
draw, but which also includes that which will disrupt the metaphysical interpretation. Hence
Derrida articulates the full economy of time, and thereby predicts the haunting of time by space.

Conclusion: The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and
The Eooch of Being and Time
Let us return at this point to the question implicitly posed In Chapter I. As we recall,
Derrida sets up "Ousia and Gramme· as an interrogation of Being and Time in terms of its
"epoch(e). • At this point we might ask in what sense Basic Problems falls under the constraints
operative in the epoch of Being and Time, that is, to what extent does it fail to pose the graphic
of the trace? Can one not claim, as Webb does, that the now as transition poses the question
of the trace and hence of time/space? Perhaps. But here one might have to have recourse to
a distinction developed by Derrida in "Vio-lence and Metaphysics" --discussing a similar point with
regard to Levinas-between inscription of a trace and thematization of the trace (a thematization
that ends up thematizing the withdrawal of the trace from thematization). In beginning an
inscription of the trace in the Obergang-character of the now, a character which we have seen
is haunted by its possible iteration in spatial contexts (thus broaching the problematic of
time/space), Heidegger still insists on the primordiality of time, of calling ecstatic temporality
"original time.• So even though the key term, Obergang, is undecidably "spatial" and ''temporal"
Heidegger attempts to manage its economy or settle the undecidability. We have seen how such
undecidability can only be settled by appeal to a proper Sinn; but we have also seen how this
poses the Sinnsfrage. So we have demonstrated the functioning of an irreducible spatial moment
in the economy of time in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology as well as in Being and Time.
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NOTES

1.All references in this chapter to Basic Problems will be made in the text, with the German
pagination only, since Hofstadter's translation carries the German pagination as well.
2."Nachwort des Herausgegebers; Grundprobleme. pp. 471-73.
Preface to Hofstadter's
translation.

See also the Translator's

3.1 use W.D. Ross' Greek text of the Physics in the Oxford aassical Text series (1950). Many
English translations are available; I use Aristotle's Physics by Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell,
Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1969). The only published text that addresses at any length Heidegger's reading of Aristotle in Basic Problems is that of E. Martineau, "Conception vulgaire et
conception aristotelicienne du temps: Note sur 'Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie' de
Heidegger(@ 19)," Archives de Philosophie, 43 (1980), 99-120. David Webb has produced an
unpublished MA thesis from the University of Essex entitled Time and the Trace: Aristotle:
Heidegger: Derrida that is the only detailed treatment of the relation between the readings of
Aristotle in Basic Problems and "Ousia and Gramme.·
4.Due to the typographic limitations of my word-processing system I must transliterate Greek
terms. I shall use an • e • to indicate an §!§ as opposed to • e • for an epsilon, and an • 6 • to
indicate an omega as opposed to • o • for an omicron.
5.Herman Rappaport, in his Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language, claims
Basic Problems is •a conservative version of Beina and Time• (p. 5). I will show that Basic
Problems and Being and Time operate under the same formal constraints: what I call the
Sinnsfrage as it instanciates Derrida's "formal rule: Rappaport's analysis of Basic Problems
occurs in Chapter 2 of his book. Some of his observations overtap my own, but since our
projects are so different I will not mark every time we agree or disagree on a particular point in
Heidegger's treatment of Aristotle. See my Introduction, note 21, above.
6.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 39. See Thomas Sheehan, "Time and Being, 1925-27," and John
Sallis, "Radical Phenomenology and Fundamental Ontology,• Research in Phenomenoloay VI
(1976), 139-49, and "Imagination and the Meaning of Being,• Heidegger et l'idee de la pMnomenoloaie. ed. F. Volpi (Kluwer, 1988).
7.Tina Chanter brought these questions to my attention at the Heidegger Circle at Notre Dame
in May 1989.
a.See the untitled first page of Sein und Zeit, as well as Heidegger's later statement in his letter
to Richardson.
9.Heidegger, Die Metaphysische AnfangsgrOnde der Loaik im Ausqang van Leibniz. (Frankfurt
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978); English translation by Michael Heim, The Metaphysical
Foundations of Logic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).
10.Rappaport, Heidegger and Derrida, p. 5.
11.Sallis points out that Basic Problems avoids repeating the death analyses of Being and Time
where the finite {endlich) nature of authentic temporallty is sketched out. See "Radical
Phenomenology and Fundamental Ontology.•
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12.0ne might very well ask here about the relation of this demand to Heidegger's desire to
ground Dasein's spatiality on its temporality. See p. 168 above.
13.I discussed the difference between the Heideggerian treatment and the Derridean notion of
dissemination in Chapter II.
14.Sallis, "Radical Phenomenology and Fundamental Ontology."
15.Martlneau notes the way Derrida calls attention to Aristotle's phrase dia ton exoterikOn logon
which precedes the laying out of the aporiai. Both Derrida and Martineau suggest that Aristotle
may not have been so caught up in the vulgarity he analyzes as Heidegger might seem to
suggest at times.
16.See, for instance, Basic Problems, p. 37.
17.W.D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 4.
18.See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 22-23.
19.ln 1939 Heidegger will compose a detailed reading of Physics 8, 1 entitled "Ober das Wesen
und Begriff der Phusls. Aristoteles, Physik B, 1"; reprinted in Wegmarken; English translation by
Thomas Sheehan "On the Essence and Concept of Phusis. Aristotle, Physics B, 1," Man and
World, 9, no. 3 (August 1976).
20.See, inter alla. the "Origin of the Work of Art," Nietzsche. "Letter on Humanism," and "The
Question Concerning Technology.•
21.At this point in the text kinesls and metabole are not yet distinguished, although they will
becomes so later In the Phvsics. See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 45-48.
22.See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, p. 15ff, for his discussion of book 7.
23.Perhaps no other work of antiquity has provoked the amount of commentary surrounding the
Physics. Among the most quoted classical commentaries are those of Slmplicius and Thomas
Aquinas. Among twentieth-century commentaries see among others J. F. Callahan, Four Views
on Time in Ancient Philosophy (Cmabridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948); J. Moreau..!,&
temps et l'espace selon Aristote (Padua: Atenore, 1965); V. Goldschmidt Temps tragigue et
temps physique chez Aristote (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982); D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics; H. Apostle,
Aristotle's Physics; P. Aubenque, Le probleme de l'~tre chez Aristote. A useful short treatment
from the analytic tradition Is David Bostock, "Aristotle's Account of Time; Phronesis, 25 (1980),
148-69. Other analytic treatments include F.D. Miller, "Aristotle on the reality of time,• Archiv fur
Geschichte der Philosophle, 56 (1974), 132-55; G. E. L Owen, "Aristotle on Time,· in Motion and
Time. Space and Matter: Interrelations in the History of Philosophy and Science, ed. P.
Machamer and A. Turnbull (Ohio, 1976), pp. 3-25; and S. Shoemaker, "Time without change,"
Journal of Philosophy, 66 (1969), 363-81.
24.I noted in Chapter 2 how Heidegger sets up Being and Time with the evocation of an aporia
of an aporia, as he repeats the term Keinesweg on the first page.
25.Martineau, p. 101. My translation.
26.Heldegger, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung,• Holzwege; tr. Hegel's Concept of Experience (New
York: Harper & Row, 1970); See also Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition.
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27.Heidegger will also claim a similar status for kinesis in his lecture course on Metaphysics
Theta. Heidegger, Aristoteles Metaphysik Theta 1-3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft, GA
33 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981 ), p. 81. See also Walter Brogan, "Heidegger's
Interpretation of Aristotle: The Finitude of Being," Research in Phenomenology. XIV (1984), 24958.
28.As Derrida shows in "Ousia and Gramme," and as I have discussed in Chapter 1, the Greek
hama, as undecidably spatial/temporal, is best left untranslated.
29.See Kelly Mink's unpublished PhD dissertation.
30.See Pierre Aubenque, Le probleme de l'etre chez Aristote, for the problems with a
straightforward bringing of this phrase under the rubric of the "analogy of Being." Aubenque
claims the analogy of attribution used by Scholastics to discuss the pros hen relation of
categories is a later imposition that has no counterpart in Aristotle, and tends to efface the
aporetic tension of Aristotle's text. Aubenque claims to show an irreducible plurality of categories
that can neither be brought under a genus, nor ordered by an analogy of attribution. Thus
ontology is an impossible science, or at best an infinite task.
31.Derrida, Maraes, pp. 295-96/247-48.
32. Metaphysics 4, 1006b 8.
33.See Leonard Lawlor's fine discussion "Dialectic and lterability: The Confrontation between Paul
Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida," Philosophy Today (Fall 1988).
34.Derrida explores these issues in "Signature Event Context" "Limited Inc" and the "Afterword:
Toward an Ethic of Discussion" all found in the new edition of Limited Inc.
35.See here Jacob Klein Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1969) for a detailed analysis of the Greek concept of number and its relations to the
operation of counting. Briefly stated, for the Greeks a number was always the number of
counted things.
36.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 104.
37.And here my discourse falls prey to the Sinnsfrage.
38.Topos, as we can read in Physics IV.4, is the Immediately surrounding envelope of a thing.
See 21 Ob 34-211 a 1: "axioumen de ton topon einai proton men periechon ekeino au tapes esti,
kai med en tau pragmatos. •
39.Here I rely on the Derridean distinction between "indifference" or "indeterminacy" and
"undecidability." What is undecidable oscillates between two definite possibilities. See the
"Afterword" to Limited Inc.
40.Ross notes that although Aristotle uses kinesis and metabole interchangeably through Book
4, he later distinguishes between them. See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 7-8.
41.Apostle translates kuriotate as "most independent.· One of its meanings lets kurios means
"lordly." I prefer "most important." See here Udell and Scott.
42.Hofstadter has: "The simplest form of motion, and the one most frequently used.by Aristotle
in his analysis of motion, of transition, is phora, transition from one place (tapes) to another,
change of place." The original reads: Die einfachste und van Aristoteles meistens in der
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Bewegungsanalyse beigezogene Form d~.r Bewegung, des Obergangs, ist der Umschlag, die
Ortsveranderung. • Hofstadter misplaces Ubergang and omits Umschlag.
43.Physics B 1, 192b 13-1S.
44.Heidegger uses Ausdehnung to translate extensio in the discussion of Descartes in Sein und
Zeit. E.g., p. 90.
45.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 369.
46.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 324: •streng genommen bedeutet Sinn das Woraufhin des
primaren Entwurfs des Verstehens von Sein:
47.Ross speaks of a •quasi-megethos• of generation and destruction, as well as alteration. Ross,
Aristotle's Physics, p. 64.
48.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 329. In italics in the original.
49.Derrida, "White Mythology,• Margins. p. 301/2S2-S3.
SO.The psuche is a unmoved mover for living things as self-movers, according to Ross' reading
of 2S9b 2. See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, p. 91. See also Plato's text on the psucM as selfmoving In the Phaedrus.
s1.Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 91-2.
S2.Here we might, with much additional work, begin to see something like an irreducible
reference to space in the being-generated of the thing by physis. This brings us to a preliminary
sketch of a huge issue to which I can only allude. Is Heidegger hert1 overlooking the irreducible
spatiality of Dasein's life with others? Here we would have to investigate Heidegger's later essay
on ..PhY.§1§ in Aristotle's Physics B 1. There he shows how the being by ..PhY.§1§ is ·on the way" to
another. But for Aristotle this birth is a re-production of the same {ftidos=species) with all the
male privilege of Aristotle's semenology as developed in De Generatione Animalium. In the
Physics we read how eidos is motionless, the first mover in the case of generation (2S7b). But
generation as well is referred to space via the heliotrope in the economy of time. Aristotle insists
that~ is necessary for generation-and not just the movement of the parents: he writes that
"both man and the sun beget man• (194b 14). We should recall here the sun's role at~
Generatione et Corruptione 11.10 336a 1Sff. Could we not here hazard the notion of another
stretching, crossing the temporal Erstreckung of Dasein, a reference to another in the field of
natality, that is, a reference to the (m)other? Here we would have to discuss Levinas' notion of
fecundity and radical alterity in Totality and Infinity. as well as Arendt's discussion in The Human
Condition of human plurality and politics as conditioned by the radical novelty brought about by
each birth. Here we might begin a reading of the irreducibility of space as a trace of radical
alterity.
S3.See Derrida's "Double Session," in Dissemination as well as Gasche's discussion in The Tain
of the Mirror.
S4.David Webb, unpublished MA thesis, University of Essex.
SS.Recall here the epigraph to ·ousia and Gramme: as I discussed it in Chapter 1.
56. "With the aid of the now I can mark a limit ... [butJ The now Is not limit, but number, not~
but arithmos" (353). Number is not bound to what it numbers. This non-boundedness was later
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interpreted by Kant as "form of intuition" (353). See here Rappaport's analysis. Here Heidegger
says just what Derrida says: that Aristotle anticipates Kant.
57.Hofstadter note in his translation, p.233, note 4.
58.Ross, Aristotle's Physics, Commentary, p. 602. See also Webb's discussion.
59.Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Derrida points out this passage in a note to "Ousia and
Gramme."
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